For several years now, the West’s strategic focus has been clearly defined: the threat on the eastern flank, centred on the war between Russia and Ukraine; the rivalry with China, centred on trade and industry; and, since the start of this year, the standoff between the United States and Iran. With such priorities, and precisely in that order (although the consequences arising from the situation in Iran, with its ramifications extending to Bab el-Mandeb, may bring about a shift in these priorities), the southern flank is treated as little more than a problem to be managed, rather than a front of primary geopolitical and strategic importance. And this attitude is nothing short of a terrible misjudgement.
What is happening between Bamako, Ouagadougou, Nouakchott, Niamey, Algiers and Rabat is not a series of local crises, but a single system that has been in a state of constant reorganisation for decades, linked to other conflicts through three channels: energy, migration and the geopolitical power games between major powers. The problem is that this lack of vision overlooks the fact that this system is shifting northwards (and the most recent example of this has occurred on Spanish soil) and that Europe, with Spain on the front line, has less leeway than it realises.
Coups in the Sahel countries
The sequence of events is all too familiar, and yet it seems to be ignored. A series of coups d’état took place in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger between 2020 and 2023; French troops were expelled, the European Union abandoned its training mission in Mali, the UN mission withdrew, and the three countries formed an alliance that promised to restore sovereignty to their states. The situation as of October 2026 is crystal clear: they have not kept that promise.
On 25 April, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, and the Azawad Liberation Front, a Tuareg rebel group – in an alliance reminiscent of times gone by and with actions that took us back to 2012 – coordinated attacks against Bamako, Kati, Gao, Mopti and Kidal: the largest offensive in Mali since that fateful year. The fuel blockade of the capital, which began in September 2025, continues to hold the country in its grip: in mid-September, more than nine hundred tankers entered Bamako under military escort, a sign of just how precarious the supply routes are. A few days earlier, JNIM had raided the Dioura camp in the centre of the country and, according to the AFP news agency, killed at least one hundred soldiers.
The lesson to be drawn from all this is as simple as it is worrying: JNIM does not need to take Bamako; it is enough for it to suffocate the city. In 2026, it has chosen to strangle the cities economically rather than storm them. It is a strategy of wearing down the state, not of conquest, and it works because the juntas inherited weak institutions and have militarised them even further. Hiring the Russian Africa Corps, the successor to Wagner – thereby playing into the hands of Moscow, which has seized the opportunity to fill a void left by Europe – has not altered the equation: they have the capacity to offer protection to the regime (which in those parts is usually sufficient for the mindset of the ruling class, whatever it may be), but not control over the territory. And the latest news regarding the setbacks suffered by Russian forces, including some airborne units, only serves to corroborate the above assertion.
Advance towards the south
The most worrying aspect is the direction of the advance: clearly southwards. And Benin is the testing ground. JNIM has appointed an emir for that country, ordering him to expand towards the coastal states, and its method mirrors that followed in Burkina Faso five years ago: reconnaissance of the terrain, a low-profile presence in rural markets, sporadic attacks and, finally, setting up checkpoints and collecting taxes from local communities, whilst gradually establishing its entire infrastructure within them and offering them the services they lack. On 25 May, four Beninese soldiers were killed in an attack on two bases near the border with Burkina Faso, one day after President Wadagni’s inauguration. The nature reserves of the W-Pendjari complex serve as a logistical rear base, which is also part of the jihadists’ traditional modus operandi.
And although some downplay what is happening, considering that it does not affect us, we should not trivialise the situation. A recent analysis by the Higher Centre for National Defence Studies (CESEDEN) argues that there is no territorial conquest, but rather a division of roles: Benin and Togo serve as areas for operational expansion, whilst Ghana, above all, serves as a supply and transit hub. Furthermore, the ACLED database has recorded acts of sabotage linked to the oil pipeline between Niger and Benin and an increasing use of drones (something that is by no means trivial and which should be one of the issues setting off all our alarm bells). The objective, therefore, is not only political, but also economic and logistical.
Access to the sea
This matters thousands of kilometres away for a structural reason. The three countries in the Sahelian alliance are landlocked and depend on the ports of Cotonou, Lomé, Tema and Abidjan. The more security deteriorates in the coastal states, the more expensive and uncertain the Atlantic routes across the whole of West Africa will become, and the stronger the temptation will be for the juntas to seek routes northwards, via the Maghreb, bringing destabilisation closer to our final frontier. Furthermore, the new front towards Nigeria brings the threat closer to a major producer of gas and oil.
When analysing the various conflict scenarios in isolation, we often lose perspective and overlook the connections that usually, in one way or another, link them together. We shall therefore now attempt to highlight these connections that are often overlooked.
- Ukraine and the rivalry with Russia. Moscow has turned West Africa into a sphere in which to project its influence, filling the void left by Europe and wearing down the West at low cost. It does not need to win in the Sahel; it is enough for it to offer the juntas an alternative partner, spread anti-Western rhetoric and keep Europe in the dark, with no information or presence on the ground. Resources are not infinite, so every euro and every intelligence resource absorbed by the eastern front is one that is not deployed in the south. This creates a vicious circle: the Western withdrawal creates a vacuum, the vacuum invites Russia in, and the Russian presence justifies not returning.
- Hormuz and energy. The conflict between the United States and Iran has had disastrous consequences for the hydrocarbon market, including the blockage of a significant proportion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Gulf. European gas prices rose from around 27 euros per megawatt-hour in January to over 80 in September (84 on the 14th, and around 70 by the end of the month), and the Commissioner for Energy, Dan Jørgensen, has called for a reduction in consumption as winter approaches with reserves far lower than recommended. This is why sources from the Atlantic and Maghreb regions are becoming increasingly valuable: Algerian gas via pipeline, Nigerian gas in the form of LNG and, in the longer term, the fields in Mauritania and Senegal. It is a bitter irony, or perhaps fate’s way of making us pay not for our faults, but for our inaction and lack of vision: Europe needs, more than ever, the very countries whose stability is in doubt.
- The Maghreb and the Algerian-Moroccan rivalry. Algeria and Morocco are competing for influence in the Sahel, over Western Sahara and to be Europe’s preferred partner. The Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline has remained closed since 2021 in its original direction; Morocco imports LNG which is regasified in Spain and arrives via the same route, but in the opposite direction. Spain, which in 2022 backed Morocco’s proposal for autonomy in the Sahara, saw Algeria freeze the Treaty of Friendship. This year, however, relations appeared to be beginning to mend: in March, Madrid negotiated with Algiers to expand the Medgaz pipeline, and in July they agreed to resume cooperation. However, Spain’s cancellation of the high-level meeting with Algeria scheduled for late October could scupper everything, even though, in theory, we would be talking about a perfect triangle: Spain depends on Algeria for its gas, on Morocco for its southern border, and on both to ensure their rivalry does not get out of hand.
And, as might be expected, in this context – despite national blindness – Spain is the most exposed and the most valuable player.
Spain currently bears the greatest risk and also holds the greatest asset. It is the gateway for Algerian gas, has one of the largest regasification capacities in the EU, and maintains solid police cooperation with Mauritania and Senegal. But it has two serious vulnerabilities. The first is our diabolical simultaneous dependence on two rival neighbours (whose hostility we have never known how to use to our advantage, as others would do without hesitation). Any gesture towards one is paid for by the other, as we saw back in 2022. The second is that the stability of its most vulnerable points from a territorial perspective – Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands – depends on decisions taken in foreign capitals, largely due to inaction or a lack of foresight and independent decision-making. July demonstrated that the capacity to react is limited when tens of thousands of people arrive in two days, if the appropriate measures have not been taken in advance.
Added to this is a problem of doctrine. Spain lacks an integrated strategy for the Sahara and the African Atlantic that links foreign policy, defence, energy and development cooperation. The External Action Strategy and the Africa plans have yielded results, but they remain isolated elements.
Conclusions
In light of the above, we can draw the following conclusions:
- The Sahel cannot be contained; it is shifting. Without an alternative security architecture, the pressure will continue to move down towards the coast and up towards the Maghreb. What is today a problem for states that do not control their territory will tomorrow be a logistical and commercial problem for the Atlantic ports.
- Crises are linked by underlying factors, not by coincidence. Energy links Hormuz with Algiers; the border links Rabat with Ceuta; competition with Russia links Ukraine with Bamako. Analysing them separately means missing half the picture.
- Whoever controls the passage controls the agenda. As long as Europe depends on third parties to monitor its southern border and supply it with gas, its foreign policy will be constrained. Diversifying partners, routes and sources is a matter of national security.
- Early prevention is cheaper than reaction. Strengthening intelligence and monitoring of the Sahel–Gulf of Guinea corridor and acting before the coastal states are compromised is a sound proposal: Benin and Togo still represent a window of opportunity, not a lost cause.
- Spain needs a doctrine for the south. It must act as a European player with a voice of its own: promoting and leading a common policy for the southern flank with funding and a mandate; balancing its relationship with Algeria and Morocco without allowing itself to be drawn into the rivalry between them; and preparing Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands for crises on a massive scale by coordinating not only preventive measures at national and European level, but also reactive measures that serve as a clear and effective deterrent at all levels.
- Military stability without good governance is illusory. Without basic services, border control and local justice, every counter-terrorism operation is merely a temporary respite, a stopgap that plugs a leak for a moment. The link between security and development is not just a slogan: it is the only way to prevent extremist recruitment from replenishing its ranks faster than it is being combated.
To ignore the southern flank is to accept a belt of continuous instability on Europe’s doorstep. But there is a worse version of that mistake: believing it can be managed without paying an ever-increasing political, energy and human cost. The approaching winter and the images from Ceuta in July are warnings that the bill has already begun to arrive.
These are just a few brief insights into what it means to broaden our perspective and address conflicts as a whole. The only certainty we have at present is that, whilst last year was difficult, if we do not take action and get down to work immediately, the coming year is likely to be even worse.