Donald Trump has now done what Benjamin Netanyahu desperately needed: He has endorsed the Israeli prime minister a week before an election that could determine whether Israel remains a prosperous liberal democracy or continues its slide toward an elected autocracy.
Israeli voters should ignore him. And they should prepare for something potentially more consequential: Trump may not accept Netanyahu's removal even if the Israeli electorate votes for change.
The endorsement came Sunday, with Trump praising Netanyahu as a great wartime leader and partner against Iran. He even suggested that without Netanyahu, America might have to confront Iran alone. This is extraordinary language from an American president about the democratic choices of an allied country.
Trump remains popular in Israel, with considerable justification. His recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, Abraham Accords diplomacy and willingness to confront Iran earned him genuine gratitude. But supporting Israel and supporting Netanyahu are two very different things. Increasingly, they may be opposites.
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The endorsement should surprise nobody. Trump has made a habit of interfering in other countries' elections on behalf of right-wing populists. In Poland last year, his administration dispatched Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to support nationalist presidential candidate Karol Nawrocki, who won. In Hungary this April, Vice President JD Vance traveled to Budapest to campaign for Viktor Orbán, who lost despite years spent consolidating control over the country's institutions.
Trump plainly admires strongmen, especially those who portray themselves as the authentic voice of the nation while treating political opponents, independent institutions and inconvenient legal constraints as obstacles to be overcome. Indeed, he aspires to the exact same style, with Trumpy embellishments like a gold-plated Oval Office.
Netanyahu belongs increasingly to this political family.
His coalition's assault on judicial independence, hostility toward the security establishment, attacks on independent institutions and efforts to concentrate power reflect a familiar populist project: preserving the appearance of democratic elections while weakening the checks that make democracy meaningful.
But the case against Netanyahu goes far beyond democratic norms. His record is a succession of national catastrophes, moral embarrassments and strategic errors, and another government dependent on the same coalition partners promises more.
Start with October 7, 2023, the worst security failure in Israel's history. Netanyahu presided over a system that catastrophically underestimated Hamas, leaving Israeli communities defenseless against mass murder and kidnapping. Three years later, he continues resisting the independent state commission of inquiry necessary to establish responsibility and prevent another disaster.
Then there are the wars. Netanyahu's supporters celebrate Israel's blows against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. Some were significant. But enormous military expenditure and sacrifice have not translated into a stable regional order, while the Gaza war has devastated Israel's international standing.
Worse, Netanyahu's political survival depends on parties whose demands threaten Israel from within.
The ultra-Orthodox parties insist on preserving sweeping military exemptions for Haredi men, even as other Israelis endure repeated and prolonged reserve mobilizations. Haredi boys attend schools without adequate mathematics, English or science instruction, while subsidies help sustain prolonged nonparticipation in the workforce.
With the Haredi population, now at a sixth of the country, growing rapidly, this is an economic and military time bomb. A shrinking proportion of Israelis cannot indefinitely finance the state, staff its military and sustain its technological economy. A brain drain that will impoverish Israel is a very real possibility—yet Netanyahu cannot enact meaningful reform without blowing up the coalition that keeps him in power.
His dependence on the far right is no less destructive. Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have promoted an agenda of settlement expansion and confrontation in the West Bank, while extremist settler violence increasingly threatens Palestinian civilians, leading to multiple fatalities and further eroding Israel's standing. The government has done essentially nothing to confront this abomination. The past week’s attacks on an American photojournalist and European visitors illustrate the danger. The world is watching, and European economic sanctions beckon should Israel return the same coalition to power.
Israel depends on international investment, trade, financial relationships and technological cooperation. A sustained confrontation with Europe, followed by growing pressure in the United States, could mean a weaker currency, declining investment, higher borrowing costs and diminished prosperity.
Current polling strongly suggests that Netanyahu's existing bloc will fall short of a parliamentary majority. The parties seeking to replace him, together with the two Israeli-Arab parties, would command a majority of Knesset seats, although translating that arithmetic into a government would require difficult political compromises. That’s because Netanyahu, with his jackhammer racist propaganda, has made the opposition peevish about actually establishing a coalition that depends on Arabs.
That brings us to the danger beyond election day.
Suppose Netanyahu loses his majority, but the opposition struggles to assemble a coalition. Trump could decide that his endorsement was merely the opening move.
Imagine the American president telephoning Gadi Eisenkot and Naftali Bennett, two leading potential architects of an alternative government, and pressing them to join a Netanyahu-led coalition instead. Trump has demonstrated little respect for the convention that American presidents should not dictate the internal politics of democratic allies. Why assume he would stop at an endorsement?
He could argue that Israel needs unity against Iran, that Washington requires Netanyahu as its partner, or that American diplomatic support depends on a government Trump finds acceptable.
The greatest temptation would be Saudi Arabia.
Imagine Trump offering a historic normalization agreement with Riyadh if Eisenkot and Bennett agree to serve under Netanyahu. Such a promise could create enormous pressure, including from Israelis who understandably regard peace with Saudi Arabia as a strategic prize.
That’s where it gets interesting.
Such a gross intervention is largely unprecedented in the annals of serious democracies, yet there is something intriguing about it. I would not categorically exclude the possibility that Netanyahu, freed from dependence on his current extremist partners, might govern differently. There could even be an attempt to arrange a presidential pardon in his ongoing corruption trial, although a pre-conviction pardon would raise exceptional legal and constitutional questions.
That would amount to an extraordinary bargain: Netanyahu retains power, the opposition joins him, his legal troubles are somehow resolved, and Trump delivers Saudi normalization.
But there is a fundamental problem. Saudi Arabia is not Trump's property to distribute. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would have to agree to an actual, credible arrangement, including whatever commitments Riyadh requires concerning Palestinian statehood and regional security. A vague American promise would be worthless. Only a concrete Saudi commitment, signed and enforceable, could make such a proposition remotely serious.
This is a low-probability scenario. But given Trump’s obsession with being seen—however preposterously—as a Nobel Prize-worthy peacemaker, I cannot rule it out. And if it turns out that Trump can drag Netanyahu in the direction of a workable accommodation with the Palestinians, organize peace with Saudi Arabia in the bargain, and (a very big if) it’s real (as opposed to a standard Trump boondoggle), it becomes fascinating. Netanyahu, with his infinite lust for power, boundless cynicism, and sharp instincts, would probably go along.
Of course, there is an opposite scenario as well—with the same Netanyahu-friendly potential outcome: that Trump and Netanyahu restart the Iran war and then invoke the emergency to try to neutralize the results of the Israeli election.
Either way, Eisenkot and Bennett would face a profound choice: whether a diplomatic breakthrough (or a new war) would justify perpetuating the leadership and political culture they have promised to replace. That could become one of the most fascinating choices in Israel's history.
For now, Israelis must distinguish gratitude toward Trump from obedience to him. Israel's election belongs to Israelis. And if they vote for change, their leaders must have the resolve to deliver it — not surrender the result to pressure from Washington.
Dan Perry is the former London-based Europe-Africa Editor and Cairo-based Middle East Editor of The Associated Press, chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem and the author of two books.
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.