Election 2028: NDC builds from the base as NPP backs Bawumia

The National Democratic Congress (NDC) is holding its constituency executive elections on Saturday, October 24, 2026, in a contest that will determine more than who occupies key constituency positions.

The exercise is an early test of the party’s internal balance of power, its ability to manage competing interests and, ultimately, its capacity to translate grassroots strength into a political advantage ahead of the 2028 general election.

The stakes are significant because constituency executives sit at the point where national political ambitions meet local electoral realities.

They are the party’s organisers, mobilisers and intermediaries with communities. They help shape the party’s relationship with voters, influence the reception of national messages and provide the organisational machinery needed to turn political support into votes. For a party preparing to defend its electoral position in 2028, the people who control these structures matter.

The NDC says the exercise is intended to “consolidate our structures, renew our leadership and strengthen our readiness.” That is the public objective. The harder question is whether the elections will produce structures capable of delivering those ambitions or deepen the divisions that often accompany contests over party positions, influence and access to power.

The scale of the exercise is revealing. The Party indicates that 16,468 applications were initiated, of which 15,049 were fully submitted, with women accounting for approximately 16 per cent of completed applications.

Elections are scheduled across 265 constituencies on October 24, with 11 constituencies voting on October 25. These figures demonstrate the breadth of participation, but they should not be mistaken for proof of organisational strength.

Applications do not tell us how many people will turn out, whether the process will be accepted by defeated candidates or whether the eventual executives will command the loyalty of the wider party.

That distinction is central. A party can conduct a large internal election and still emerge politically weakened if the process leaves behind aggrieved factions, disputed outcomes and leaders unwilling to cooperate.

Conversely, a closely contested election can strengthen a party if the rules are respected, winners reach out to their opponents and defeated candidates remain invested in the collective objective. The real measure of today’s exercise will therefore be found not only in the results, but in what happens after them.

The NDC’s internal elections also take place against the background of a longstanding feature of Ghanaian party politics: the struggle between established networks, ambitious new entrants and competing centres of influence.

Research on factional politics within the NDC has shown how internal groups and power blocs can shape leadership contests and political decision-making. These factions are not necessarily evidence of institutional failure; competition can help parties renew their leadership.

The danger arises when political loyalty to a faction becomes more important than loyalty to the party, or when access to positions and resources is treated as the principal reward for winning an internal contest.

This is where constituency elections become particularly consequential. Constituency executives do not operate in isolation from parliamentary candidates, regional leaders, national officers or influential political patrons. Their choices can strengthen particular networks and alter the balance of influence within the party.

In constituencies where competition is intense, today’s results could shape relationships that remain important during parliamentary primaries and the eventual mobilisation for 2028. The elections are therefore both a contest for local office and an early negotiation over who will have influence when the next cycle of political decisions arrives.

The party’s leadership transition makes this dynamic even more important. National Chairman Johnson Asiedu Nketiah has indicated that he will not seek re-election to the position, creating an opening for a new leadership contest at the national level.

Potential contenders have been discussed publicly, but the eventual field and its alignments must be distinguished from speculation. What is clear is that the constituency and regional structures being formed now will become part of the political environment in which the next national leadership is chosen.

This creates an important relationship between the elections taking place today and the national contest scheduled for later in the year. The constituency elections are not a direct vote on who should become national chairman, but the networks, alliances and loyalties built through them may influence the subsequent contest.

Candidates for national office will need support beyond their immediate constituencies, and local executives can provide a channel through which that support is organised. The question is whether these structures will function as independent party institutions or become extensions of rival leadership campaigns.

The timetable underlines the significance of this sequence. The NDC has scheduled regional executive elections for November 14–15, with the Regional Youth and Women Conference on November 13. National nominations opened on October 20 and closed on October 21; national filing is scheduled for November 7–9, followed by vetting on November 12–13 and appeals on November 15–16.

The National Youth and Women Conference is set for December 12, ahead of the National Congress on December 19, 2026. Each stage will build on the political relationships and tensions generated by the preceding one. If disputes from the constituency level remain unresolved, they could travel upwards through the party’s electoral structure.

One of the most consequential questions concerns the party’s six-month resignation rule under Article 54 of its constitution. The provision requires specified full-time government appointees, including ministers, deputy ministers, chief executives and deputy chief executives of state institutions, and metropolitan, municipal and district chief executives, to resign within the stipulated period if they intend to contest certain party executive positions.

Board chairpersons and members are expressly exempt. The rule should not be interpreted as applying indiscriminately to every government appointee or every party position.

The political significance of the provision extends beyond its technical requirements. It raises a question about how the NDC intends to balance experience in government with fairness in internal competition. Supporters can argue that the rule prevents public officeholders from combining the advantages of state appointments with the pursuit of party positions, thereby protecting the internal electoral process.

Critics may question whether the rule unnecessarily excludes experienced figures who could contribute to party organisation. A reported legal challenge also places the provision within a wider debate about its interpretation and application; the existence of a challenge, however, does not itself establish that the rule has been invalidated.

The deeper test is whether the rule is applied consistently. A constitutional provision strengthens a party when members believe that it is clear, fair and binding on everyone to whom it applies. If it is perceived as a mechanism used selectively against some aspirants while others receive favourable treatment, it can undermine the very legitimacy it is intended to protect.

For the NDC, credibility will depend not only on the wording of Article 54 but also on transparent decisions, clear explanations and an effective process for handling complaints.

Gender representation presents another measure of the party’s organisational health. If women account for around 16 per cent of completed applications, the figure invites scrutiny of the barriers that affect their participation. It does not, on its own, explain whether those barriers arise from campaign costs, local political networks, access to party resources, intimidation, social expectations or other factors.

But it does raise a legitimate question: can a party claim to be renewing its grassroots structures if a substantial part of its potential leadership remains underrepresented? The same scrutiny should be applied to young people, not simply in terms of the number of candidates but in terms of whether they can win positions that carry real authority.

The NDC’s challenge is also clearer when compared with the New Patriotic Party’s approach. The NPP selected Mahamudu Bawumia as its presidential candidate in January 2026, with Bawumia receiving 110,643 votes, or 56.48 per cent, against Kennedy Agyapong’s 46,554 votes. That process settled the party’s presidential candidacy well ahead of the 2028 general election.

The NDC’s current process, by contrast, is primarily about rebuilding and renewing the structures through which the party operates, even as its own national leadership transition approaches.

It would be too simplistic, however, to describe the difference as an NPP “top-down” model against an NDC “bottom-up” model. Both parties depend on grassroots organisation, internal electoral rules and networks of influential party actors.

The difference is one of timing and political emphasis: the NPP has already resolved its presidential nomination, while the NDC is still conducting a sequence of internal elections that will shape its local, regional and national leadership.

The NPP’s early selection may provide a period of relative clarity around its presidential candidate, but it does not automatically guarantee unity or effective mobilisation. Equally, the NDC’s broad internal process may renew its structures, but it cannot guarantee that competing groups will reconcile once the votes are counted.

History offers useful warnings. Ghana’s political transitions in 2000, 2008 and 2016 demonstrate that governing parties can lose power despite possessing established structures and experienced political figures. They also show that opposition parties can return to power when political conditions, public sentiment, leadership and mobilisation align.

These outcomes cannot be explained by internal elections alone. Economic conditions, the credibility of presidential candidates, public perceptions of governance and the effectiveness of campaign strategies all matter. Internal party organisation is therefore best understood as an enabling factor: it helps a party respond to political conditions, but it cannot compensate indefinitely for poor public confidence or a weak national message.

The 2024 presidential results provide a reminder of the scale of the electoral contest ahead. The Electoral Commission’s updated figures put John Dramani Mahama on 6,591,790 votes and Bawumia on 4,877,611, a difference of 1,714,179 votes. Those figures describe the 2024 outcome; they are not a forecast of 2028.

The political environment will change, and both parties will face a different set of economic, governance and leadership questions. Nevertheless, the result reinforces the importance of maintaining a credible national coalition, mobilising supporters and persuading voters beyond a party’s most committed base.

That is the central strategic issue for the NDC. Constituency executives must do more than win internal elections and consolidate their own networks. They must help maintain contact with voters, identify local concerns, communicate the party’s message and ensure that national political decisions are understood at community level.

If the structures become preoccupied with internal rivalries or the distribution of positions, the party risks confusing organisational control with electoral readiness. A party may control its internal machinery without necessarily expanding its appeal among voters.

Today’s results should therefore be assessed against three connected tests: legitimacy, cohesion and performance. Legitimacy means that candidates and members have confidence in the process and its outcomes.

Cohesion means that competition does not permanently fracture local party networks. Performance means that the executives who emerge can organise effectively, remain connected to communities and contribute to the party’s wider political objectives. Failure on any one of these fronts could weaken the value of the exercise.

The NDC has several months of internal elections ahead, culminating in its National Congress on December 19. That gives the party time to resolve disputes, correct procedural weaknesses and build a leadership structure that is both representative and functional.

It also means that tensions arising today could accumulate if they are ignored. The party’s response to defeated aspirants, complaints and allegations of unfairness may prove just as important as the victories themselves.

 Ultimately, the contest is not simply about who wins a constituency executive position. It is about whether the NDC can renew its grassroots leadership without allowing competition to harden into division, and whether its internal structures can translate political organisation into public confidence.

The NPP has already settled its presidential nomination; the NDC is still navigating the internal processes that will shape its organisational and leadership landscape. Neither position guarantees success in 2028.

The decisive question is what each party does with the political advantage it believes it has secured. For the NDC, today’s elections will matter most if they produce more than winners: they must produce credible leaders, functioning constituencies and a party capable of moving from internal competition to a common electoral purpose.

The ballot will determine who takes office. The party’s conduct in the weeks and months that follow will determine whether those victories strengthen its road to 2028 or leave it managing divisions it could have prevented.