Barak M. Seener is an associate fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, founder of Strategic Intelligentia and co-presenter of “The Geo Godfather Wars Podcast.” He can be followed on X at @barakseener.
(Oct. 25, 2026 / JNS)
Saudi Arabia’s military vulnerability and its efforts to protect its economic future leave it exposed to Tehran’s ballistic missiles, drones and terrorist proxies, including Yemen’s Houthis. Iran and its proxies have the capacity to threaten Saudi oil infrastructure, shipping routes and critical civilian facilities.
Iran launched attacks on Aramco’s oil installations in Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019, as well as the Ras Tanura refinery in March 2026. Iran has also attacked oil and gas infrastructure and data centers across the Gulf.
The Houthis’ recent territorial advances in Yemen pose an increasingly direct threat to Saudi Arabia’s national security, economic ambitions and regional influence. Their growing control of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline and strategic access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait give them greater leverage over maritime trade and Saudi energy exports, while their arsenal of Iranian-linked ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones enables them to threaten critical infrastructure and major population centers.
This has created a strategic dilemma for Saudi Arabia. It must deter further Houthi expansion without triggering another costly Yemeni war that could jeopardize its energy infrastructure and trade routes. Moreover, the Iranian and Houthi threats could undermine the kingdom’s Vision 2030 economic transformation, which depends on attracting foreign investment, developing tourism and positioning Saudi Arabia as a stable economic hub.
Riyadh has also realized that rapprochement with Iran alone cannot guarantee its security. Iranian missile and drone capabilities pose a strategic threat to the kingdom’s sovereignty, energy exports and economic transformation. Riyadh must therefore contend with a strategic paradox: While it seeks to constrain Iran’s regional influence and missile capabilities, it also fears that an all-out confrontation could trigger further attacks, disrupt energy exports and destabilize the wider region.
The limits of the Mecca pact
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement has already exposed a gap between the symbolism of collective Muslim solidarity and the practical realities of military assistance. Signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey in August 2026, the pact stipulates that an armed attack on one member should be treated as an attack on all. Yet when Iran-backed Houthi forces intensified attacks on Saudi cities and energy infrastructure, neither Ankara nor Islamabad initially committed to direct combat operations.
Pakistan quickly backtracked, saying it had not discussed any military response, while Turkey said its role would be defensive, focusing on air defense, electronic warfare, intelligence and technical assistance rather than offensive strikes in Yemen.
The kingdom does not have the luxury of relying on a strategic alliance that aspires to rival the Abraham Accords but whose limitations have already been exposed. A mutual-defense commitment does not automatically translate into a willingness to fight. It is Israel—not the Mecca Accords—that has come to Saudi Arabia’s assistance.
Saudi forces have benefited from Israel providing covert intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assistance, including tactical reconnaissance data and tracking information on Houthi deployments and infrastructure targets, through U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). This, in turn, has helped Riyadh counter escalating drone and missile attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.
This has raised U.S. President Donald Trump’s hopes that increased security cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia could revive normalization and serve as the basis for an expanded Abraham Accords.
As such, Saudi Arabia cannot afford to be at odds with the United Arab Emirates over Yemen or regard Palestinian statehood as a prerequisite for normalizing relations with an Israel whose unprecedented power projection across the region enhances Riyadh’s security against Iran and its proxies.
Israel as a ‘model ally’
It is precisely this that the Pentagon’s 2026 National Defense Strategy recognizes and values.
“A more peaceful and prosperous Middle East can only come at the hands of those with the greatest stake in the region’s future—our allies and partners in the region itself,” the strategy states. They must “take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, including by strongly backing Israel’s efforts to defend itself; deepening cooperation with our Arabian Gulf partners; and enabling integration between Israel and our Arabian Gulf partners, building on President Trump’s historic initiative, the Abraham Accords.”
“In the Middle East, Israel showed that it was able and willing to defend itself after the barbaric attacks of October 7th—in short, that it is a model ally,” it states.
The Netanyahu government’s role as a “model ally” has not been limited to targeting Hamas in Gaza or Hezbollah in Lebanon. In June 2025, Israel took the initiative by launching strikes on Iranian military and nuclear facilities before the United States joined the offensive 12 days later. Again, during Operation Epic Fury in February 2026, the United States and Israel launched simultaneous strikes targeting Tehran, leadership circles, air-defense networks and missile launchers.
Iran is seeking to reconstitute its missile and nuclear programs, which pose a threat to the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia alike.
While Yashar leader and former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot has argued against making explicit regime change in Tehran a formal war objective, this is at odds with Trump’s September 2026 post on Truth Social that a U.S. attack would “hit [Iran] again at a much harder and higher level.” He asserted that the biggest attack of them all was “waiting in the wings, and when it is over, there will be very little left of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
The United States needs Israel’s power-projection capabilities to counter the Iranian threat and strengthen the Abraham Accords. The Trump administration has made clear the importance it attaches to Netanyahu’s continued leadership. This, in turn, would benefit Saudi Arabia’s security.
Trump’s recent endorsement of Netanyahu, echoing the Pentagon’s 2026 National Defense Strategy, should be taken seriously.
“If Israel has the wrong Leader, which would be anyone other than Bibi, America will have to do this work ourselves, and I am not inclined to do so,” Trump said. He described a strong Netanyahu as “the kind of Partner that the United States of America is demanding of Israel.”
The Netanyahu Doctrine
Benjamin Netanyahu’s updated national security doctrine, articulated in October 2026, favors prevention rather than containment of adversaries and advances Israel’s regional military superiority. This benefits Saudi Arabia’s security and is precisely what makes Israel a “model ally” for the United States.
An Israel that projects power across the Middle East can underpin U.S. strategic interests in the region and serve as an anchor for an expanded Abraham Accords that includes Saudi Arabia. Israel can serve as a catalyst for greater intelligence sharing, interoperable defense systems and cooperation against missiles and drones among Abraham Accords countries, enabling them to respond collectively to common threats without relying on direct U.S. military intervention.
This positions Israel as an essential partner in a broader American-led security network. Riyadh should therefore return to its pre-Oct. 7 trajectory of warming relations with the Netanyahu government. Saudi normalization with Israel is the logical culmination of that strategic realignment.