Ukraine and the radical changes in warfare

Last Tuesday, we discovered the extent of Ukraine’s dependence on one man. Not Zelensky or Trump, but Elon Musk and his SpaceX company. His Starshield, a militarily encrypted version of the Starlink network of 10,000 low-orbit, geostationary satellites, had become the backbone of military communication in Ukraine, enabling incoming killer missiles and drones to be intercepted, and far off targets destroyed, at lightning speed. Suddenly, Ukraine found its interface with Starshield restricted and its ability to chase all but the slowest of attacking devices impeded.

While Musk, Trump and the Pentagon blame each other for the blackout, Kyiv is suffering from lost drones and disrupted missions, while Moscow’s missiles are raining down virtually unchecked. The point is less who’s to blame than the fact that Kyiv was obliged to rely on a single system, with no back-up. More generally, communications resilience is an issue taxing many countries, with the result that a military satellite race has begun, and why Space Commands are sprouting across the globe like mushrooms. 

The good news is that there are currently six European commercial alternatives to Starlink/Starshield, including two focussed on maritime traffic, with two further ventures planned, plus ten in America, but none are as fully developed, and all are prey to transnational squabbles over control. NATO also maintains its own satellite communications (SATCOM) services, but all require exactly that elusive quality, resilience. Coverage may resume, but today’s controversy over access to Starshield should be a wakeup call to the dangers of a single defence system or technology failing. 

At the same moment Zelensky’s Starshield cover was disintegrating, I was being briefed by military colleagues just back from Ukraine. They began with the observation that there is no such thing as a front line any more. The forward edge of the battle areas — the so-called fortress belt, shielding Ukraine from Russian forces in the Donbass — are held very lightly, with none of the density of troops or foxholes found in either world war. Instead, they have been replaced by a dense mesh of unmanned systems, optical devices and other sensors, some concealed on the ground, which can cover forward areas 24/7, day and night, in all weathers. Dozens of kilometres can now be held by a few hundred well-equipped defenders, who can call on precision-guided artillery and/or drones in the event of trouble. Small raiding parties of interlopers from both sides, often armed with tactical quadcopters, occasionally filter through the notional front on foot, having navigated minefields and concrete anti-tank obstacles, but cannot achieve much and do not linger. My friends believe the days of banning anti-personnel mines appear to be over. 

To skimp on manpower, both sides have found it expedient to cover terrain by fire, rather than the traditional methodology of humans dug deep into the earth. Painful memories of days wasted on NATO exercises digging trenches flashed through my mind. Furthermore, outside of urban areas, combat zones with an ever-present risk of drone or artillery interception may stretch as deep as 20km, so the concept of front and rear has also disappeared. However, such tactical depth is not always available to small countries, such as the Baltic states. In urban areas, whenever Russia claims possession of a new settlement or objective, its troops are rarely able to move around above ground by day, due to opposing drone activity. New gains announced by Moscow are in fact merely of cellars and subterranean passages. It takes us back to the old adage that to take and hold ground, you need ‘boots on the ground’, not a few nervous moles. My colleagues suggested, “It’s like claiming control of an ocean, from the seabed”. 

And those drones? The latest figures from Ukraine are suggesting 85 per cent of Moscow’s human and equipment casualties are allegedly caused by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or artillery and mortars directed by them. According to retired General David Petraeus, including long-range strikes and air defence, Kyiv is routinely expending between 9,000-10,000 UAVs per day and aims to manufacture 7m in 2006. On that basis, any NATO partner that boasts of being drone-ready for the next war, will need an arsenal of a minimum of 3.5 million cutting-edge UAVs and the manufacturing capability to replace them, to conduct operations for a year. 

Often of the First Person View (FPV) type, identifiable by the spools of gossamer-thin wire they carry (which keeps them proof against electronic interference, but limits their range) UAVs come with the advantage of being cheap and easy to assemble. Crucially, these cunning little devices and their longer-range brethren have largely replaced (often American-built) cruise missiles, regarded as exorbitantly expensive by comparison, with long lead times. It is, put simply, the economics of interception, and a logic that is starting to spread to Western navies.

Via UAVs and waterborne drones, Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), Kyiv now controls huge swathes of the Black Sea. Recently a Ukrainian USV successfully intercepted and destroyed a Russian USV in a world-first tactical clash of this type. This activity has pushed the Russians to begin to use their Caspian Sea flotilla to launch long-range missiles, as their Black Sea warships are so degraded. Practical combat experience is also suggesting that all soldiers, in every arm or service, will need to be trained in small drone operation, which is proving to be as basic a required skill in war as operating a rifle. Furthermore, the most important figure to whom troops now report seems not to be the ranking infantry officer, but the network engineer or coder. They are the ones who need to know of the success or otherwise of their various integrated unmanned systems and can make on-the-spot adjustments, or send the necessary reports up the command chain. 

Tweaks might include the ability of drones to take prisoners (Russians are now known to be surrendering to machines), and the availability of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to not only bring up all manner of logistics, but return with casualties. All the engineers have a price on their heads, and as a result, their workshops are better protected than traditional headquarters because their signature across the electromagnetic spectrum is huge. This is becoming a perennial problem for the Ukrainians but one they have exploited amongst Russian positions for some time. 

Another drone development was unveiled very recently by Kyiv’s 475th Assault Regiment who sent a Challenger 2 tank and a Bradley M2 infantry fighting vehicle against Russians in a forward area. Normally this would result in instant destruction, but addition to being surrounded by protective metal cages (‘turtles’) and armed with welded-on spikes to trigger incoming warheads (‘hedgehogs’), the armoured vehicles were protected by new classes of crewless aerial scouting and escort craft, devised to protect friendly ground assets from air interference. Drone apparently fought drone, while others dropped grenades to suppress Russian positions and clear mines. 

In terms of President Trump’s current obsession, I was told that the use of Artificial Intelligence is so far massively exaggerated. Still in its very early stages, it features where one might expect, in some situational awareness, targeting, logistics planning, intelligence fusion, drone and artillery guidance processes. With Ukraine and its software advisors very aware this is the first peer versus peer conflict where AI is playing a role, its use is generally limited to speeding up processing times from hours to minutes, at speeds conventional systems cannot replicate.

Analysts had expected AI to immediately support the military OODA (Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act)-loop, which emphasises the sequence of decision-making in war first identified by USAF pilot John Boyd in the early 1970s. He highlighted the importance of rapidly and accurately acquiring information and acting on it quicker than your foe. It was seen as causing the Wehrmacht’s besting of the French in 1940. Today, it is assessed that the side whose OODA-loop is fastest is likely to prevail, but AI has apparently yet to be introduced into that cycle. 

The latest escalation has seen both sides target each other’s data centres to cripple internet connectivity and broader digital infrastructure. Recent weeks have seen Ukraine mount several missile attacks against centres run by Yandex, disrupting telecom systems and the apps and services that run on them, in retaliation for Russian attacks on those of Ukraine. This was a tactic copied from the Iran-Middle East War, and one for which the West currently has no answer, as such targets have few defences from air or ground attack, and none that are coordinated or tested. This facet is one of the most interesting innovations of this war, for in hindsight they are an obvious target, and will certainly be considered an effective and legitimate strategic objective in any conflict from now on. 

Attention has also been focussed on the four key aspects of the new Geran-4 jet drones that are supplied by China. This analysis comes from reading component labelling on downed machines and includes the turbojet engine itself, its camera, network modem, and anti-jamming system. Some transceivers, microchips and microcomputers originate in the West. Beijing remains defiantly insistent that any such transfers of technology are forbidden by its export-control rules. Of course, Kyiv knows that Moscow minutely examines every single piece of their drones to copy as much as possible. 

Such lethal innovation has become routine, with Russian forces in the past coating a few of their Geran-2 suicide drones with chemical substances that remain on the wreckage, posing health risks to anyone who comes into contact with them. Their drones were also recorded as releasing yellow phosphorus onto Ukrainian trenches. In May this year, Ukraine’s SBU (internal intelligence service) found depleted uranium in a missile mounted on a modified Russian Geran-2 drone. They noted elevated radiation levels on the debris which posed toxic contamination risks to Ukrainian civilians, fire and rescue and bomb disposal personnel, and provided proof that Russia is prepared to deploy depleted uranium weapons.

Persistent insecurity vis a vis Russia has forced Ukraine to model itself on other states with aggressive neighbours, notably Taiwan and Israel

In this deadly game of tit-for-tat, Kyiv had no qualms in experimenting with a fleet of fire-spewing “dragon drones” against its foes. The aerial devices were recorded as releasing a white-hot mixture of thermite (aluminium powder and iron oxide which burns at very high temperatures). Seen as much as a psychological tool as a physical weapon, they could still remove tree- and vegetation-cover instantly, as well as killing or disabling the troops below, but their use has so far been limited.

Persistent insecurity vis a vis Russia has forced Ukraine to model itself on other states with aggressive neighbours, notably Taiwan and Israel, in embracing a climate of technological innovation that has also become central to Kyiv’s post-war vision of itself. Development time for new procurement or enhancements has shrunk. It was about 7 months in 2022 when the war started, and had soon shrunk to half that within a year, and is now measured in terms of weeks. In extremis, a minor tweak can be requested by an operator in the morning and be in service the same afternoon. This agility to upgrade should inspire all modern armies, who still tend to think in terms of months and years, not weeks, for improvements. However, a matched opponent will operate at the same speed of innovation, so forces must recognise that for every introduction they make, their opponents will first notice then come up with a counter, sometimes within a week.

With massive casualties on both sides, developments in medical processes have also been under the spotlight in Ukraine

With massive casualties on both sides, developments in medical processes have also been under the spotlight in Ukraine. Some now feel that the days of the trained combat medic have ended. There used to be a “golden hour” in which to get a wounded soldier back to a medical facility for swift treatment. Instead, some surmise every soldier has to be his or her own medic, capable of far more than basic first aid on themselves or each other. Now unmanned ground vehicles are beginning to take on the evacuation role, particularly in rescuing those trapped or wounded in minefields, but they are often threatened by hostile aerial drones, preventing the movement of valuable medical assets to collect the wounded, and there is now routine disrespect by Russia of the Red Cross symbol. The implications for deep medical training and extensive procurement of kit beyond bandages and ampules of morphine need much military thought. 

Acclimatisation to battlefield gore via experience of abattoirs and hospital emergency wards might be one solution, which is already used by special forces worldwide, but numbers alone make this impractical. However, there is a growing trend for trained doctors to routinely carry all necessary tools for extractions, amputations, tourniquets and transfusions, with the ability to facetime specialist colleagues to be talked through quite complex procedures whilst in a combat area. In this sense, the concept of conveying a wounded soldier back was fading in relevance in some contested areas, to be replaced by bringing necessary sophisticated aid forward. The traditional concept of stabilising a patient in order to move them is sometimes not applicable, hence single medical officers or students having to do the work of a battlefield hospital (even if under digital supervision) themselves.

All my colleagues wisely observed that while Ukraine pointed to a direction of future conventional war, its lessons might not be applicable in all cases. They thought care must be taken not to slavishly apply all the conclusions coming out of Ukraine. For example, poor weather can erode the effectiveness of drones. It may not be the case that one side in the future could virtually eliminate its opponent’s naval forces in the way Kyiv has destroyed Russia’s Black Seas Fleet. Also, there are relatively few manned sorties of aircraft, other than the Russians releasing missiles from the safety of their own territory. Its lack of air dominance, and timidity in the skies, is truly puzzling. Instead of risking airframes and aircrew (Moscow lost at least 7 long-range fighters and bombers in September), the Kremlin has taken to launching ever more ballistic missiles into Ukraine, with a current average of 150 per month. 

For anything but a Putin-led dictatorship, the Kremlin’s costs-benefits ratios are disastrous. Little has been gained at huge cost, with virtually no end in sight. Overall, Moscow’s forces remain poor due to the extensive recruitment of poorly-educated ethnic minorities; widespread corruption at every level; and the lack of an NCO class. They have senior soldiers with nominal NCO ranks to pass on wisdom, but none who are trained as intermediate leaders or take on responsibilities. All bottom-up initiative is crushed, while top-down Kremlin-inspired diktats from distant generals remains the only permissible methodology of command.

All at my Ukrainian experience briefing were unanimous in seeing the conflict as directly connected to Vladimir Putin, and was deeply unpopular to most Russians. The participants remained inspired by Volodymyr Zelensky’s leadership attributing hostility towards him as Russian disinformation, Trumpian interference and jealousy of his approval ratings (stable at around 67 per cent and double that of the Republican leader), plus war-weariness. In their collective view, Ukraine still possesses an unshakable belief that their fight for freedom will continue until Putin dies. The collective view, after four and a half years of intense fighting, the bitterest since 1945, was that the end will not be decided soon by Trump or anyone outside Russia making news statements. To announce a ceasefire doesn’t necessarily mean that it exists. 

The 10 October initiative fell apart almost immediately, following which Putin initiated 76 recorded missile attacks on Ukrainian energy targets in the following week. This is part of Moscow’s current strategy, aimed at attacking cities to get the populations to leave, putting pressure on more fragile rural community infrastructures during the coming winter. To date (February 2022-September 2026), the UN assesses 73,451 Ukrainian civilian casualties from air raids, of whom 17,605 have been killed. The same source concludes 46,230 Russian military casualties killed and wounded in September alone, but probably only 30,000 new recruits inducted into Moscow’s forces, thus bizarrely the Kremlin is currently losing the strategic materialschlacht (strategic war of resources). The West’s job must be to help keep up this pressure.

Despite the Washington-Moscow “diesel deal” which amounts to the import of only a few days’ worth of US fuel needs, so won’t affect prices, and wobbly intelligence and Starshield provision from the Pentagon and SpaceX, my own assessment is these developments are more connected with Trump’s own fears for the US mid-terms, than any strategic methodology to crush Ukraine. At times, the Washington leader has been conciliatory to Kyiv and hostile to Moscow. I am coming round to the view that the highly erratic and corrosive nature of his Presidency, in which Congress, the State and Defense departments play no role other than to rubber-stamp their leader’s whims, are less pro-Russian, than pro-Trump. 

It is his sheer incompetency, petty vindictiveness and greed that is hampering US military effectiveness and pushing away his Western allies. As a result, Europe and Canada are racing to proof their own defence infrastructures across the board against Washington’s whims. In terms of air defence, land and logistics procurement, this can only further strengthen Kyiv and weaken US defence exports. The long-term result is that Trump is swiftly destroying the military dominance it has enjoyed since 1945. Into the ensuing vacuum with steps not China or Russia, but if it can get its act together, the rest of NATO, finally decoupled from Big Brother American. The geopolitical world is spinning as never before.