ACCOUNTABILITY DIVIDE OP-ED: SA and Kazakhstan reveal sharply contrasting paths to biological weapons dismantlement

South Africa signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire class of weapons, on 10 April 1972, and ratified it in November 1975. 

Fifty-plus years later, and as concerns mount about the use of chemical and possible use of biological weapons in what has become known as grey warfare in Ukraine and elsewhere, it is an appropriate time to reflect on the rise and decline of South Africa's biological weapons programme, the only country in Africa to develop biological (and nuclear) capabilities. 

There are profound lessons to be learnt about how to – and how not to – govern the dismantling of high-consequence programmes such as these. In this six-part series, we focus on the biological programmes that went by the benign name of Project Coast, a covert endeavor that collectively represents bad practice when it comes to building and dismantling a biological weapons programme responsibly.

Project Coast head Wouter Basson and his colleagues went to great lengths to establish best practice in counter-insurgency warfare in the run-up to building Project Coast. They carefully examined the methods of British and Portuguese colonial administrations, white Rhodesia's counter-insurgency unit called the Selous Scouts and the US Army’s performance in Vietnam. 

They diligently (and coldly) drew lessons about how to best practice and refine their craft. Corrupted by avarice, eugenics and a disdain for (especially Black) human life and driven to deceive by covering their tracks to avoid prosecution, they did not search for best practice as responsible individuals would in the dismantling of a dangerous enterprise such as Project Coast. This in contrast to Kazakhstan, which has become a historical exemplar in responsible dismantlement. 

Early 1990s

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Africa and Kazakhstan faced the dismantlement challenge at the same time during the same early 1990s period, the era of expansive democratisation that led political theorist Francis Fukuyama to talk about the end of history. 

But their circumstances were very different in one crucial respect: in South Africa the people who built Project Coast during late-stage apartheid were the same actors who had to dismantle it during early-stage democracy, whereas the Kazak elite inherited a vast Soviet-era biological weapons infrastructure, including facilities such as the Stepnogorsk Scientific and Production Base long associated with the Soviet Biopreparat network that it had no hand in creating, and therefore no vested interests in hiding. 

Therefore, rather than obscuring this legacy, Kazakhstan formally acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 2007 and consistently reinforced its commitment through institutional and legal frameworks. Even prior to acceding to the convention, Kazakhstan established the National Center for Biotechnology in 1993 to redirect former weapons capabilities towards peaceful scientific and commercial applications. 

Its Ministry of Health, alongside other governmental bodies, assumed responsibility for Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention implementation, while the 2022 Law “On Biological Safety” created a modern regulatory framework governing dangerous pathogens.

Crucially, Kazakhstan embraced transparency as a core strategy to transform suspicion into trust among the international community. It regularly submitted Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) reports to the BWC Implementation Support Unit, including submissions in 2008, 2011, and consistently from 2015 through 2023. Kazakhstan also granted access to foreign experts, sharing facility layouts, equipment inventories, and environmental data. 

Through cooperation with the United States under the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, it allowed extensive on-site inspections and verification activities. Equally important was Kazakhstan’s commitment to irreversible dismantlement by ensuring the physical remnants of the programme could not be easily reconstituted. Facilities were not merely closed; they were decontaminated and repurposed. 

International supervision

At major production sites, internal surfaces were chemically treated, contaminated infrastructure was removed, and military-specific equipment was destroyed. Dangerous biological agents, including anthrax, were eliminated under international supervision. 

Kazakhstan also created a durable and credible framework for long-term compliance by embedding nonproliferation into institutions, legislation, and scientific culture. Through programmes supported by the International Science and Technology Centers, tens of thousands of former weapons scientists were transitioned into peaceful research roles, thus reducing the risk that expertise would be exported to other states or non-state actors. South Africa offers a sharply contrasting rollback example. 

Despite signing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972 and ratifying it in 1975, it developed an offensive biological and chemical weapons programme during the apartheid era. When the programme was dismantled in the early 1990s, the process lacked the transparency and verification seen in Kazakhstan. 

South Africa established a legal framework through the 1993 Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which created the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. However, legal structures alone did not translate into meaningful transparency. 

Unlike Kazakhstan, South Africa never submitted CBM acknowledging its past offensive biological weapons activities, despite the availability of such mechanisms. Instead, official statements denied that such efforts had occurred, despite substantial evidence to the contrary. 

The dismantlement process itself was conducted internally, with minimal external oversight. Documentation related to Project Coast was destroyed under circumstances that could not be independently verified. Key figures, including programme leader Basson, retained access to sensitive materials and information. Facilities associated with the programme were closed or absorbed into civilian structures without international inspection or validated decontamination processes. This lack of transparency had lasting consequences. 

Foreign actors

Allegations emerged that biological materials and expertise were diverted, with concerns that elements of the programme may have reached foreign actors, including Libya. Basson himself was later found in possession of significant quantities of illicit substances produced within programme-linked facilities. 

The contrast between Kazakhstan and South Africa illustrates a fundamental principle. Dismantlement without transparency produces enduring uncertainty, while dismantlement with verification builds lasting credibility.

Kazakhstan’s approach integrated international cooperation at every stage. It worked closely with international partners, particularly through the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, and enabled meaningful inspection and oversight, with international inspections playing a central role in validating its efforts. 

South Africa, by contrast, resisted external involvement. Western experts encountered barriers when seeking access to facilities and records, and the process remained largely a domestic affair. The management of scientific personnel further highlights the divergence. 

Kazakhstan invested heavily in redirecting expertise toward peaceful purposes, reducing the risk of proliferation through human capital. South Africa failed to implement a comparable strategy. Former scientists were left without structured pathways, and some reportedly sought opportunities abroad, raising concerns about the diffusion of sensitive knowledge.

Accountability

Accountability also differed significantly. Kazakhstan’s transparency reinforced international monitoring and attribution capabilities, strengthening the broader nonproliferation regime. South Africa’s refusal to fully acknowledge its programme weakened these mechanisms. The absence of clear admissions and verifiable records created gaps in the historical and regulatory framework, limiting the ability to enforce consequences or deter future violations. 

These differences are not merely historical. They offer a clear lesson for contemporary proliferation challenges, highlighted by a recent article published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The effectiveness of nonproliferation depends not only on formal treaty commitments but also on how those commitments are implemented. Transparency, verification, and international cooperation are essential components of credible disarmament.

The relevance of these lessons becomes increasingly apparent. The choice is not merely between action and inaction, but between competing models of action. Kazakhstan demonstrates that openness and cooperation can transform a proliferation risk into a foundation for international trust. By contrast, South Africa shows that secrecy and partial measures can leave a legacy of doubt that persists for decades. 

The path forward is clear. If the international community seeks durable nonproliferation outcomes, it must prioritise transparency, enforce verification, and support the irreversible, benevolent conversion of previous capabilities. DM

Wilmot James, a former MP (South Africa), is Professor at the School of Public Health, Senior Adviser to the Pandemic Center and Director of the Africa Initiative at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. He is also a member of the Advisory Panel to the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biothreats in Africa (Simba), a collaboration between the G7-led Global Partnership Against Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Africa CDC.

Brendan Beng was a 2025 and 2026 summer intern and Andrea Uhlig a Research Associate at the Pandemic Center.

He is grateful to Razie Salie of the Nelson Mandela Foundation and Jessica Saunders of the Churchill Archives Center, Cambridge University.