Why Ethiopia Cannot Win by Force Alone

ANALYSIS · ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia fielded one of Africa’s largest armies in 1961–91 and still lost Eritrea. The 2020–22 Tigray war ended at the negotiating table in Pretoria, after enormous loss of life, a famine and economic damage that still weigh on the country.

As federal troops reach the Eritrean border, a common question is why the Ethiopia Tigray Eritrea war cannot simply be won outright. The record shows that overwhelming force has repeatedly won battles in the north without ending the conflicts behind them.

For American readers, a new war would sit beside the Red Sea, a main shipping route between Asia and Europe. The latest advance is set out in Ethiopian Troops Reach Zalambessa by 13 Oct.

What Overwhelming Force Achieved Before

Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962, dissolving a UN-backed federation, and fought Eritrean rebels until 1991. From 1974 the war was run by the Derg, the military junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam.

Historian Gebru Tareke counts 84,537 government troops against 22,184 guerrillas in the 1982 Red Star offensive, as summarised by Alex de Waal. After four months the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) had driven it back, with about 43,000 combatants killed or wounded.

Ethiopia ended the 1998–2000 border war in the stronger military position, but the Algiers Agreement of 12 December 2000 sent the border to a commission. Its unanimous 2002 ruling left Badme, where the war began, in Eritrea, and Ethiopia accepted it only in June 2018.

The Tigray war began in November 2020, when Tigrayan troops seized the army’s Northern Command in Mekelle, and ended after a decisive federal advance in late 2022. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the party that long ruled Tigray, signed a peace deal in Pretoria on 2 November 2022.

That win did not settle Tigray, where federal and TPLF forces fight again, as Why Ethiopia’s Tigray Region Is at War Again in 2026 explains. Both campaigns were ordered by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in power since 2018.

The Human Cost

No full count of the 2020–22 war’s dead exists, so every figure is an estimate. A Ghent University team, including geographer Jan Nyssen, put civilian deaths at 162,000 to 378,000 in an update by researcher Emnet Negash in May 2023.

Crisis Group, the conflict-prevention organisation, describes the toll more cautiously as tens of thousands killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. In June 2021 the IPC, the UN-backed hunger scale, found nearly 353,000 people in Tigray in Catastrophe, its most severe phase.

A joint inquiry by the UN human rights office (OHCHR) and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission in 2021 found reasonable grounds to believe all parties committed violations. It said some may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The UN-mandated International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) found that the federal government’s blocking of aid to Tigray violated the ban on starving civilians. Its 2023 report said Eritrean troops kept committing atrocities in Tigray after the Pretoria deal.

The Economic Bill

Washington ended Ethiopia’s duty-free access under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) on 1 January 2022, citing gross human rights violations. The IMF had already paused payouts from a 2019 programme after the war began, Crisis Group notes.

Ethiopia then missed a US$33 million coupon on its only Eurobond, defaulting in December 2023. A US$3.4 billion IMF facility followed in July 2024, tied to a market-determined exchange rate to ease foreign currency shortages.

Average inflation fell from 26.6% in 2023/24 to 16.0% in 2024/25, the Fund’s July 2026 review shows. The next review has slipped to talks in November, as reported in Ethiopia IMF Review Talks Slip to November.

Why Insurgencies Outlast Offensives

De Waal described the Derg’s strategy as overwhelming force, and by 1989 its army listed 374,000 regular soldiers. Yet the EPLF overran the army’s largest garrison in Eritrea at Afabet in 1988, and the Derg fell in 1991.

Tigray repeats the lesson. Crisis Group wrote in February 2026 that fighting the TPLF again in its mountainous home terrain is “a forbidding prospect, no matter how depleted the Tigrayan forces.”

The Amhara region shows how one campaign can start another. The Fano, Amhara militias that fought the TPLF, rebelled in August 2023 after Abiy ordered regional special forces disbanded.

Why Eritrea Is a Harder Target Than Its Size Suggests

Crisis Group put Ethiopia’s army at around 600,000 ground troops in 2026 and Eritrea’s below 200,000, while IISS data for 2020 published by the World Bank listed 138,000 and 202,000. Eritrea relies on mass conscription, and a UN human rights report in May 2025 said its national service remains indefinite, as Eritrea Explained 2026 sets out.

The 1998–2000 war was fought largely from trenches along the same frontier, as Part 1 of this series, Ethiopia vs Eritrea: Who Would Win a War?, shows. Its death toll has been estimated at up to 100,000, a figure cited by journalist Martin Plaut in 2005.

Crisis Group says Eritrea is “ensuring that its military is entrenched in strategic border areas.” It adds that Ethiopian commanders fear becoming “bogged down in an exhausting conflict against a dogged opponent.”

A push to Assab, Eritrea’s southern port near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, would leave Ethiopia exposed on other fronts, the group warns. It points to Eritrea’s ties with the TPLF and the Fano, which could open fighting behind federal lines.

The Legal and Diplomatic Walls

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter bars any state from using force against another’s territorial integrity. Eritrea, ruled by President Isaias Afwerki since 1993, wants Security Council action under Chapter VII, as Eritrea Accuses Ethiopia at UN on 14 October.

Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos invoked Article 51, the right of self-defence, telling the Council that Eritrean units had entered Ethiopian territory. Whatever the claim, the Geneva Conventions bind every armed force in the conflict to protect civilians.

The African Union Commission urged Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt on 1 October to show “maximum restraint,” as reported in AU Urges Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt to Show Restraint. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Abiy that Horn of Africa states must respect their neighbours’ sovereignty and warned against cross-border incursions.

Egypt, at odds with Ethiopia over Nile waters, signed a joint Red Sea declaration with Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia on 4 October. Crisis Group warns a war could drag in Egypt and Gulf states, and urges Western powers to tie IMF support to restraint.

The Case Made for Decisive Force

Supporters of a hard line in Addis Ababa start from security. The government told the Security Council that Eritrea sent mechanised and infantry units into Ethiopia, and it accuses Asmara of channelling support to the Fano.

Officials also accuse TPLF leaders of forging a clandestine alliance with Eritrea, Crisis Group records. Eritrea denies sending troops into Ethiopia, and Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel calls the campaign “an unprovoked war of aggression.”

The second argument is the sea, and in October 2023 Abiy said “a population of 150 million can’t live in a geographic prison.” In September 2025 he said the loss of the Red Sea “will be corrected,” as Ethiopia Red Sea Access Push Risks a Wider Horn Crisis explains.

Eritrea quotes Deputy Army Chief of Staff General Abebaw Tadesse as declaring on 27 September that “our ultimate destination is Assab.” Abiy has denied plans to seize a port by force, Crisis Group notes, and Addis Ababa frames its current operations as self-defence.

What Could End It Instead

The first tool for ending the Ethiopia Tigray Eritrea war already exists. The Pretoria agreement promised federal authority and services in Tigray in return for TPLF demobilisation, but Crisis Group says full demobilisation never took place.

The deal created the Tigray Interim Administration, a federally funded regional government first led by former TPLF spokesman Getachew Reda. Crisis Group urges Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria to broker talks through the AU, which asked envoy Olusegun Obasanjo on 23 September to help.

Between the two states, the 2002 boundary ruling offers a settled line, and the 2018 Jeddah Agreement, mediated by Saudi Arabia, ended the state of war. Washington cites that 2018 framework as the basis for talks, and Crisis Group urges candid talks on reliable sea access for Ethiopia.

What the Markets Say

Polymarket gave a 16.5% chance that Eritrea invades Ethiopia by 31 October and 19.5% by 31 December (15 October, 5:25 a.m. ET). About US$97,000 has been traded, and the bet counts only an Eritrean operation holding Ethiopian ground for 48 hours or more.

A companion bet that Ethiopia targets Eritrea priced 24% by 31 October and 60% by 31 December, but only about US$470 has changed hands. That market is thin, and it counts only air or missile strikes on Eritrea, not artillery or ground incursions.

Why we show this: prediction markets turn real-money bets into a live probability that moves within minutes of the news, which is why investors, campaigns and newsrooms in the United States now follow them closely. We show them next to polls and official results, never instead of them.

What It Means for US Readers

The main exposure is shipping, because Assab lies near the Bab el-Mandeb, the strait linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. A wider Ethiopia Tigray Eritrea war on that coast could raise insurance costs on a main route to and from the Suez Canal.

Holders of Ethiopia’s defaulted Eurobond depend on an IMF programme that a new war could put at risk. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa tells Americans not to travel to the Tigray, Amhara or Afar regions for any reason.

What Is Not Known

There is no confirmed death toll for the fighting since early October, and no census-based count of the 2020–22 war’s dead. It is not confirmed whether all Eritrean troops have left Ethiopian territory.

It is not known whether the Security Council will act on Eritrea’s request, or whether either army will cross the border. Nor is it clear whether the IMF’s November talks will go ahead on schedule if fighting spreads.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why doesn’t Ethiopia just invade Eritrea?

Ethiopia’s army is larger on recent estimates, but Eritrea defends entrenched highland positions, and the 1998–2000 war killed tens of thousands without moving the border in Ethiopia’s favour. An invasion would also breach the UN Charter, could cost Ethiopia IMF support and risks drawing in Egypt.

How many people died in the Tigray war?

No official count exists, so every figure is an estimate. Ghent University researchers put civilian deaths at 162,000 to 378,000, while Crisis Group describes tens of thousands killed.

Why did Ethiopia lose Eritrea?

Imperial and Derg armies fought Eritrean rebels from 1961 to 1991 but could not defeat them, even with offensives such as Red Star in 1982. After the Derg fell in 1991, Eritreans voted for independence in a UN-observed referendum in 1993.

What is the Pretoria agreement?

It is the deal the Ethiopian government and the TPLF signed in Pretoria, South Africa, on 2 November 2022 to end the Tigray war. It promised federal authority and services in Tigray in return for demobilising Tigrayan forces, a step never completed.

Sources: Crisis Group, Briefing 210 (18 Feb 2026) · ICHREE report A/HRC/54/55 · EHRC–OHCHR joint report · OHCHR report on Eritrea A/HRC/59/24 · USTR, AGOA termination · IMF, ECF approval · IMF Country Report 26/174 · The Reporter, Eurobond coupon · PCA, Boundary Commission · USG Tigray fact sheet (IPC data) · Ghent team estimate · Alex de Waal on Gebru Tareke · ASC Leiden seminar · World Bank, armed forces personnel (IISS data)

This article was produced by The Rio Times’ automated newsroom system. How we use AI · Report an error · Editorial responsibility: Matthias Camenzind, Editor-in-Chief