Bola A. Akinterinwa
The Nigerian Society of International Law (NSIL) held its 47th Annual Conference on Tuesday, 13th and on Wednesday, 14th October, 2026 at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), the most important Institutional Member of the NSIL. The theme of the conference was ‘From Obligations to Implementation: Re-assessing the Efficacy of International Law in Contemporary International Relations.’ The conference was significant from three perspectives.
First, it was held at a time the disrespect for international law became more visible than ever before and when it is done with reckless abandon. Secondly, the theme of the conference raises two different but still complementary points of intellection at the level of international law: the doctrines of Monism and Dualism. This is precisely what ‘From Obligations to Implementation’ actually implies. The moment an agreement is done, regardless of the name it bears, whether it is initialled, signed, ratified, and even domesticated in the context of Nigeria, the first obligation raised is that of implementation of the agreement in the spirit of the rule of pacta sunt servanda. Consequently, when talking about re-assessing the efficacy of international law (IL) in contemporary international relations, the intellectual challenge cannot but be two-fold in analytical focus.
On the one hand, it has to deal with the assessment of issues involved from the time of initialling and signing of an agreement. It cannot but also deal with the efficacy of IL in terms of the extent to which the obligations created by the agreement are being complied with in the spirit of sanctity of agreement. An agreement freely negotiated, and not imposed, must be complied with. It is against this background that the NSIL conference theme is not only quite thought-provoking, but that the thrust of today’s Vie Internationale takes a different view. The column takes a look at the need to assess the recidivist character of the disregard for international law and to posit that a conscious policy decision to disregard international law has emerged and that this beginning may not have an end in the foreseeable future.
Obligations and Implementation: the Recidivist Disregard
First, the use of force in international relations is only allowed under the UN Charter in the context of legitimate self-defence and authorisation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Israelo-American military aggression on Iran cannot be legitimised by the UN Charter which prohibits intervention. It is on record that there are widespread violations of international humanitarian law in Lebanon and Gaza. And true enough, ‘the systematic flattening of entire villages south of the Litani River by Israeli forces and the targeting of civilian areas fall under acts that could constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Geneva Conventions’ (https://protecting education.org).
Another truth is that global leaders flagrantly bypass or challenge, or fail to enforce legally-binding global frameworks. Many examples abound: the U.S.–Israeli aggression on Iran, the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro and his wife in their bedroom by U.S. President Donald Trump, Russia’s special military intervention in Ukraine, etc. are manifestations of IL infractions. These infractions also abound at the level of international humanitarian law (IHL). IHL differentiates between combatants and non-combatants or civilians who are supposed to be internationally-protected persons. However, as shown in the reports of the UN Commission and the Amnesty International, Israel had been engaged in systematic atrocities, starvation as a weapon, and extensive civilian casualties. In other words, Israeli forces have committed genocidal acts for which the international responsibility of Israel should be raised. In the same vein, Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon have indiscriminately targeted civilian-affiliated infrastructure, such as the al-Qard al-Hassan financial institution.
What about the conscious undermining of international court decisions? Rather than seek to enforce ICC decisions, the U.S., for example, is making life very difficult for the ICC to exist. The U.S. of Donald Trump has taken aggressive financial sanctions against the ICC and has created entry barriers to its judges and prosecutors. In this regard, what is the strength and implications for IL in the face of this U.S. blatant violations of IL in the future? What can IL do in the face of non-enforcement of arrest warrants, even though all signatories to the ICC Statute are obligated to execute ICC arrest warrants?
South Africa is on record to have refused to arrest the Sudanese leader, Omar al-Bashir when he attended the African Union Summit in South Africa in June 2015. The rationale for non-arrest by the South African government was that it had no legal duty under the Rome Statute or customary international law to arrest any sitting head of state from a non-member country. In the eyes of South Africa, President Bashir had immunity under local diplomatic and host-country agreements. Even though the South African Supreme Court of Appeal ruled in March 2016 that it was unlawful for the South African government not to have arrested President Bashir, the problematic is how to respect two conflicting supranational obligations: the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which provides for immunity from arrest and prosecution, on the one hand, and the ICC Statute that provides for the arrest of people accused of genocidal crimes, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, etc. Whatever is the case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber unanimously ruled in July 2017 that South Africa had breached its obligations.
South Africa apart, several European countries, like Germany, France, and Poland, similarly refused to arrest Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his travels in Europe. If European countries are not complying with IL, should China be blamed for rejecting a legally- binding 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning its expansive territorial maritime claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS)? To what extent are ECOWAS Member States complying with the binding judgments handed down by the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice? IL is particularly noteworthy in terms of disregard than in obeisance and the reasons are not far-fetched.
Implementation of IL is challenged by three main factors. First, there is the lack of a central law enforcement agency. There is no global police or global military to compel the Nuclear Weapons States, also known as the P-5 (Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council), to comply with court rulings and judgment. In fact, any international law obligation can always be vetoed simply on the basis of political whims and caprices of any member of the P-5.
Secondly, Global governance is largely governed by the conditionality of state consent The administration of justice itself is a different problem on its own: international treaties and other agreements, as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) largely depend on state consent. The weak countries readily accept the supranational and jurisdictional competences of the ICJ and the ICC. The big powers, on the contrary, more often than not, refuse to ratify some treaties or often opt-out of some jurisdictions, or even refuse to recognise some judicial rulings. They prefer to damn the consequences because they have the economic, financial, and military clout to absorb or deflect international criticism, sanctions and penalties.
Thirdly, there is the dominance of power politics as an obstacle to the implementation of IL. Depending on how the acquisition and purpose of power is conceived, there can be many types of power politics. As Thucydides, Nicolo Machiavelli, and Hans Morgenthau have observed, there was a classical realism, predicated on animus dominandi, that is, humans have innate and insatiable biological lust for power. Kenneth Waltz, a major proponent of structural/neorealism has argued to the contrary: international system is driven by structure and not by human nature as propounded by the power school.
Additionally, there are also offensive and defensive realism. While offensive realism as argued by John Mearsheimer, has it that states must maximise their relative power and actively seek regional hegemony because it is the only true way to guarantee absolute security, defensive realism, as observed by Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jervis, seeks to maintain a balance of power rather than maximise it blindly. Balancing of power is aimed at preventing any single state from dominating the system. Above all, the realist school traditionally priorities hard power over soft power
The power school of thought in international relations is also referred to as the Realist School, which considers international relations as an anarchical struggle for power, security, and survival among the sovereign Member States of the international community. Put differently, the definiens of the power school include the consideration of the international system as not having a central and overarching authority, that sovereign states are the central actors on the global stage while the international organisations, international corporations, and individuals are not more than secondary in influence, that states often act rationally to ensure their own survival and prioritising national interest above morality, and perhaps most importantly, that power is relative and finite. In this regard, any gain in power or security for a given state is inherently perceived as a loss and therefore result in a security dilemma.
In essence, the conduct and management of international relations, and particularly in terms of treaty obligations and implementation, is largely governed by state consent and this can be first explained by the doctrines of monism and dualism. Put differently, one good way of understanding ‘from obligations to implementation’ is to explain it in the context of monism and dualism. Monism considers international law and municipal law as part of a single and unified legal law. By implication, when an international agreement is done, all the processes of ratification and domestication as required in Nigeria are not taken as a big deal as international law automatically becomes part of municipal law the moment an agreement is ratified. Dualism considers that IL and Municipal Law are separate. In Nigeria, after ratification of international agreements by the government, it must still be referred to the National Assembly for domestication before the agreement can be enforceable in Nigeria.
Efficacy of International Law: What Future?
The efficacy of IL can be determined at various levels. The UN Secretary- General, Anthonio Guterres, has always warned “that an ‘alarming disregard for international law’ is destabilising the Middle East, ignoring rules of engagement, and causing severe humanitarian crises.” If IL is consciously disregarded by the United States, Russia and Israel, what prevents other sovereign States from also similarly disregarding the same IL? In his opening remarks at the NSIL 47th Annual Conference, General Ike Nwachukwu, a two-time Minister of Foreign Affairs, made it clear that the selective application of international law by powerful nations has the great potential to undermine the global legal order and also encourage smaller States to abandon international treaties. Apart from this, will the environmental conditionings of IL not be disorderly and belligerently? The future of disregard for international law cannot but be largely a function of the preparedness to sustain the principle of pacta sunt servanda. The extent to which violations of IL are meaningfully contained, and preparedness to accept the democratic reform of the United Nations in light of the provisions of Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter, are other issues to address. Without the P-5 of the UNSC voting in consensus within the two-thirds majority voting required before the UN Charter can be reviewed, amended, or modified, the reform of the United Nations cannot but remain a permanent dream.
And without any shadow of doubt, IL creates several obligations for all the Member States of the international community. For instance, Article 94(1) of the UN Charter, has it that ‘each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party.’ Article 94 (2) further stipulates that ‘if any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.’’
Two issues are raised in this Article 94 of the UN Charter. Under paragraph 1, obeisance or compliance with court decisions is obligatory when a state is a party to a dispute under adjudication. The issue here is that states, grosso modo, have to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ before the court can hear a contentious case. Acceptance of the court’s jurisdictional competence can be done by a Special Agreement (ad hoc) in which case two or more countries do accept to submit a given dispute to the ICJ jointly after the dispute had already broken out. It can also take the format of Treaty Clause or Compromissory Clause by which States might have previously agreed in a bilateral or multilateral treaty that any future disputes regarding that treaty will go to the ICJ. It can also take the form of a Unilateral Declaration, that is, Compulsory Jurisdiction, in which case States can make a declaration under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute recognising the court’s jurisdiction as compulsory in relation to any other State that has made a similar declaration.
And perhaps more interestingly, the acceptance can be a Forum Prorogatum (a Post-Seizure Acceptance), in which a State can accept implicitly or otherwise ICJ’s jurisdiction after an application has already been filed against it by another state, simply by appearing and pleading on the merits without objecting to the issue of jurisdiction. Whatever is the case, Article 36(6) of the ICJ Statute allows the Court to pronounce on its jurisdictional competence in the event its competence is challenged.
The second issue raised is the advice given under Article 94(2) that when a party to a dispute does not perform as required by a court decision, other party or parties can refer the matter to the UNSC for determination of the best way forward. As good as this clause may look, it is, at best, subject to the veto whims and caprices of the P-5. Even if States are required to indicate acceptance of the ICJ’s jurisdictional competence before the court processes begin, the eventual court decision following the trial cannot but be a desideratum, a political decision to comply with, at the level of implementation. It is against the backdrop of these two issues that the efficacy of IL should be explicated and understood. Put differently, should we expect a sudden collapse of IL system? What are the likely scenarios with which IL will be faced? One school of thought has observed that, rather than have a collapse of the entire IL system, it cannot but be a transition into a new era, but what should the definienda be?
On the basis of the parallel and plenary discussions at the NSIL 47th Annual Conference, there is nothing to suggest that there will be efficacy of IL in the foreseeable future. General Ike Nwachukwu’s remarks are noteworthy here: ‘we are also witness to the unflattering situation where some Member States flout the provision of treaties and conventions claiming national interests, whilst holding down weaker member states to the same provisions, preferring consequences when such countries attempt to neglect those same provisions in their own interest! How unfair and inconsistent with an equitable world order can it all be?’
And perhaps more concernedly, countries serving as guardians of world order and security have their citizens ‘excluded from answering to the ICJ and Human Rights Commission. When citizens and even leaders of other countries have been arrested, tried and made to serve prison sentences for human rights violations and war crimes…, stronger nations (are) forcing change in leadership of perceived weaker States as they harness those countries’ resources at will.’ How does IL of the future address this type of sovereign injustice? Can UN Resolution 1515 and 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty on Natural Resources remain sustainable in the near future, bearing in mind the character of the emerging new global order? Can IL of the future be able to sustain the principle of ex-territoriality of diplomatic missions in their host states? A situation where a host State of a foreign diplomatic mission can refuse visa entry to members of a foreign delegation? What happens when countries hosting international organisations violate the hosting agreement?
Professor Yinka Omorogbe, (SAN), the NSIL President, noted in her welcome address that IL must be more than a collection of noble aspirations and must remain a credible instrument for the maintenance of peace, the protection of human dignity, the promotion of justice and the advancement of sustainable development. The Keynote Speaker, Ambassador Ayoola Olukanni, Nigeria’s former High Commissioner to Australia, with concurrent accreditation to New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, rightly observed that treaties and other documents established as rules-based order to guide state behaviour, have not worked ‘even at the best of time. The Genocide Convention did not prevent the Rwanda Genocide nor the ongoing Genocide in Gaza. The UN Charter did not prevent the invasion of Venezuela and the seizure of Donetsk Crimea and incorporation into Russia.’ More important, Ambassador Olukanni noted that ‘there have always been and there will continue to be challenges on the implementation of international law and its efficacy.’
We cannot agree more with this postulation, especially in light of the many AI issues raised in various conference papers. Mujeeb Ademola Imran of the Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, Bola Ajibola College of Law, Crescent University, Abeokuta, presented his paper on ‘AI Governance and the Limits of State Sovereignty: From Juridical Sovereignty to Effective Technological Sovereignty.’ He asked one question: ‘does international AI governance erode sovereignty or make it effective? His answer was ‘no state can regulate a technology built from cross-border data infrastructure, expertise and firms on its own.’ In other words, the AI governance can erode national sovereignty and may not. This is our own interpretation of the answer.
At the municipal law level, the paper on “The Effectiveness of Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Mechanisms: Interrogating the Impact and Limitations of the UPR Process in Advancing States’ Accountability for Human Rights Implementation, authored by Gloria Eguono Aigbadon of the Caleb University College of Law, Flora Alohan Onomrerhinor of the Faculty of Law, University of Benin, and Agbenukoiwocho Precious Emmanuel of the Caleb University, raised several challenges that were similarly noteworthy. They noted, for example, that ‘while Nigeria acknowledges that the role of the press in the nation is very important and seemed to have evidenced this in the 2011 Freedom of Information Act which gives the right to access public information, in the past fifteen years since its existence, the effect of the Act is yet to be seen. The effectiveness of the Act is seriously hampered by non-response by public entities to information requests. Public institutions routinely fail to comply with the provision of the law with impunity.’
And perhaps more interestingly, Dr Samson R. Osagie, in his paper on ‘State Sovereignty and the Implementation of International Obligations, noted that ‘the effectiveness of international law may also be affected by institutional paralysis within international organisations…’ and that ‘emerging challenges, such as climate change, cyber warfare and the regulation of artificial intelligence require more than the formulation of international norms; they require states to develop and apply effective mechanisms for their implementation. The central concern is therefore no longer merely whether international obligations exist, but whether, and through what mechanisms, states translate those obligations into effective conduct.’
Grosso modo. disregard for international law has the potential to continue to be recidivist because the likelihood of Member States of the international community and international organisations being free from political paralysis is still remote. International law is still largely dependent on the rule of voluntary compliance and political whims and caprices of sovereign governments that still remain the main actors in international relations. Negotiation of new treaties and conventions is not likely to stop, hence there cannot but be more legal instruments to guide the conduct and management of international relations. In fact as many European countries are opting out of some multilateral frameworks, alternative legal or transactional alignments that prioritise raw state sovereignty over human rights are also being opened. By implication, it cannot but be a situation of re-assessment of a beginning without a foreseeable end. It may be a situation of changes in continuity rather than change and continuity. Like Chad, Niger, and Venezuela have withdrawn from the ICC more countries can still denounce the ICC when nothing is done to address the deliberate obstruction of international justice. Continued flouting of international law (IL) by the major powers also has the potential to induce the smaller powers to do the same, hence likelihood of distrust in IL is high. And true enough, the disregard is nothing more than an erosion of the rules-based order which cannot but prompt the power and coercion to dictate outcomes rather than allowing treaties and sovereign equality to so do. This cannot but be a beginning without end, especially in light of the new concept of ‘proud disregard’ or ‘open disregard’ for IL.