In August 2024, the Biden administration asked the Supreme Court to partially lift lower-court injunctions blocking its new Title IX regulations, which expanded protections against sex discrimination in education. The justices refused. Less than eight months later, the Trump administration asked the same court to intervene after a federal judge ordered the Department of Education to continue funding grants that it had terminated. This time, the government prevailed.
Both applications came from the Department of Education, both sought emergency relief from lower-court orders, and both were decided by the same nine justices. But their outcomes differed entirely.
The comparison raises a broader question about the Supreme Court’s treatment of presidential power: Has the court given Donald Trump a more favorable reception than Joe Biden? The two cases might seem to suggest yes, but they illustrate why answering that question is difficult. They concerned different policies, legal claims, and procedural circumstances, each of which could influence how the justices responded.
Across the emergency applications examined, Trump has an apparent advantage when his administration seeks relief. During his first term, the government prevailed in 28 of 36 substantively decided applications, or 78%, in the published full-term tally. During his second term, the figure rises to 27 of 33, or 82%. Under Biden, it was 10 of 15, or 67%. But that difference becomes considerably smaller when the comparison expands to include cases in which the government was defending its actions against applications filed by others (rather than bringing the application itself). At the level of distinct controversies, executive success was approximately 75% under Trump I, 74% under Biden, and 77% under Trump II.
So what explains these numbers?
Part of the explanation is visible in the composition of the docket. Immigration accounts for 12 identified government-applicant applications during Trump’s first term and 14 during his second, compared with four under Biden. Trump’s second-term docket also includes 10 personnel and removal applications involving presidential control over executive-branch officials and operations. Biden’s affirmative applications were more concentrated in education and public health, while Trump’s first-term docket featured a larger share of immigration, federal execution litigation, foreign-affairs, and census disputes. Comparing the administrations therefore also means comparing different mixtures of executive actions, legal disputes, and lower-court interventions.
The data
To separate these relationships, I examined Supreme Court emergency applications involving general federal executive actions from January 20, 2017, through October 12, 2026. The primary dataset contains 165 identified applications grouped into 109 distinct controversies, with 93 controversies producing determinate outcomes. Applications are classified by administration, whether the federal government sought or opposed emergency relief, substantive issues, policy direction, lower-court circumstances, and disposition. Related applications are grouped into controversies so that repeated litigation over a single executive policy does not disproportionately influence the aggregate results. Applications withdrawn, dismissed as moot, deferred, or otherwise unresolved are excluded from the success-rate calculations. Individual justice positions are reconstructed from the court’s orders, treating justices who did not actively dissent as joining the court’s ruling.
The key question is how much of Trump’s advantage survives closer comparisons. Does the difference persist when the government is the party requesting relief, when the same substantive issue is involved, or when the court confronts similar lower-court restrictions? Do particular policies receive greater support regardless of who occupies the White House? And do individual justices consistently favor presidential authority, or does their support change with the administration and the substance of its actions? Examining these distinctions provides a more precise account of presidential success on the emergency docket than simply the overall win rates.
A presidential advantage that depends on who is asking
The first important distinction in comparing Trump and Biden is the position each administration occupied when its disputes reached the Supreme Court. During both Trump presidencies, the federal government overwhelmingly appeared as the applicant, asking the justices to intervene after a lower-court ruling had restricted an executive action. Under Biden, the pattern was nearly reversed. His administration was much more frequently defending an existing policy against an emergency application brought by someone else.
The difference is substantial. Of the 39 core applications involving Trump’s first administration, the government was the applicant in 34 (that is, 87% of these). Under Trump II, it was the applicant in 42 of 45 (93%). Under Biden, the government brought only 18 of 81 applications (22%); the other 63 were brought by challengers to federal executive action.
That difference changes what an executive victory means. When the government files an emergency application, success generally requires persuading the justices to alter a lower-court ruling. When the government is the respondent, success may mean convincing the court to deny the challenger’s application, allowing the existing policy or lower-court arrangement to remain in place.
As noted earlier, the difference becomes apparent in the outcomes. Among applications in which the federal government sought relief and the court issued a substantive disposition, Trump prevailed in 25 of 33 identified applications during his first term (76%), and in 28 of 36 (78%) under the published full-term tally, which includes three additional favorable rulings. He prevailed in 27 of 33 during his second term (82%). Biden prevailed in 10 of 15 (67%). The Trump administrations therefore had a higher success rate when seeking emergency intervention, with the difference especially pronounced during Trump’s second term (at least so far). The relatively small number of Biden applications, however, limits how precisely the extent of that advantage can be estimated.
The comparison looks different when every distinct executive-action controversy receives equal weight, regardless of which side requested relief or how many applications the controversy generated. The executive prevailed in 18 of 24 determinate Trump I controversies (75%), 29 of 39 Biden controversies (74%), and 23 of 30 Trump II controversies (77%). At this level, the three administrations look remarkably similar. Biden’s overall record is considerably stronger than his applicant-only record because his administration frequently prevailed when challengers sought to interfere with its policies. Indeed, among the resolved Biden controversies initiated by challengers, the president prevailed in 21 of 27, or 78% of them.
This paints different portraits of the court’s rulings. Trump enjoyed greater success securing affirmative emergency relief, while Biden’s frequent success defending executive actions brought his overall record close to those of both Trump administrations. The distinction is important, although it leaves the central explanation unresolved. The presidents did not arrive with interchangeable applications, and the legal burden of obtaining emergency intervention depends on more than the identity of the applicant. The next question is therefore what kinds of executive actions each administration was bringing before the justices.
Three administrations, three different emergency dockets
The presidential comparison becomes more revealing when the applications are separated by subject matter. Unsurprisingly, Trump and Biden approached the same Supreme Court with substantially different kinds of disputes, reflecting differences in executive policy, the lower court challenges those policies encountered, and the kinds of relief each administration sought.
Across the 94 identified core applications filed by the federal government, immigration is the largest recurring category under both Trump administrations. During Trump’s first term, 12 of 34 (35%) government applications concerned immigration, citizenship, or border policy. Eight more involved federal execution litigation, with seven favorable dispositions for the government, while foreign-affairs and elections/census disputes accounted for four applications each. The first Trump administration’s emergency docket was thus heavily concentrated in questions involving entry restrictions, immigration enforcement, federal executions, and other exercises of federal authority.
That composition changes during Trump’s second term. Immigration remains prominent, accounting for 14 of 42 (33%) government applications, but personnel and removal disputes emerge as a second major category, with 10 applications. Together, those two areas comprise nearly 60% of Trump II’s government-applicant docket. The personnel matters include disputes over presidential authority to remove officials serving on independent federal agencies and the ability of lower courts to reinstate those officials while litigation proceeds. These cases place questions about presidential control of the executive branch more directly before the justices than much of the first-term docket.
Biden’s applicant docket looks different. Of the 18 core applications brought by his administration, five concerned education and five involved health or public-health policy. Those 10 applications account for more than half of the government’s affirmative emergency requests. Biden’s education disputes included protecting student-loan programs and Title IX (sex discrimination) regulations, while his health-related applications included federal vaccination requirements and FDA regulation. Immigration appears in four applications, but the policies at issue frequently differ in direction from Trump’s. Two additional applications concerned federal firearms regulation, rather than capital punishment. The relative prominence of these categories means that comparing presidential success also means comparing very different statutory frameworks and substantive policy choices.
The contrast becomes even more pronounced when the applications filed against each administration are considered. Of the 63 applications in which Biden’s government was the respondent, 25 (40%) concerned health or public health and 23 (37%) involved environmental or energy regulation. Together, those categories account for approximately three-quarters of the applications challenging Biden-era executive actions. Many also arose from repeated challenges to the same policies. The OSHA vaccination-or-testing standard alone generated 15 applications, while several EPA regulations produced additional clusters of related filings.
The administrations’ different portfolios provide a plausible explanation for part of the presidential disparity, but they also raise a more precise question. If Trump wins more frequently because his emergency applications involve policies more compatible with the court’s preferences, we should expect the presidential gap to vary across issue areas. Immigration provides one test, although the administrations often sought opposite policy outcomes. Health, education, and other overlapping categories offer additional comparisons. Examining those differences helps distinguish the court’s response to a particular president from its response to the legal policies the president asks it to protect.
The differences are clearer where the cases overlap
The different composition of each administration’s emergency docket makes the presidential comparison difficult, but, as noted, it also provides an opportunity to examine the areas where their cases overlap. If the justices were simply inclined to favor one president over another, we would expect a relatively consistent difference across subject areas. Instead, the size and direction of the presidential advantage change considerably depending on the issue.
Immigration provides the most pronounced contrast. Among substantively decided government-applicant applications, Trump prevailed in 11 of 12 immigration matters during his first term, or 92%. His second administration has prevailed in 11 of 12, also 92%. Biden, by comparison, succeeded in two of four, or 50%. These are application-level figures, and related cases sometimes concern the same underlying policy. Nevertheless, they identify immigration as an area in which the Trump administrations achieved considerably greater success than Biden when seeking emergency intervention.
One of the closest comparisons involves the Migrant Protection Protocols, better known as Remain in Mexico – which required non-Mexican asylum seeks to stay in Mexico while their case was processed. In March 2020, the first Trump administration asked the Supreme Court to stay a lower-court injunction restricting the program. The justices granted the application, allowing the policy to remain operative while litigation continued. Justice Sonia Sotomayor would have denied the request. In Aug. 2021, the Biden administration sought emergency relief from a different injunction requiring continued implementation of the same program after Biden had attempted to terminate it. This time, the court denied the government’s application, with Justices Stephen Breyer, Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan indicating that they would have granted relief.
In denying Biden’s application, the court specifically questioned whether his administration was likely to succeed in defending the explanation it had supplied for rescinding the program under federal law. The later merits proceedings further complicate the comparison. In June 2022, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit’s judgment and held that federal immigration law did not require the administration to continue Remain in Mexico. The earlier emergency denial therefore cannot be treated as a final judicial endorsement of Trump’s policy over Biden’s.
Other issue areas produce different patterns. Biden prevailed in all four substantively decided health and public-health applications, including challenges involving federal vaccination requirements and FDA regulation. Trump I won one of two such applications, while Trump II won its single substantively decided application in this category. Biden’s success in health disputes stands in contrast to the immigration results and suggests that a general presidential ranking conceals areas in which a Democratic administration received substantial emergency relief.
Education points in the opposite direction. Biden lost all three substantively decided education applications in the core sample, while Trump II won both of its applications. The Biden cases included Title IX and student-loan repayment disputes; Trump’s concerned education grants and executive-branch restructuring. The outcomes differ sharply, although, once again, the underlying legal questions provide limited grounds for a direct comparison.
Federal execution litigation and firearms regulation offer a different contrast: Biden prevailed in both applications involving the federal ghost-gun rule, while Trump I prevailed in seven of eight applications concerning federal executions. These results arose from substantially different uses of federal authority rather than comparable criminal-law disputes.
The results then reveal a pattern more complicated than a uniform preference for Trump. His immigration success is significant, particularly during his first term, but Biden also achieved consistent victories in certain health and firearms disputes. Moreover, the number of genuinely comparable controversies is smaller than the number of applications suggests. Multiple travel-ban applications contribute to the Trump I immigration total, three birthright-citizenship applications contribute to Trump II, and repeated challenges to the same vaccination or firearms rule affect the other categories.
The strongest conclusion from these comparisons is that subject matter makes a notable difference, although it operates alongside the substantive direction of the policy and the particular relief being requested. The presidential averages combine cases involving different statutes, different lower-court orders, and sometimes opposing positions on the same federal program. To determine whether these differences reflect a general attitude toward executive authority or preferences concerning particular policies, it is also necessary to examine how the individual justices respond as the administration changes.
Same justices, different presidents
The presidential comparisons look different when examined justice by justice. A general preference for executive authority would suggest that at least some justices consistently support the federal government, regardless of which president occupies the White House. Yet again, the voting patterns reveal something more complicated. Several justices shift dramatically between administrations, while others display considerably more stable support for executive action.
Justice Clarence Thomas provides one of the clearest examples. He supported the Trump administration’s position in 83% of the substantively decided applications examined from Trump’s first term and 94% during his second, compared with 41% under Biden. Alito’s corresponding rates were 83%, 94%, and 57%. Sotomayor shows almost the reverse pattern, supporting Biden’s executive position in 93% of applications but Trump’s in 27% during his first term and 11% during his second. Kagan’s support similarly rises to 93% under Biden, compared with 43% under Trump I and 17% under Trump II. Jackson supported the Biden executive position in 89% of her eligible observations, compared with 6% under Trump II.
These differences are considerably smaller for some of the conservative justices. Roberts supported the executive position in 76% of Trump I applications, 73% under Biden, and 78% under Trump II. Kavanaugh’s corresponding figures were 79%, 70%, and 78%. Gorsuch occupied an intermediate position, supporting Trump in 83% of first-term applications and 83% during his second term, compared with 62% under Biden. Barrett’s record is also comparatively balanced, with 75% support under Biden and 78% under Trump II. (The four emergency applications she heard under Trump I provide too little evidence for a meaningful comparison.)
These patterns complicate the proposition that the justices are simply divided between supporters and opponents of strong presidential power. Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson exhibit substantial differences depending on the administration whose position is before them. Roberts and Kavanaugh, by comparison, are relatively consistent across presidents. The broader finding is then that presidential identity alone tells relatively little about aggregate executive success, but it is strongly associated with how several individual justices respond.
The Trump advantage?
The Supreme Court’s emergency docket provides evidence of an advantage for Trump, but a more qualified one than the raw outcomes might suggest. Both Trump administrations were more successful than Biden when the federal government requested emergency intervention. Yet when applications are grouped into underlying controversies and cases brought against the government are included, the administrations’ overall success rates are similar. Much of the apparent difference depends on whether the president is asking the justices to intervene or defending an action already taken.
The differences also depend substantially on not just the administration itself, but what that administration is trying to accomplish. Trump’s immigration victories contrast with Biden’s success in health-related disputes, while the same justices frequently change their support for executive action across presidencies. Some, particularly Roberts and Kavanaugh, show relatively consistent support for executive positions. Others display sharp differences that align more closely with the administrations and policies before them.
These findings complicate the notion of a Supreme Court uniformly committed to Trump on the emergency docket or simply strong presidential power. Executive authority receives substantial protection, but that protection varies with the legal issue, the government’s procedural position, and the particular justices. The more revealing question may therefore be which exercises of presidential power command the court’s support, and which justices are willing to depart from their usual alignments when those powers are tested.