Debika Dutta
(debika.dutta2015@gmail.com)
The next struggle for geopolitical power may begin without a missile being fired or a soldier crossing a border. A cable severed beneath the ocean could disrupt financial transactions, interrupt business operations and expose the vulnerability of a nation’s digital infrastructure. There might be no immediate evidence of an attack, no identifiable adversary and no dramatic images to capture public attention. Yet the consequences could extend across continents. While governments compete for supremacy in artificial intelligence and advanced technology, the physical networks carrying the world’s information remain vulnerable to events on the ocean floor. For India, protecting these invisible arteries is no longer simply a telecommunications concern. It is a question of national security, economic resilience and strategic autonomy.
According to the International Telecommunication Union, submarine telecommunications cables carry approximately 99 per cent of international data traffic. They sustain international banking, cloud computing, commercial transactions and government communications. Satellites provide valuable alternatives in particular circumstances, but cannot replace the capacity of the global undersea cable network. Behind the apparent weightlessness of digital communication lies a physical infrastructure shaped by geography, maritime routes, landing stations and specialised repair capabilities. The internet may appear borderless, but its foundations are not. The security of the digital economy depends on infrastructure that crosses international waters and passes through regions where commercial activity, geopolitical rivalry and maritime insecurity intersect.
For India, this dependence exposes a contradiction at the heart of its technological ambitions. The country is expanding its digital public infrastructure, developing artificial intelligence capabilities and attracting investment in data centres and advanced digital services. Yet the ability to process information domestically does not guarantee the ability to exchange it reliably with the world. A country may possess sophisticated computing infrastructure and still remain vulnerable to disruption thousands of kilometres away. Digital sovereignty cannot be measured merely by where data is stored or which country develops a particular technology. It must also be measured by whether essential connections remain dependable when international circumstances deteriorate. India’s challenge is not to withdraw from global networks, but to ensure that interdependence does not become strategic helplessness.
The Red Sea cable disruptions of September 2025 offered a stark illustration. Damage to multiple submarine cables affected connectivity across parts of Asia and the Middle East, while Microsoft reported increased latency for some Azure services. The precise cause was not immediately established. This distinction matters because cables can be damaged by ship anchors, fishing activity, geological events and equipment failures; deliberate interference must not be alleged without evidence. Nevertheless, the incident demonstrated how a physical failure in a geographically confined maritime corridor could affect digital services across a much wider region. Traffic must be redirected, operators must locate faults, and specialised vessels may need to travel to damaged sections before repairs can begin. The digital economy can suffer disruption long before the underlying infrastructure is restored.
The geopolitical danger lies partly in the difficulty of establishing responsibility. Unlike a conventional military attack, cable damage may leave no immediate evidence of hostile intent. A vessel operating near a cable route is not proof of wrongdoing, but uncertainty cannot become an excuse for neglect. If deliberate interference occurs, delayed attribution can complicate deterrence and diplomatic responses. If damage is accidental, inadequate repair arrangements can still magnify its economic consequences. India therefore needs an approach that avoids speculative accusations while strengthening surveillance, investigation and recovery. The most effective defence is not to assume that every disruption is aggression, but to ensure that disruption cannot easily become a prolonged national vulnerability.
The Indian Ocean brings this challenge directly into India’s strategic calculations. The region is traditionally viewed through the movement of energy, commercial shipping and naval forces. Beneath its waters, however, lies another network of growing importance: the cables connecting India with West Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia and Europe. The geography of digital connectivity increasingly overlaps with the geography of maritime security. A disruption along an important route can affect not only shipping but also the information flows supporting commerce and public services. Naval strength remains essential, but warships alone cannot protect a dispersed system of seabed cables, landing stations and repair facilities. Digital infrastructure must become a recognised component of India’s maritime preparedness, supported by coordination among telecommunications operators, maritime authorities, regulators and security agencies.
India has begun addressing this vulnerability. The Department of Telecommunications has pursued measures to strengthen submarine cable resilience, including attention to route diversity, repair readiness and the availability of specialised vessels. India’s participation in international initiatives on cable resilience also provides a platform for cooperation. These efforts are important, but their value will depend on implementation. A policy framework matters most when a critical connection fails: when repair equipment is needed, a vessel must be mobilised, or operators must redirect traffic. India’s preparedness should be judged by its ability to manage such circumstances, not merely by the existence of plans and institutional arrangements.
The next challenge is to make resilience measurable. A greater number of cables does not automatically provide greater security if several follow similar routes or converge near the same vulnerable maritime passages. Geographic diversity must be genuine, and alternative systems must have sufficient capacity to carry traffic when another connection fails. Repair readiness matters just as much. Specialised vessels, trained crews, spare cable and technical equipment are indispensable, while administrative delays can prolong disruption. India should strengthen domestic expertise and establish dependable arrangements with international operators so that an emergency does not become a crisis simply because the necessary equipment or personnel cannot be mobilised in time.
Institutional coordination is equally important. Cable operators possess technical information, maritime agencies monitor activity at sea, and security institutions assess potential threats. If these bodies work in isolation, responses may be slower than circumstances permit. Clear responsibilities, timely information-sharing and coordinated emergency exercises should form part of India’s critical-infrastructure preparedness. Commercial investment must remain central to cable development, but market competition alone cannot guarantee national resilience. The government must ensure that decisions about routes, landing stations and repair arrangements take account of strategic interests without imposing unnecessary restrictions that discourage investment.
No country can independently secure the entire global network. India should therefore work with Indian Ocean partners to improve maritime awareness, exchange information about incidents, facilitate emergency repairs and strengthen practical arrangements for protecting shared infrastructure. Such cooperation need not depend on agreement over every geopolitical question. Reliable communications serve a common economic interest, even among countries that disagree on other matters. India can help ensure that protecting essential connectivity becomes an area of practical cooperation rather than another instrument of strategic rivalry.
The larger question is what strategic autonomy means in an interconnected world. It cannot mean eliminating every external dependency; that would be impossible for any major economy. It must mean possessing sufficient domestic capabilities, alternative routes and dependable partnerships to prevent disruption from becoming a crisis of national proportions. As artificial intelligence, digital finance and data-intensive industries grow, reliable international connectivity will become even more important to India’s economic competitiveness. Submarine cable security must consequently find a permanent place in the country’s thinking on maritime strategy, technological development and economic security.
The cables beneath the oceans rarely attract public attention, yet they carry the information that sustains modern commerce and connects societies across continents. Their protection is not a peripheral technical matter; it is part of the infrastructure of national power. India must prepare for this reality before a major crisis makes the cost of neglect unmistakable. The next contest for influence may depend not simply on which country develops the most advanced technology, but on which country can keep its systems functioning when the networks supporting them come under pressure. For India, digital sovereignty will ultimately be measured not merely by the technology it creates, but by its ability to remain connected when the routes beneath the waves become contested.