Estonia has been a leading advocate of sanctions for years. Now it turns out that we have nevertheless been feeding the Russian war machine through Silmet. How is that possible?
Estonia has been and will continue to be one of the most active advocates of sanctions and supporters of Ukraine in Europe. And just on Monday, we imposed sanctions on 1,600 companies and individuals. But my question is rather the other way around: How is it possible that, in the fifth year of the war, Europe remains so dependent on Russia, particularly for rare earth elements, for example? And that is not a question for Estonia. Rather, the question is how actively Europe has been working to eliminate these dependencies. We know that we are buying less energy, but Europe still continues to consume Russian energy.
What we are doing now is setting out our conditions for Silmet. And now that Silmet has also received notification from the European Commission that it has been included on the list of strategic companies, this provides a basis for obtaining European funding. But that funding must come with conditions and one of those conditions must be that the company eliminates its dependence on Russia.
But Estonia has held itself up as a moral beacon in the European Union when it comes to doing business with Russia. How can we now point fingers at others who want to do business with Russia or refuse to impose sanctions?
I would not exaggerate this position of being Europe's moral beacon quite so much. We have simply been very exemplary in our actions and we have absolutely never discussed...
This particular case shows that we have not been exemplary.
Yes, but this particular request also came from the European Commission. We also have to ask the question the other way around: If Russia were to stop supplying these raw materials to Europe altogether, European technology companies, including those in the defense industry, would be in very serious trouble.
So this is not a question of our being a moral beacon. We will continue in that role. Unfortunately, there is still a great deal of lobbying going on in the corridors of the European Commission, not specifically on strategic issues where Europe is dependent, but also purely in the interests of business. This is something that Estonian viewers do not usually learn about.
But we will continue our work as advocates of sanctions and Silmet's owners have also been told very clearly that they have a certain amount of time to eliminate their dependence on these raw materials. And this particular company will be added to the sanctions list at Estonia's own initiative.
How exactly did Silmet's supplier, a Rosatom subsidiary, end up on the proposed sanctions list? Who put forward that proposal?
We do not know how this particular company ended up on the list. Estonia has also made a great many different proposals concerning both companies and individuals. And in a sense, that is the problem with the European Commission's procedure: Before a draft reaches the member states' ambassadors, quite a few names and companies disappear during the process.
That happened this time as well. In fact, of those 1,600, I estimate that more than 50 have disappeared. We do not know who made those proposals, which is not even such a big problem. But we do not know at whose request those individuals and companies were removed from the list.
Now, Estonia acted very honestly and clearly. When the draft was already complete, the Commission pointed out that this particular magnesium plant was very directly connected to Silmet's supplies and that Silmet accounts for a very large share of what Europe needs for its industry. They asked us to look into it and it turned out that Silmet was dependent on this particular plant in its supply chain.
Did Estonia ask for Silmet's supplier not to be included on the list?
On the Commission's recommendation, we said that this particular proposal should be removed from the draft until the supply problem involving Russia had been resolved.
Did that proposal come from the Estonian government or from Silmet?
No, the proposal came to us from the Commission and I, as foreign minister, acting under the existing government mandate, confirmed that this would indeed have real consequences for European industry and that, until the supply problem was resolved, this company would not be included on the sanctions list.
We have been working for several years to find some kind of solution, but Silmet is not a state-owned company. Silmet is a private company. Silmet's owner is Neo Group, which is listed on the Canadian stock exchange.
Now that we have a real means of leverage, for example through funding, we can set our conditions directly for Neo Group. And that is what we have done.
I hope this problem will be resolved next year and that this particular company in Russia will also be on the sanctions list. It is not that easy to change the mines from which these raw materials originate. The issue is not only that there is enormous global competition, but, according to Silmet, it also requires changes in technology, and that is precisely why investment is needed.
Four and a half years have passed since the start of the war. Have you previously spoken with Silmet's management about the fact that importing these materials from Russia is not a particularly sensible thing to do, given that they would inevitably be sanctioned at some point?
We have discussed this repeatedly and we have also discussed how to attract investment here so that this specialized industry can develop in Estonia. Our goal, in fact, is to bring rare earth production, magnet manufacturing and the entire research, development and innovation center to Estonia. There is enormous competition for this around the world.
Silmet and Neo are the world's largest producers of rare earth elements outside China. So, for example, we are currently negotiating with the United States to conclude a memorandum of understanding. The European Union has already done so with the United States.
And we have been working to get Silmet and Neo included on Europe's list of strategic companies, which happened last week, and to bring European Union investment here.
Incidentally, a Neo magnet plant opened in Narva last year and the European Commission has already invested in it. So there are enormous opportunities here for Estonian industry and for our own economy.
But one specific problem that remains unresolved in Europe is this dependence on Russia and it must now be addressed as quickly as possible. It certainly will not be easy, but the only thing the Estonian government can do is apply pressure. We do not actually want to lose our own industry either.
By the way, are raw materials still being shipped from Russia's Solikamsk Magnesium Plant to Estonia today?
We are in contact with Neo's representative and my understanding is that another shipment still needs to be made. They have already factored that in. This morning (Wednesday — ed.), they also issued a public press release announcing their intention to use the available opportunities to end Russian supplies and eliminate this dependence.
Four and a half years after the start of a war that everyone has long known about. Can we trust them? And what happens if they still have not found a new supplier by the end of this year or the beginning of next year? Will national sanctions be imposed or what happens then?
If Europe has taken the necessary steps to make this technological change possible and Silmet, for example, still does not make that change, then it is no longer our responsibility. In that case, this particular company must be added to the list.
We have simply provided an opportunity for this change to take place. And this is not something that began because the company appeared on a proposed sanctions list. Work on this issue had already been underway.
Let's clarify one more thing about the timeline. Did the prime minister know that Estonia did not want to impose sanctions on a Rosatom subsidiary?
This was part of the normal working process and it was handled at my level. We bring individual decisions to the government when, for example, we are going to block a sanctions list.
That is what almost happened with the sanctions against individuals when two oligarchs were removed at France's request. If we had decided, for example, to be the only country to vote against the list and the entire list of 3,000 individuals headed by Putin had ultimately been left without sanctions, decisions of that kind would go through the government.
The prime minister is certainly aware that Silmet depends on Russian raw materials or that European industry depends on Russian raw materials. But this particular process is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
But the Riigikogu Foreign Affairs Committee did not know about this either?
That Europe depends on Russian raw materials? I think that...
Were they aware that Silmet imports raw materials from Russia?
I think the entire Estonian public knows that because, as far as I know, Silmet's story has been discussed for more than 10 years.
As for the working process, this is actually how it operates because there is constant work going on between the member states and the Commission on these sanctions lists, proposals and everything related to them. That is precisely the work of our diplomats.
Why was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' initial reaction that this information should not have become public?
I do not know where the idea comes from that this information should not have become public.
That initial reaction, suggesting that this was some kind of retaliation against Estonia, that we had done something and now information had become public about which company in Russia might face sanctions?
Everything that happens in the Committee of Permanent Representatives, or Coreper, is not some kind of state secret. In that sense, I cannot say what the big secret here is.
Perhaps it is even a good thing that this has become so public and that Estonian society as a whole and Europe more broadly are recognizing that we still have a very significant strategic dependence on Russia.
What is even worse is that Europe is actually dependent on China, and, to be frank, I do not see any solution whatsoever to that problem.
We will resolve this Russian problem, or rather, the company must resolve it, not the Estonian state. But I think Europe's dependence on China will remain for a very long time.
In your assessment, did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs act correctly? Was its reaction in the first few days exactly what it should have been?
I think the reaction of the Estonian public was entirely...
The ministry's reaction.
The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is doing its job and we have never concealed what we are working on.
If I were in the same situation I was in a few weeks ago, I would make exactly the same decision because we are talking about European industry, we are talking about Estonian industry and we are talking about the need to eliminate our strategic dependence on Russia.
So there is no need to look for any conspiracy theory here. Communication has been very open.
But perhaps we should openly acknowledge that, in certain cases, we have no other choice. This company is so important to our economy that, in some cases, exceptions have to be made and imports from Russia have to continue.
In certain cases, when supply problems have not been resolved and these are existential issues for us, then inevitably that is how things are.
But that does not mean we should in any way abandon our support for Ukraine or stop applying additional pressure on Russia, which we have no intention of doing.
In a sense, I am even pleased that Estonian society is so uncompromising that we do not accept any such deviations or alternative interpretations.
Unfortunately, that is not the case across Europe. Increasingly, we are seeing that it is becoming harder and harder to agree on new sanctions packages. In fact, when you start working on something, you often have to take several steps back.
How can Estonia demand that other countries adopt these sanctions packages when we ourselves seemingly cannot even comply with them very well?
We can comply with them very well. Estonia has called for a complete trade embargo. Just today, at my decision-making meeting, I approved new proposals and this changes absolutely nothing about our course.
This is completely normal work for other member states as well. When issues like these come up, they are raised. This is not just about Estonia's interests or anyone's business interests. It is actually a European problem.
These matters must be discussed openly and, as foreign minister, I have no problem explaining them because any reasonable person in Estonia can understand this.
This is not some kind of moral competition. We are talking about how to inflict as much pain as possible on Russia while also ensuring our own survival.
And the question should rather be asked the other way around: How is it possible that Russia holds such powerful leverage over the whole of European industry?
What do you think the answer is? Why has Europe backed itself into a corner when it comes to raw materials?
It is not just Europe. This is actually a broader global issue and it is not just about Russia. China's influence is even greater.
In this context, perhaps what is unfamiliar to Estonia is that this particular rare earth industry and magnet industry are of such enormous importance to the entire world, especially Europe.
Europe has simply been unable to respond in the way many other countries have. And if we look, for example, at what President Trump is doing in this field today, the sums of money involved are enormous and so is the political influence.
We will get to Trump, but I want to ask one final question on this subject. You met with your Ukrainian counterpart on Monday. How could you look him in the eye in light of all this?
I looked him in the eye the same way I always do.
They are facing a very difficult winter, during which they will need very substantial assistance from Europe.
By Monday, it was also already clear that Trump had once again put Ukraine under pressure.
So I think we should focus on what the truly existential issues are and how we can help Ukraine survive this winter.
Those are the issues we actually discuss with our colleagues from Ukraine and Europe.
Eesti Ekspress reported today that there are 22 kilometers of spare gas pipeline in southeastern Estonia intended for Russia. Should Estonia maintain a gas pipeline intended for Russia in working order?
If that is what you mean, then it can be kept in working order, but not open.
Keeping it in working order also costs money.
Well, that is some kind of international obligation, since it is an international gas pipeline. But the question is whether the pipeline is open. It is not open.
It has been open on certain occasions?
Exactly, and that is why I met with the prime minister this morning and our climate minister has also been given the relevant instructions.
In fact, the valves are located in Latvia and a large part of the infrastructure is in Lithuania.
This is a European Union issue, but it is certainly one of the ways, let's be frank, that we could put pressure on Russia at some point because gas and gas transit are not subject to EU sanctions.
Let's talk about Trump and Putin. As we know, the U.S. president struck a so-called diesel deal with Putin. Why has the U.S. president begun bringing Vladimir Putin out of isolation?
First of all, this is not the first time that many people who sympathize with Ukraine have suffered what you might call a nervous breakdown, gone gray or lost a few brain cells.
But I think these questions should, of course, be put first and foremost to U.S. President Trump.
I think the answers are primarily connected to the midterm elections, which are fast approaching.
What is Estonia's position on this?
We have stated very clearly that this is a step in completely the wrong direction, considering that it allows Putin to earn additional revenue.
But this has now also been accompanied by pressure that goes beyond buying diesel. What is particularly serious is the pressure on Zelenskyy to stop his attacks on oil refineries.
That is actually where Putin and his capabilities can be significantly weakened.
Ultimately, the volume involved is not decisive in terms of either the global market or U.S. consumption.
And this is largely a political game aimed at his own voters, in response to a situation of his own making in which oil and gas prices have risen very sharply.
Has Estonia communicated its position to the United States in any way?
We have stated it completely publicly and our positions are well known.
Going back to the beginning of the interview, we criticize Trump, saying that this move is wrong. Yet through Silmet, we ourselves are feeding that same Russian war machine. Isn't that hypocritical?
These are two completely different issues.
One is whether you go and offer a deal to buy diesel or propose that kind of cooperation.
The other is when you are trying to eliminate your own strategic dependence.
These are not comparable issues.
How has this company been trying to eliminate that dependence for four and a half years without succeeding and now we are hoping it will manage to do so in just a few months?
That is what they say and I think the company's representatives should come on this program and explain to you what they have done over the past four and a half years.
By the way, have you been in contact with Silmet's CEO again over the past week?
I have been in contact with him before, personally.
But not recently?
I have. I spoke with him on Friday and our people are in contact.
Perhaps as a result of this pressure, the company, as a publicly traded company, also issued a press release this morning, which I recommend reading.
Returning to Trump, is Trump now so angry that, for the Ukrainians, this means receiving less intelligence, none at all or receiving it with a delay?
Today, I met with NATO Secretary General Rutte who was visiting Estonia and this was one of the questions we discussed.
NATO is very well informed and as of today, the United States has not restricted its intelligence sharing.
I hope that remains the case.
So this appears to be primarily political pressure, but who knows? Trump is unpredictable.
So, as things stand, at least according to NATO's assessment, the Americans have not started reducing the intelligence reaching Ukraine or causing any delays in its delivery?
Yes. The information our secretary general had was that intelligence sharing has not been reduced.
Military assistance provided through the PURL mechanism has also not been reduced or suspended.
I hope that remains the case.
Finally, a little about Estonian domestic affairs. President Alar Karis criticized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meaning you, in his latest speech. Do you accept the criticism?
I think Alar Karis should now move on with his life, just as he appeared to be doing in the photo he posted on Facebook, sitting in a comfortable chair by the sea.
Tomorrow, I am meeting with the new president, Ülle Madise. We have also sat down together since her election by the Riigikogu and our team is working very well with her.
So I would not go down the path of commenting on the views of a president who is already leaving office.
But what will communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the presidency as an institution look like now? Will cooperation with Ülle Madise be better?
Just as cooperation was excellent during President Karis' term, it will also be excellent with Ülle Madise.
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