The backstory: When West 'tricked' Russia to overthrow Gaddafi's regime in Libya

Fifteen years ago, Muammar Gaddafi’s over four-decade-long dictatorial rule in Libya ended in a drainage pipe. A Nato raid had struck his convoy, and insurgents executed him while Western capitals cheered."We came, we saw, he died," Hillary Clinton, then US secretary of state, famously quipped. Moscow watched with a very different feeling. Many Russians, primarily Vladimir Putin, were convinced they had been played.Gaddafi's regime fell during the Arab Spring, the wave of uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa that year, and his end marked the success of a Western-led military campaign.For Russia, however, it marked something else. Moscow believed it was misled into allowing that campaign, and the resentment still shapes its dealings with the West.

The UN resolution 1973

The beginning of the end of Gaddafi's regime began at the UN security council, where Russia, the United States, Britain, France and China can each block a decision with a veto. However, the regime's fate in Tripoli was sealed with a trick.On March 17, 2011, with Gaddafi’s forces turning their guns on rebels in Benghazi, the council voted on Resolution 1973. It allowed Nato countries to use "all necessary measures" to protect civilians and banned flights over Libya, while ruling out any foreign occupation force.

Russia could have vetoed it, but it chose to abstain, as personally ordered by President Dmitry Medvedev. Moscow failed to read between the lines. And the resolution passed.Nevertheless, UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, still warned that the wording allowed wide-ranging military intervention. But it all fell on deaf ears.

Kremlin had read the resolution as a shield for civilians, starting with the city of Benghazi, plus a ban on flights over Libya.The resolution did rule out a foreign occupation force, which sounded like a limit, but that limit covered only a land invasion. For everything else, the text authorised "all necessary measures" to protect civilians under threat, and it never specified who would judge what was necessary.Western powers, basically, maintained that civilians would remain at risk as long as Gaddafi was in power. The objective was clear.

Regime change.A year later, a Western diplomat involved with the resolution said he was "astonished" that the Russians had allowed it. "We would have settled for much less," he told journalist Jeremy Bowen.

When Putin felt played

After the US, France and Britain launched airstrikes against Libya, Russia accused them of exceeding the mandate granted by Resolution 1973. Moscow believed the authorisation to protect civilians had become a means of removing Gaddafi from power, allowing Western governments to reshape Libya’s political future at Russia’s expense.Vladimir Putin, then Russia’s prime minister, condemned the resolution by comparing it to a medieval call for a crusade. He believed that Gaddafi had forfeited his legitimacy by ordering violence against civilians, but warned that a military overthrow could plunge Libya into prolonged instability.

Russia subsequently explored a diplomatic solution through its envoy, Mikhail Margelov. Margelov maintained that political crises could not be resolved through military force alone.

Despite these efforts, Moscow failed to halt the campaign led by Nato, which also received support from wealthy regional allies, including Qatar.

The lesson Moscow took to Syria

Sergey Lavrov, who served as Russia’s ambassador to the UN during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, viewed the Libya intervention as another instance in which Western powers had exploited a Security Council resolution to advance their own objectives. Western officials believed the experience reinforced his determination to prevent a similar outcome in Syria.When the Syrian conflict came before the security council, Russia and China repeatedly blocked efforts to condemn President Bashar al-Assad’s government. Moscow would eventually exercise its veto on Syria 15 more times. Libyan episode also weakened Dmitry Medvedev’s influence over Russian foreign policy while strengthening hardliners within the defence ministry.Russia, therefore, continues to blame Nato for Libya’s collapse, arguing that the intervention undermined state institutions and contributed to the spread of terrorism and migration.

Nato maintains that its operation was legitimate and necessary, while attributing Libya’s subsequent crisis to developments from 2014 onwards.Whether Moscow misjudged the resolution’s language or believed Western powers had deliberately exploited it remains contested. However, the intervention left Russia deeply distrustful of Western-backed resolutions and more determined to prevent similar outcomes in subsequent conflicts.