The Gulf can no longer afford to treat Iran’s proxy strategy as a series of isolated security incidents. Every missile launched toward Saudi Arabia, every threat against critical infrastructure and every attempt to intimidate commercial shipping exposes a regional vulnerability that no Gulf state can afford to ignore. The use of armed groups to pressure sovereign governments, disrupt trade and advance geopolitical objectives is not simply a security problem for the country under attack. It is a direct challenge to the stability of the entire region.
Saudi Arabia is not confronting a threat confined to Yemen. It faces a broader strategic challenge in which Iran-aligned groups possess the capacity to threaten Arab states, endanger civilian lives and place vital economic arteries at risk. The Houthis may launch the missiles and drones but the consequences extend across the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea and the international trading system.
The fundamental question is whether the Gulf can establish credible deterrence against a strategy that exploits regional divisions and turns insecurity into an instrument of political coercion.
For Saudi Arabia, this is about more than defending territory. It is about refusing to accept a regional order in which an armed militia can threaten a sovereign state, target critical infrastructure and disrupt international commerce without facing meaningful consequences. No government can be expected to tolerate an indefinite campaign of intimidation against its population and economic assets. The right to defend national security is fundamental.
The Gulf has the resources, strategic partnerships and institutional foundations to respond more effectively
Hani Hazaimeh
Yet Saudi Arabia cannot be expected to shoulder this challenge alone. If attacks against one Gulf state are treated as someone else’s problem, the precedent threatens every member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Today’s target may be a Saudi airport, an energy installation or a commercial vessel. Tomorrow, another country’s ports, power facilities, desalination plants or transport networks could face similar threats.
The assumption that geography, diplomacy or economic interdependence will insulate individual states from regional instability is increasingly difficult to sustain. Modern missile and drone warfare has reduced the protection offered by distance, while threats to maritime routes can affect economies far beyond the immediate area of confrontation. The security of one Gulf state is therefore inseparable from the security of its neighbors.
This reality demands a shift from expressions of solidarity to practical defense cooperation. GCC countries should strengthen intelligence sharing, improve coordination between air defense systems and establish more effective mechanisms for detecting and responding to missile and drone threats. Joint exercises must test not only interception capabilities but also the protection of civilian infrastructure, the continuity of essential services and recovery following an attack.
Such cooperation would not eliminate every vulnerability but it would make it harder for hostile actors to exploit gaps between national defenses. It would also demonstrate that attacks designed to intimidate one government will encounter a coordinated regional response rather than fragmented reactions.
Iran’s proxy strategy benefits when neighboring states disagree over the scale of the threat or the appropriate response
Hani Hazaimeh
Maritime security requires the same urgency. The Red Sea, Bab Al-Mandab Strait and Strait of Hormuz are strategic arteries connecting Gulf economies to global markets. Threats to commercial shipping can increase insurance premiums, disrupt supply chains, delay energy deliveries and undermine confidence in regional trade. The consequences reach consumers and businesses worldwide, giving the international community a direct stake in protecting freedom of navigation.
Gulf states should expand maritime intelligence sharing, coordinate patrols and strengthen efforts to detect and intercept illicit weapons shipments in accordance with international law. These measures must be accompanied by sustained diplomatic engagement with international partners and the effective implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
Restricting weapons supplies is particularly important because deterrence cannot depend exclusively on intercepting missiles after they have been launched. It must also address the networks that enable armed groups to acquire, transport and maintain the weapons used to threaten neighboring states. Where evidence establishes violations of applicable international obligations, those responsible for facilitating illicit transfers must face accountability.
At the same time, strategic clarity requires distinguishing established facts from assumptions. The Houthis also retain their own leadership, interests and capacity to make decisions. Recognizing this does not diminish concerns about Tehran’s regional policies; it helps ensure that diplomatic, economic and security measures target the actors and networks responsible.
Nor should confronting the Houthis mean treating Yemen’s population as an adversary. Years of conflict have inflicted immense suffering on ordinary Yemenis, whose interests cannot be equated with those of an armed movement. A sustainable strategy must combine deterrence with support for a political settlement, humanitarian assistance and efforts to prevent Yemen from remaining a platform for attacks against its neighbors.
Diplomacy should remain part of the response but it cannot substitute for credible defense. Engagement with Tehran must convey that regional stability requires respect for sovereignty, an end to threats against neighboring states and a commitment to preventing armed groups from destabilizing the region. Dialogue without accountability risks becoming an exercise in managing recurring crises rather than resolving the conditions that produce them.
The wider international community also has a responsibility to uphold consistent standards. Sovereignty, civilian protection and freedom of navigation cannot be defended selectively according to political convenience. Allowing armed groups to use violence as leverage against sovereign states weakens international norms and creates incentives for other actors to adopt similar tactics.
The Gulf has the resources, strategic partnerships and institutional foundations to respond more effectively. What remains essential is sustained political coordination and a shared recognition that fragmented responses invite further pressure. Collective security must mean more than issuing condemnations after attacks; it must involve the capabilities, agreements and political resolve necessary to prevent aggression and limit its consequences.
Saudi Arabia should not have to confront this challenge in isolation, just as no Gulf state should assume that restraint alone will protect it from the consequences of proxy warfare. Deterrence does not require an appetite for endless confrontation. It requires credible defenses, coordinated action and a clear understanding that attacks on civilian infrastructure and international commerce will not be accepted as normal instruments of regional politics.
Iran’s proxy strategy benefits when neighboring states disagree over the scale of the threat or the appropriate response. The Gulf must deny it that advantage by closing security gaps, protecting shared economic interests and reinforcing the principle that sovereignty is not negotiable.
The choice is between continuing to manage each attack as a separate emergency and building a regional framework capable of addressing the underlying threat. The former leaves the Gulf vulnerable to repeated coercion, while the latter offers a more credible path to stability.
The Gulf must stop treating proxy warfare as someone else’s problem. Its security, economic ambitions and regional standing depend on recognizing that an attack on one state can become a threat to all — and responding accordingly.
Hani Hazaimeh is a senior editor based in Amman.
X: @hanihazaimeh