Passionate about promoting aviation, the beauty of flight and the science behind it, Antonio is an avid reader of aviation magazines and books, and he loves visiting airshows all over the world, taking photos and writing about airplanes and helicopters as well. He is currently based in Palermo, Sicily.
Airbus spent most of the last decade watching its largest twinjet play second fiddle to an aircraft that had not yet carried a single paying passenger. The Airbus A350-1000 entered service with 
Qatar Airways in 2018, yet for years it lived in the shadow of the Boeing 777-300ER and, later, the Boeing 777X, which 
Boeing promised for 2020. That delivery is now targeted for 2027, about seven years late, and the market has finally started to move. By June, Airbus data showed the A350-1000 had 367 orders and 114 deliveries, a far healthier position than its sluggish early sales ever suggested.
The key question is why demand has picked up now, rather than when the aircraft entered service, and whether the momentum will last. 
Air Canada, 
Riyadh Air, Philippine Airlines and even 
Emirates have all been pulled toward the type, while Airbus studies a stretched version that could challenge Boeing's largest jet head-on. Understanding the shift means looking first at why the A350-1000 struggled early, then at how Boeing's delays rewrote the buying logic, and finally at what Airbus might do with its sudden leverage.
The A350-1000 Faced An Uphill Battle From The Start
Airbus launched a strong aircraft into a market where many airlines already knew what they wanted. The 777-300ER had been the benchmark for large, long-range twinjets for years, and carriers looking for more than 350 seats on demanding routes had little reason to switch. The A350-1000 offered higher fuel efficiency and a newer composite airframe, but it arrived with a modest order book and no obvious must-have customer beyond its launch operator, Qatar Airways. Airlines also tend to favor evolutionary choices, and the larger A350 looked like a familiar design stretch rather than a leap.
Boeing's pitch made the choice harder still. The 777X, with its larger capacity and folding wingtips that let it fit standard gates, was positioned as the natural heir to the 777-300ER, and many carriers simply decided to wait. According to One Mile At A Time, Emirates planned to rely almost exclusively on the 777X for fleet renewal and had a total of 205 aircraft on order. An airline with that kind of commitment had little incentive to buy the Airbus alternative, however efficient it was. The 777X date kept sliding, and the A350-1000 was left to sell on its own merits.
Those merits were real, but so was a lingering worry about the Rolls-Royce engines, and sales stayed slow while Airbus kept building the aircraft anyway. The delay has left the market asking how much longer Boeing's schedule can slip, and what that means for Airbus.
Boeing's 777X Delays Changed The Competition
The 777X was meant to enter service in 2020 and is now targeted for 2027, roughly seven years late. That has left Emirates unable to count on the program for growth, according to One Mile At A Time. For airlines with aging 777-300ERs, that gap is not abstract. Every extra year of delay means another year of older aircraft, higher fuel prices and heavier maintenance. Boeing also carries a reputational cost, since a program that slips year after year hands its rival a standing sales argument.
The delay has also changed the competitive balance. In its comparison of the 777-9 and the A350-1000, the delay has already decided half the market in Airbus' favor. Airbus has kept selling throughout. By mid-November 2025, A350-1000 orders for the year had reached 77, after Airbus' monthly update, and the backlog ended 2025 at 258 aircraft, according to ePlaneAI.
Financiers notice this momentum because lenders and lessors rely on appraisal overviews, such as the one in American Airlines' 2026 Form 424B5 filing with the SEC, to judge how aircraft hold their value, and a jet that can be delivered is easier to value than one still awaiting certification. In that sense, the A350-1000's rising order count is not only a sales story but also a statement about perceived risk.
Airlines Are Turning To The A350-1000
Air Canada offers the clearest example of the shift. In February 2026, the carrier placed a firm order for eight A350-1000s, with rights to eight more. Simple Flying previously explored why the airline chose them over the 777X to replace its 777-300ERs. The deal secures delivery slots from the second half of 2030, which shows how long the queue for large twinjets has become. For a carrier retiring long-serving 777-300ERs, a firm delivery date mattered more than a bigger aircraft on paper.
Riyadh Air and Philippine Airlines have also placed orders recently, that 
Etihad Airways and Philippine Airlines have shown real enthusiasm for the type while other carriers remain cautious, according to ePlaneAI. Even Emirates, which had publicly criticized the Trent XWB-97 engines, was in advanced talks for at least 30 A350-1000s in late 2025, One Mile At A Time reported. That is a remarkable turn for an airline that had built its fleet strategy around the 777X. A trend emerged: carriers that once treated the A350-1000 as a niche choice now see it as a way to secure capacity on a predictable timeline.
Emirates' reported change of heart points to the A350-1000's main selling point: a combination of economics and availability, rather than novelty. Its specifications help explain why that matters.
Range is one clear advantage. The A350-1000 is listed at roughly 8,700 nautical miles (16,100 km), while the 777-9 is rated for about 7,285 nautical miles (13,492 km), a difference of about 1,400 nautical miles (2,600 km), according to The Flying Engineer's 2026 comparison. That edge matters on thin ultra-long routes, where airlines want a large aircraft without payload restrictions. The A350-1000 is already in production, with more than 100 delivered, while the 777-9 is still awaiting its first customer handover. For buyers such as Air Canada and Riyadh Air, that certainty of availability is a selling point in itself.
Airbus has pushed the envelope further with the ultra-long-range version. Qantas' Airbus A350-1000ULR completed a marathon test flight of about 12,460 miles (20,050 km) in late July, a demonstration for the Sydney–London flights known as Project Sunrise. Airbus' October 2026 widebody presentation describes the A350-1000ULR as a key part of the project, with 12 aircraft ordered and a planned maximum range exceeding 9,700 nautical miles (17,965 km). In a presentation delivered on October 13, Airbus lists certification and first delivery for 2027, following the aircraft's first flight on June 2. These remain program targets, rather than confirmation that the aircraft has entered commercial service. Boeing has nothing comparable to fly, and that was precisely Qantas's reason for choosing Airbus.
The figures make a strong case for Airbus, but they do not settle the question that has followed it since launch: engine durability. Rolls-Royce must show it can address operators' concerns.
Rolls-Royce Still Has To Address The Engine Concerns
Not every part of the A350-1000's story is positive. The engine remains the strongest argument against the aircraft. One Mile At A Time noted that Emirates President Sir Tim Clark has called the Trent XWB-97 engines defective, and that frequent maintenance cycles are especially punishing in the hot Gulf climate. In its presentation this month, Airbus outlined an additional durability package for the Rolls-Royce Trent XWB-97, saying the engine is expected to achieve “up to double the time on wing from 2028.” The planned changes include redesigned hot-section components, a new high-pressure turbine seal segment, and combustor and temperature-profile modifications. The target matters for airlines concerned about maintenance intervals, although the presentation does not show that the improvement has already been achieved in operational service.
Emirates reportedly weighed an order for at least 30 A350-1000s because the 777X remained unavailable, suggesting delivery certainty can outweigh engine criticism as fleets age. Rival Gulf carriers Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways fly the type too, though the same report observed that Qatar has recently placed a large Boeing order rather than ordering more A350s.
Clark's complaint, according to The Flying Engineer, is that the engines stay on the wing for only about a quarter of the time Emirates needs between maintenance visits. Rolls-Royce's durability program targets that gap.
If Rolls-Royce can make the engine concerns more manageable, Airbus will have a stronger case for expanding the family. The next question is whether that means taking on Boeing's biggest jet more directly.
The A350-2000 Could Turn Airbus' Momentum Into A Lasting Advantage
Growing interest has given Airbus a reason to consider a larger version. The company is studying a stretched aircraft, informally called the A350-2000, which it presented at the 2025 Dubai Airshow, ePlaneAI reported. The aim is to fill the gap between the A350-1000 and the 777X. Whether the project becomes a formal launch will depend less on engineering than on whether airlines believe a larger twin is still needed once the 777X finally arrives, and whether Airbus can fit another variant into a busy A350 production system.
The next few years should show whether Airbus has gained a lasting advantage. If Boeing delivers its first 777-9 in 2027 while airlines such as Air Canada continue taking A350-1000 delivery slots into the second half of 2030, Airbus' position may prove more than a temporary beneficiary of delays. Timing helps Airbus here, because every large-twinjet customer that signs now locks in a decade of fleet commonality, crew training and spares support. If Emirates converts its reported interest into a firm order, that would signal that the 777X delay changed even its most loyal customer's thinking.
The Flying Engineer concludes that airlines needing aircraft now have no practical choice but the A350-1000, while the decision grows harder for deliveries between 2027 and 2030. That is the open door: a Boeing recovery that arrives too late to win back the customers Airbus has already signed.