Elbridge A. Colby, the United States Under Secretary of War for Policy, has delivered a mid-term assessment of the Donald Trump administration’s defence strategy a month before the mid-term elections in the United States. His recent update on the 2026 National Defense Strategy shows how Washington is converting the administration’s priorities into policy.
The strategy focuses on four main goals: defending the U.S. homeland, deterring China, gaining more support from allies and partners, and rebuilding the U.S. defence industry. These priorities indicate clearly how Washington plans to manage its relationships. The U.S. wants its partners to be stronger, contribute more, and assume greater shares of the costs for regional security. India should consider this background when looking at the new American approach.
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A different bargain with partners
For many years, the U.S. supplied much of the military strength behind its alliances and partnerships. Colby’s approach now demands that partners take more responsibility for security in their own regions. Europe is being urged to lead on its own defence. South Korea is expected to do more on the Korean Peninsula. Japan and Australia are also being asked to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific.
This new model combines American strategic leadership with stronger regional partners. The U.S. keeps its advanced capabilities, strategic coordination, and extended deterrence, while partners are expected to provide more troops, infrastructure, funding, and industrial support.
China is still the main strategic concern. The National Defense Strategy aims to stop China from dominating the Indo-Pacific by focusing on deterrence, especially along the First Island Chain. Meanwhile, the Trump administration is also negotiating with Beijing on trade and other matters. So, military competition and economic talks are happening simultaneously.
This has important implications for India. India’s value to Washington is substantially based on China and the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S.-China relationship can shift between competition and cooperation. So, Indian and American interests will often overlap but will not always align.
Russia is another factor into this new approach. The U.S. wants to lower its costs in the Ukraine War and expects Europe to take more responsibility for its own security. At the same time, the U.S. still wants to limit Russian military power and influence. For India, this connects directly to its defence ties with Russia, its energy needs, and its desire for strategic autonomy.
Europe shows this trend most clearly. Washington is urging European countries to build up their own defence capabilities. For India, the lesson is that strong regional partners are becoming more important in U.S. strategy.
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What this means for India
India has a unique place in this new system. Its location, military potential, position in the Indian Ocean, technology goals, and role in the Indo-Pacific make it important to Washington. These interests have stayed mostly the same across different U.S. administrations.
The main change is in the contributions to the relationship. Washington now expects India to help keep the regional balance, work more closely on defence, join technology and supply-chain projects, and build up its military strength.
India also has good reasons to aim for these goals. It is building partnerships with France, Europe, Japan, Australia, the Gulf, and others, while keeping important ties with Russia and other countries. These connections give India more capabilities and strategic choices.
This leads to a key question for the next stage of India-U.S. relations. The U.S. wants India to be stronger and do more for the Indo-Pacific balance. India wants to build its strength, partly to have more freedom to act on its own. Gaining leverage will therefore become increasingly important. A country’s importance to Washington does not automatically determine the terms on which Washington negotiates with it. Leverage does. Economic scale, military capability, technology, market access and the ability to offer or withhold strategically important capabilities all contribute to bargaining power.
The China example
China is a useful example. Its economic and technological strength gives Beijing the tools to influence the U.S.’s decisions. As India’s capabilities and economy grow, it will also have more influence in its relationship with Washington, but gaining that leverage will take time.
Colby’s mid-term report shows that the U..S is putting more value on capable partners, regional responsibility, and shared contributions. For India, this is a big opportunity. A stronger India is more valuable to the U.S. and better able to look after its own interests.
New Delhi’s strategic task is to build that capability while keeping the freedom to use it. This means India needs to work more closely with Washington, but also keep building its own defence industry, technology sector, and partnerships. The next phase of India-U.S. relations will be shaped less by whether the two countries are strategic partners and more by the terms on which two increasingly capable powers cooperate.
Anil Raman is a retired Brigadier and a research fellow at the Takshashila Institution