Qubic has resumed network processing and opened recovery claims after the wallet-seed theft that prompted it to halt transactions, moving the response from an emergency freeze to the return of assets and replacement of vulnerable wallets.
The project said on October 20 that its Computor quorum had approved recovery arrangements and that the first funds had been returned to verified owners. It did not disclose a total payout or the number of completed claims in the reviewed announcement.
During a Wednesday check, Qubic’s public RPC endpoint reported tick 85,597,890, beyond the 85,371,949 stopping point recorded in our report on the network halt. That confirms progress at the endpoint, rather than an independent audit of the whole recovery.
A restart resolves only one part of the disruption
The network was stopped after an attacker reportedly obtained control of wallets created with insufficiently random seeds. Qubic’s earlier account put the stolen amount at approximately 2.94 trillion QU.
The halt prevented normal transfers while the project prepared a response. Resuming processing changes that operating state, but does not establish that every affected user has recovered assets or that all disputed balances have been reconciled.
According to the project’s recovery announcement, affected holders have until May 1, 2027 to submit claims. The approval of a recovery process, the submission of a claim and its eventual payment are separate stages.
That distinction matters when assessing the outcome. A platform can be accepting applications while some holders are still gathering evidence or awaiting verification. An initial payment is progress, not proof that the remaining losses have been covered.
Existing weak wallet secrets must be replaced
The official wallet’s version 4.26.4 includes a seed-generation fix. The underlying issue concerns how the secret controlling a wallet was created, rather than merely the password used to open the application.
Installing corrected software improves the generation of new secrets. It cannot add randomness to a seed that already exists. Keeping the same vulnerable seed inside a newer version would leave the original credential unchanged.
Qubic’s latest warning tells users to treat wallets created with the web wallet before that release as insecure. Its advice is to generate a new recovery phrase using the corrected wallet and move remaining assets to the new address.
Our guide to wallet keys, backups and recovery explains why control follows the secret rather than the device or application password. Reinstalling software and changing the authority over funds are different operations.
Recovery still needs a measurable outcome
The next useful figures are how much has actually been repaid, how many claims have been resolved and which balances remain outstanding. Those would make it possible to assess the recovery beyond the reopening announcement.
For now, the confirmed operational change is that the public endpoint has advanced beyond the halt. Qubic reports that its recovery process is open, while the security response still requires holders to replace credentials produced by the vulnerable generator.