Netanyahu or Eisenkot? Where their visions for Israel’s security align - and collide

While there are many national security strategies, the next government will ultimately come down to a choice between two visions.

One is the vision of current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who faces pressure from the Right.

The other is the vision of Yashar party leader and former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot, who faces pressure from both his right and his left.

There are few major differences between Netanyahu and Eisenkot on the Iranian threat, though there are some nuances. Both will oppose a "bad deal" if US President Donald Trump's administration opts for such a deal.

Despite Trump's endorsement of Netanyahu and statement that he probably will not help attack Iran again, the US president has few positions set in stone and is likely to act on whatever whim is convincing to him at any particular moment: Whether to cut a deal, to return to war, or to continue a marathon economic standoff of competing blockades.

In that sense, the main differences are that Netanyahu would likely be more open about opposition to a bad deal to try to influence American public opinion, even at the cost of trying to improve the deal behind the scenes.

Eisenkot, by contrast, would likely keep his opposition private in order to try to improve the deal quietly, while viewing American public opinion as something he has less control over.

Both Netanyahu and Eisenkot would be ready to attack Iran in some circumstances where the nuclear or ballistic missile threat became too close for comfort. Both of them have shown they will not jump at attacking Iran at every moment.

Most would agree that at this stage Netanyahu would be willing to take on more risk to attack Iran and might interpret the point of no return as an earlier point than Eisenkot.

Neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot has a real plan for Gaza. Both have promised to eliminate Hamas's control of the Strip, but neither has a clear path to doing so.

Netanyahu's path is thoroughly unconvincing because he has had three years to achieve this goal. While Hamas is substantially weakened, it is still quite clearly in power.

In a recent briefing to which he invited only a small portion of the Israeli military reporters' group, leaving out The Jerusalem Post, other English-language Israeli outlets, and the vast majority of Hebrew-speaking reporters, he refused to back away from his commitment to "absolute victory" over Hamas, despite there being no evidence that he has come any closer to that goal since October 2024, when Yahya Sinwar was killed and all 24 of Hamas's battalions had already been dismantled.

Somewhere between 80% and 90% of Hamas was killed by the end of 2024.

Although the IDF took control of 60%-75% of Gaza's territory in 2025-2026, and airstrikes several times a week continue to keep Hamas on the run, the last two years have seen very little change in how close Hamas has come to losing control.

Even if the IDF undertakes another invasion of Gaza, something the Trump administration has consistently blocked, Hamas has shown that it can hide among the civilian population and outwait and outlast the IDF's ability to remain in the area in large numbers.

Netanyahu also invoked the "fortress Israel" metaphor and said he was willing to keep Gaza in ruins, with no rebuilding indefinitely, until Hamas disarms completely. This made it clear that his strategy is to try to keep Gaza miserable long enough for Hamas to simply quit.

But Hamas will not simply quit. It is a fanatical and messianic movement with perverse delusions of grandeur.

In that sense, Netanyahu has no clear plan.

He also seems ready to sacrifice all of Israel's international relations with Europe and perhaps even the US to maintain this uncompromising stance.

In contrast, Eisenkot has no clear plan of his own but is willing to move forward with Trump's cease-fire plan without resistance, including empowering Palestinian Authority-linked technocratic leaders and police, as well as international peacekeepers in Gaza.

He would likely be ready to allow partial rebuilding in exchange for partial disarmament, if for no other reason than to pause, and perhaps even push back, the diplomatic tsunami that is already threatening Israeli national security and economic stability.

This will not eliminate Hamas.

It might weaken the group politically, which could, in the very long term, lead to other groups challenging it. Alternatively, Hamas might manipulate the system, becoming a Hezbollah-style group that controls politics like a puppet master behind the scenes.

Neither of those outcomes will make Israelis feel safer now. But if Hamas is eventually weakened enough to have to share power, that would represent a fundamental shift.

Even if Hamas manages to retain its current power, as it has since October 2024 despite Israel's efforts to crush it, Israel will at least avoid a further deterioration in support from Europe, the US, and elsewhere.

These differences could have implications over the next year and beyond, but Eisenkot has made it clear that he will not move toward a Palestinian state, certainly not during a first term.

So, the differences between them are not as large as those between, say, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who favors transfer, and Democrats leader Yair Golan, who would push for a two-state solution.

If there are strong commonalities between Netanyahu and Eisenkot on Iran and Gaza, with differences largely in the nuances, they are worlds apart on the West Bank.

The only thing they have in common is a strong commitment to fighting Palestinian terrorism as their number one priority.

But on fighting Jewish extremism and expanding Israeli settlements, their second- and third-priority issues, they are far apart.

Eisenkot would immediately reinstate administrative detention for Jewish extremists, which Defense Minister Israel Katz suspended in January 2025 and which Netanyahu has allowed to remain suspended for nearly two years, despite losing control of Jewish extremists.

In addition, Eisenkot would clean house at the police, bringing in officers who would crack down hard on Jewish extremists.

He would likely also fire Shin Bet Director David Zini and replace him with a new chief who would crack down more forcefully on Jewish extremists.

Until recently, most people were not blaming the IDF for the out-of-control situation, so the officers currently in place might be allowed to remain. However, the last few months have blemished their records as well.

It remains to be seen whether Eisenkot might also clean house among senior IDF officers. One major question is whether Maj.-Gen. Dado Bar Kalifa's appointment as the next IDF Central Command chief, scheduled to begin in January 2027, will go through.

That could depend on how strongly IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir backs "Dado" and how much the appointment is perceived as having been dictated by Katz.

Regarding the more than 100 new "farms" that Netanyahu's government established or expanded under the authority of Bezalel Smotrich within the Defense Ministry, Eisenkot would likely clear most or all of them.

He would certainly freeze new settlement construction or limit it to the "natural" expansion of existing settlements.

He would certainly block the expansion of the E1 settlement bloc near Jerusalem, which has intensified European criticism.

Collectively, these actions would help pause or even reverse the diplomatic tsunami that has begun to engulf Israel's national security and economic stability.

However, Eisenkot has no vision for resolving the standoff with the Palestinians in the West Bank, which has persisted since 1967. Once again, he opposes a two-state solution in the near and medium term.

Netanyahu is not prepared to annex the entire West Bank, as Ben-Gvir would like, but his moves to expand Israel's presence in the West Bank have, in a way, forced the final-status issues to the fore.

If he remains in power and continues taking over new parts of Area C, it is not impossible that, at some point, the Palestinians in the West Bank might become concerned enough to offer a new deal under which they receive closer to the 70% of the territory that Trump offered them in 2020.

That would be a significant reduction from the 90%-95% promised to them under the Oslo Accords, but Netanyahu's moves could shift their approach.

There do not appear to be any major differences between Eisenkot and Netanyahu on Lebanon.

Both would maintain a security zone. Both are open to partial withdrawals in exchange for the Lebanese army partially clearing Hezbollah from the security zone, and neither trusts the Lebanese army to do its job sufficiently.

Unlike in Gaza, no one believes there is any real chance of removing Hezbollah from power.

Under light pressure from Trump, with heavier pressure likely to focus on Gaza and the West Bank, might Eisenkot agree to partial withdrawals faster than Netanyahu? Maybe.

But Eisenkot has said he would draw a line at eight kilometers to prevent Hezbollah from firing anti-tank missiles into Israel.

Eisenkot might not have destroyed as many homes belonging to southern Lebanese Shiites as Netanyahu ordered destroyed, but that has already happened, so it is unclear whether it would affect future policy.

Whoever is prime minister, there will likely be some partial withdrawals and some degree of a standoff over the security zone.

The only major difference in nuance might be that Eisenkot would try to restore France to a productive role, hoping to score diplomatic points with Paris on other fronts, whereas Netanyahu now relishes public conflicts with the French government.

There also is likely little difference between Netanyahu and Eisenkot on Syria.

Once again, both want to keep a security zone and both have dropped hints at times that they might agree to partial withdrawals, but both have strong doubts about trusting Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa because of his al-Qaeda past.

Once again, Eisenkot might make some partial withdrawals more easily under pressure from Trump, but Netanyahu will to if Trump presses hard enough – and the US president has made it clear that he views Sharaa as an ally, no matter what Israel thinks.

Eisenkot would significantly improve relations with Europe. He might reach new understandings with Middle Eastern countries that once liked Netanyahu but now loathe him.

All of these diplomatic gains could help address various national security and economic stability issues.

Netanyahu would stick to alliances with India, the UAE, Cyprus, and Greece, insisting that if Jerusalem compromises in the way the West wants it to, Israel's national security will be gravely undermined.

But the most crucial prize is the US.

Stunningly, Netanyahu this week invoked a scenario in which Israel loses the US as an ally entirely.

That would mean Israel losing access to US-built aircraft, including the F-35, as well as various other weapons, global diplomatic support, and potentially a major source of economic stability.

This is stunning because, while such a scenario might materialize in January 2029, one would think that any Israeli prime minister would do everything possible to avoid it.

Netanyahu presented this scenario alongside the prospect of two more years of Trump in power, as if anything Israel wants to achieve must be accomplished in the next two years.

And perhaps Netanyahu might achieve things with Trump in those two years that would forever change the playing field.

But Trump's declaration of love and unconditional support for Netanyahu on Sunday was anything but unconditional.

The US president barely made the declaration and has taken numerous potshots at the prime minister over the years.

All it meant was that, given the polling a week before the election, Trump would much rather continue working with Netanyahu, whom he knows well, than have to get to know Eisenkot.

But if Eisenkot is more compliant with some of Trump's demands regarding Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, the two will likely figure out how to get along.

More importantly, Eisenkot will not give up on the Democratic Party, which has turned against Israel more than at any time in decades.

He will try to hit "restart" on relations in the post-Netanyahu era.

The bad news is that he has no clear plan for doing so, and the gulf between Israeli and American expectations regarding the Middle East is substantial, even if Netanyahu exits stage left.

Whether Eisenkot could bridge that gulf would be one of the key challenges and uncertainties of his premiership.