Saudi Arabia, the Houthis and the Changing Economics of Modern Warfare
Who is driving the war and who is benefiting from it?
Saudi Arabia’s confrontation with the Houthis has evolved far beyond a conventional military campaign, leaving the kingdom facing a conflict it increasingly appears unable to fully control.
The war raises a broader strategic question: is the balance of military power changing, with cheap missiles and drones allowing smaller armed groups and states to challenge far more heavily equipped adversaries?
Saudi Arabia has not received the level of support it expected from the United States, while Turkey and Pakistan have largely limited their involvement to what they describe as protecting Saudi territory. Meanwhile, attacks have threatened the kingdom’s critical infrastructure, including oil facilities and airports, while Riyadh itself has faced heightened security measures and disruptions to normal life.
Why is Saudi Arabia struggling against the Houthis?
Saudi Arabia’s difficulties reflect a wider problem confronting major military powers.
Russia remains deeply tied down in its war with Ukraine, while the United States has also faced difficulties translating its overwhelming military superiority into a decisive political outcome in its confrontation with Iran.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, entered the Yemen war heavily dependent on airpower, precision-guided weapons and advanced aircraft purchased largely from the United States and other major arms suppliers.
The underlying problem is becoming increasingly clear: a country or armed movement capable of producing or acquiring large numbers of relatively inexpensive missiles and drones cannot necessarily be defeated through airstrikes alone.
That represents a major shift in modern warfare.
The rise of cheap weapons
When comparing Russia and Ukraine, Russia is clearly the larger military power. Likewise, if the United States and Iran are compared purely in terms of conventional military strength, Washington possesses overwhelming advantages.
But military superiority on paper does not automatically translate into victory.
One of the most important developments in recent conflicts has been the growing effectiveness of relatively inexpensive weapons particularly drones, cruise missiles and other precision systems against expensive military platforms.
Russia’s experience in Ukraine provides a striking example. Moscow initially expected a relatively short war built around its superior airpower, artillery and armored forces. Instead, the conflict developed into a prolonged war in which Ukraine made extensive use of drones and missiles while rapidly expanding domestic weapons production.
The economics of the battlefield became increasingly important. Expensive missiles and advanced weapons can cost millions of dollars, while some drones and other strike systems can be produced at a fraction of that cost.
Russia consequently turned to alternative sources, including Iranian-made Shahed drones, to supplement its own weapons production.
The lesson is significant: when a weaker side can continuously replace its losses with cheaper weapons, it can impose disproportionate costs on a much stronger opponent.
The same problem facing the United States and Iran
A similar dynamic can be seen in the confrontation between Washington and Tehran.
The United States possesses vastly greater military resources, but military superiority alone does not provide an easy path to ending the conflict.
Iran’s objective is likely to seek an agreement that reflects a degree of strategic parity, while President Donald Trump would want any settlement to be presented as an American victory.
Between those two positions lies the possibility of a prolonged conflict whose final outcome is difficult to predict.
Iran has experience operating under sanctions and prolonged military pressure. It has also developed domestic capabilities for producing missiles and drones. The United States, by contrast, faces the enormous industrial challenge of replacing sophisticated weapons consumed during sustained military operations.
A post-Cold War lesson
Since the Second World War, major powers such as the United States and Russia have invested heavily in sophisticated and expensive weapons systems designed to provide overwhelming military superiority and strategic deterrence.
But modern conflicts are exposing a weakness in that model.
The critical question is no longer simply how destructive a country’s weapons are, but also how quickly and cheaply those weapons can be replaced and whether the opponent can continue fighting after absorbing the initial blows.
A state with a large military-industrial base, inexpensive weapons and the ability to absorb losses can potentially turn a short war into a long and costly conflict.
That is the strategic problem now confronting major military powers and increasingly, Saudi Arabia.
Can Saudi Arabia find a way out?
The Saudi-Houthi conflict has already reached a point where Riyadh faces a difficult strategic dilemma.
Saudi Arabia needs a way to end the war while preserving the appearance of military and political success. Ideally, Riyadh would enter negotiations from a position of strength.
The Houthis, however, have an interest in preventing Saudi Arabia from reaching that position
This dynamic resembles challenges faced by other combatants in prolonged conflicts: once the weaker side survives the initial assault, the strategic balance can begin to change.
What is behind the Houthis’ growing military capability?
One of the most notable recent developments has been a statement by Major General Turki al-Malki, spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition.
Al-Malki said the Houthis had obtained advanced military technology with assistance from regional actors, although he did not specify what technology had been acquired or identify the parties involved.
The statement is significant because Saudi Arabia has traditionally been explicit in accusing Iran of supporting the Houthis.
This time, however, the coalition spokesman did not name a particular country.
That has fueled speculation that another regional actor may be contributing to the Houthis’ growing military capabilities.
Saudi Arabia may also be reluctant to publicly identify such a country in order to avoid widening the conflict.
If another Middle Eastern state is indeed assisting the Houthis, it would suggest that the conflict is becoming part of a broader regional competition in which multiple actors see strategic advantages in the continued pressure on Saudi Arabia
What does this mean for the Horn of Africa?
The lessons of these conflicts are particularly relevant to the Horn of Africa, where concerns have periodically emerged over the possibility of a confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
If such a conflict were to occur, Ethiopia would likely seek to exploit its numerical and technological advantages during the opening phase.
The initial strategy could involve intensive strikes against strategic targets using missiles, aircraft, drones and other long-range weapons, with the objective of severely degrading Eritrea’s military infrastructure before it could organize an effective response.
But the decisive question would be what happens after the first days of the war.
If Eritrea were able to absorb the initial strikes, preserve key military capabilities and rapidly adapt to the battlefield, the conflict could become much more difficult for Ethiopia to control.
The longer the war continued, the more important factors such as ammunition production, logistics, manpower, resilience and the ability to replace destroyed equipment would become.
A conflict that Addis Ababa initially expected to resolve quickly could therefore develop into a prolonged and costly confrontation.
The bigger lesson
The most important lesson from recent wars is that military power cannot be measured simply by the number of aircraft, missiles, tanks or other advanced weapons a country possesses.
Modern warfare increasingly depends on industrial capacity, affordability, adaptability and endurance.
A military equipped with extremely sophisticated weapons can still face serious difficulties if its opponent can produce large numbers of inexpensive weapons and sustain attacks over a long period.
For countries in the Horn of Africa, the implication is clear: winning the opening week of a war may be important, but surviving and sustaining the months that follow could ultimately matter far more.
Any state that ignores the changing economics of warfare risks entering a conflict it believes it can win quickly only to find itself trapped in a war that becomes increasingly expensive, difficult and unpredictable.