Alleged Chinese spies targeted former premier and AFP commander via LinkedIn

Two LinkedIn accounts connected to suspected Chinese spies amassed thousands of connections worldwide and approached dozens of Australians working in government, policing and trade with offers of paid consultancy, an ABC investigation has found.

The alleged spies posed as employees of a think tank, offering their targets competitive pay in return for "valuable advice".

Between 2016 and 2025, the alleged spies targeted more than 100 individuals linked to Australia, including former Queensland premier and now opposition leader Steven Miles, an Australian Federal Police commander and several senior federal government officials.

Their LinkedIn profiles appeared in the connection records of two LinkedIn accounts presenting themselves as think-tank representatives. The accused foreign agents reached out to 58 of those connections, and some recipients shared their personal contact details.

The ABC can reveal the Australians were targeted by the same alleged Chinese spying network that groomed Australian businessman Alexander Csergo, who has been jailed as the first person convicted of reckless foreign interference.

LinkedIn records obtained by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) during the investigation into Csergo show the accounts approached other Australians, including those who worked at government agencies and state trade and investment bodies.

The AFP alleged the operation was conducted by China's Ministry of State Security (MSS), the country's principal civilian intelligence agency. It said the MSS used fake LinkedIn profiles to contact and cultivate potential foreign sources, before requesting information from them.

The Chinese Embassy in Canberra rejected the AFP's claims as "entirely groundless".

"We firmly reject unwarranted accusations and vilification against China and hope that the Australian media will observe professional ethics and report in a fair and objective manner," a spokesperson told the ABC in an email.

In June, the Five Eyes alliance, an intelligence-sharing partnership consisting of the USA, the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, issued a rare joint warning about Chinese intelligence using online job platforms for recruitment "that can provide China with a strategic and tactical advantage over the Five Eyes".

Asked by the ABC if it's aware of or investigating the alleged spying operation, a spokesperson for Australia's domestic spying agency, ASIO, said: "Consistent with long-standing practice, ASIO does not comment on — or confirm — investigations."

Inside the recruitment pitch

In November 2021, while Csergo was living in Shanghai, a LinkedIn account using the name Vera Su offered him part-time work.

The sender introduced herself as being from Nesa Consulting and said the organisation wanted experts to advise on trade between China and Australia.

According to the prosecution case, Csergo subsequently met two people known to him as Ken and Evelyn, prepared reports and received cash payments.

He was convicted in March of reckless foreign interference, an offence introduced under Australia's 2018 national security laws.

The prosecution case was that his conduct involved secrecy or deception and that he was reckless as to whether it supported a foreign principal's intelligence activities.

But an analysis by the ABC of Vera Su's communication records, first obtained by the AFP as part of its investigation into Csergo, revealed how the same LinkedIn accounts sought other people with useful expertise and contacts.

Among those directly approached were people whose profiles listed employment at Austrade — the federal agency that promotes Australian trade and investment — the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Investment NSW, Invest Victoria and Tourism Australia.

The accounts' pitches also sought access to people inside government.

"I wonder if you have special source of information… for example: from important people in the government," one message asked.

Some recipients declined.

One Austrade employee said he could not accept money because he worked for the Australian government, although he offered to introduce people in his professional network.

Former Queensland premier Steven Miles was also connected with the same Vera Su account in April 2021 while he was deputy premier.

The ABC has seen no messages between Mr Miles and the account, and the connection alone does not establish that he received a consultancy offer or provided information. The ABC understands that Mr Miles did not respond to any message from Ms Su.

'Honey traps'

Data reviewed by the ABC shows some Australia-linked targets shared contact details or discussed continuing the exchange outside LinkedIn, including through WeChat, phone calls or meetings.

Business consultant Nick Coyle was dealing with the arrest of his former partner, Cheng Lei, in China on espionage charges when he was approached by the alleged Chinese spies.

"During that time, I was getting many strange approaches," he said. Some were "honey traps", people trying to become "friends", both online and in person.

"I just took the approach — if I don't know them from prior — I would steer clear," he said.

Australian life coach Adrian Cahill also exchanged contact with Vera in 2021. He suspects his background as a former soldier made him a more attractive target.

"I would get those a fair bit," he said. "People write to me saying, 'we've got a job, we've got money, we've got a budget.'"

He said his training helped him recognise those tactics, but people without security experience could be gradually drawn into providing "more and more information".

A 'fundamental shift' in tradecraft

Chinese intelligence expert Nicholas Eftimiades described the state-sponsored fishing expedition as a "fundamental shift".

Professor Eftimiades said China's growing AI capabilities may be playing a role, making mass outreach more efficient and safer for Chinese intelligence officers.

"They can reach out to hundreds of thousands at a time, it's a less expensive proposition to try and get people to work for you," he said.

"We can't keep up with that type of onslaught."

Former US federal prosecutor Vikas Didwania, who has run cases involving Chinese intelligence operations for the US government, said LinkedIn was a "goldmine" for intelligence gathering.

"We have seen on LinkedIn, people post information about what kind of classified information they have access to, what kind of clearances that they have."

Didwania said information obtained from LinkedIn recruits may not be classified, or even useful, but could be part of a process of cultivating sources.

"Over the course of that relationship, you can start to push a little more."

Delicate balance for Australians working with China

In recent years, ASIO director-general Mike Burgess has warned the threat of foreign interference in Australia had reached an "extreme level" and was likely to intensify.

Csergo is the first person convicted of reckless foreign interference under the new threat environment.

During Csergo's trial, the court heard he did not disclose any confidential information. His reports were compiled from publicly available material.

At a sentencing hearing last month, District Court Judge Craig Smith described Csergo as "an otherwise decent man" who had committed "a most serious offence". 

He sentenced him to three years and six months in jail.

Judge Smith said it was "fundamental and important" to deter people from becoming involved in activities that could harm Australia's national security.

For Australians working with China, however, the verdict has also redrawn the perilous line between legitimate work with a foreign entity and state-sponsored interference.

Some experts have noted a complicating factor is that China has about 2,000 think tanks, with varying and often opaque ties to the Communist Party and the government.

China's 2017 national intelligence law requires organisations and citizens to support national intelligence work. Some experts argue its practical reach can also affect foreign companies operating in China.

Mr Coyle said Australians working in China had to become adept at "walking and chewing gum".

Mr Didwania said efforts to counter China's spying operations needed to be balanced against the risk of creating a chilling effect.

"How do we differentiate between the great kinds of collaboration versus the collaboration that's really part of an MSS recruitment," he asked.

"It becomes a real challenge."