The clock is ticking toward October 27, and tensions are running high. The central question is whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will manage to hold on to power, although most polls suggest that his chances are slim. Yet a closer look at the election campaigns of Gadi Eisenkot and Netanyahu reveals that each side has its own interpretation of why the 2026 election is critical to Israel’s future.
While Eisenkot and his fellow leaders of the center-left bloc, including Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, Avigdor Liberman, and Yair Golan, have placed the October 7 failure and the question of haredi (ultra-Orthodox) conscription at the center of their campaign, Netanyahu is seeking to highlight the achievements of the War of Redemption [the multifront conflict following Hamas’s 2023 attack] while downplaying his responsibility for the October 7 failure.
Alongside allegations that Netanyahu received two warnings of an impending attack, from the Emiratis and the Egyptians, the statements made by his former military secretary, Avi Gil, are regarded by the opposition as compelling evidence of Netanyahu’s failure.
Eisenkot’s camp has also continued to emphasize that Netanyahu’s inner circle is tainted by corruption and a lack of integrity. In addition to the alleged attempt to falsify the official record, Netanyahu presented a selective account of the State Comptroller’s Report on the October 7 failure.
The opposition’s claims are certainly open to debate, and a closer examination of Gil’s statements only reinforces the conclusion that the security establishment failed on that terrible night. Nevertheless, several questions arise when we analyze the arguments put forward by both sides.
Analyzing the arguments
First, although Netanyahu pursued a failed policy toward Hamas, motivated in part by a desire to avoid a confrontation that could derail efforts to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, the fact remains that he received intelligence indicating an impending attack only after it had begun.
Unlike the hours preceding the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, when then-prime minister Golda Meir was involved in the decision-making process and could have ordered a preemptive strike against Egypt, Netanyahu was not even given an opportunity to influence events that night.
Second, questions also arise regarding the claim that the alleged criminal attempt to change the time of a phone call in the official record, from 6:40 a.m. to 6:29 a.m., was intended to reinforce the bizarre conspiracy theory that a generals’ revolt had taken place. Netanyahu’s opponents argue that members of his inner circle sought to create the impression that the generals had deliberately failed to wake him.
An alternative explanation, however, is that the change was intended to demonstrate that Netanyahu had not been asleep while Hamas terrorists were infiltrating communities near the Gaza border. If Netanyahu’s associates had wanted to emphasize that the generals had kept him in the dark, it would have made more sense to leave the call time at 6:40 a.m., allowing them to argue that he had been informed only 11 minutes after the attack began.
Third, Netanyahu’s strained relationship with the security establishment’s leadership was shaped in part by his insistence, during the judicial reform debate, that the phenomenon of military refusal be confronted rather than tolerated. Critics argue that Netanyahu chose to disregard the security chiefs’ warnings about the implications of the proposed judicial legislation and the threat it posed to national security, as well as their less specific warnings of a possible war.
Others, however, argue that had the IDF responded to military refusal as it did during the Disengagement from Gaza, Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif might have thought twice before launching their attack.
This raises another question: If the security establishment’s leaders had warned of an impending war, why was the IDF so unprepared on that fateful day and caught so completely off guard?
In conclusion, Netanyahu has effectively been campaigning continuously since the 2022 election, particularly in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, massacre. Yet focusing on the alleged falsification of official records and the conduct of Netanyahu’s inner circle is unlikely to be the key to defeating him in the 2026 election.
Israel’s political history repeatedly demonstrates that corruption is not necessarily a decisive issue for voters. Arye Deri, for example, led Shas to 17 seats in the 1999 election despite having been convicted of bribery. Ariel Sharon led Likud to 38 seats in the 2003 election despite the cloud of suspicion surrounding the Cyril Kern affair.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, has consistently secured more than 30 seats in elections held since he became a criminal defendant. Rather than dwelling on the past, the opposition would be better served by persuading the public that Israel has a better future beyond Netanyahu’s leadership. That is how elections are won!
The writer is a lecturer and research fellow at the University of South Wales in the United Kingdom. He is the author of Collapse: The Israeli Labor Party, 1992–2024.