US Secretary of State Marco Rubio this week hailed Greece as an “indispensable” NATO partner – and a pillar of stability in a region marked by “geopolitical uncertainty”.
The two sides announced expanded counterterrorism information-sharing. A defense agreement has been reached – worth up to $4 billion.
Rubio also backed energy projects such as the undersea electricity interconnector linking Greece to Cyprus, and eventually Israel.
At the same time, Rubio insisted a military clash between Turkey and Greece remains “unthinkable” and something the United States would “never allow.” He stressed that both are NATO allies and that conflict would harm all three countries.
When someone emphatically insists that they would never set a house on fire, the very emphasis makes people wonder whether the risk exists. Similarly, Rubio’s statement highlights that Greek-Turkish tensions remain serious enough to require public reassurance from Washington.
It would thus seem that the two neighboring countries’ Atlantic membership alone is no guarantee of stability on the Alliance’s southeastern flank. NATO itself has in fact long been split over the “Turkish Question”.
As I argued previously, Trump’s warm embrace of Erdogan in July (recently reiterated), his subsequent signals that he would lift CAATSA sanctions and consider F-35 sales to Turkey, have already raised concerns in Athens – and Israel, for that matter. This exposed divisions, at a time when Ankara pursues strategic autonomy – while also clashing with “allies” over the Aegean, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Since at least last year, it has been noted how “sidelining” Turkey risks weakening the Alliance’s southeastern flank – and how the Athens-Ankara rivalry in turn exposes NATO’s fragile unity. These tensions predate the current US-Greece deepening of ties.
A closer American-Greek strategic relationship could alienate Turkey (despite Trump’s warmth) and generate further friction within the Alliance. Ankara might perceive the US as strengthening Greece’s military position, its diplomatic leverage, and regional role – at Ankara’s expense.
Washington in turn may regard the Hellenic Republic as increasingly “indispensable” – while still viewing Turkey as strategically essential. Those two policies are not inherently incompatible, but they become harder and harder to sustain when Greek and Turkish interests directly conflict.
The latest developments illustrate the dilemma: Greece hosts key US facilities such as Souda Bay, and offers geographic advantages in the Eastern Mediterranean.
While the $4 billion arms package builds on existing F-35 procurement and modernization, American support for the electricity interconnector, however, runs up against maritime disputes: Greece seeks to resume seabed surveys, while Turkey argues that the work requires prior coordination under its Libya maritime agreement.
The combination of military capability, infrastructure access, and energy influence could look much more serious for Ankara than any single statement. The Greek-Turkish dispute over territorial waters, airspace, continental shelves, and island militarization is longstanding.
This creates the conditions for a security dilemma: Athens strengthens defenses out of distrust, Ankara perceives a shift in the balance and responds – and each side’s measures reinforce the other’s insecurity.
Moreover, perception matters in foreign relations. Calling Greece “indispensable” does carry symbolic weight. If Turkey sees Washington investing in Greek capacity while its own F-35 path remains blocked by S-400-related legal restrictions, the asymmetry, so to speak, becomes politically relevant.
Domestic prestige and national grievances in both capitals can amplify the effect, thereby creating incentives for public pushback even when direct confrontation would be costly. How can the US and NATO “balance” this?
Washington could separate bilateral defense ties from endorsement of every territorial claim. “Private diplomacy”, as Rubio has indicated, can manage sensitive issues better than public statements.
NATO’s existing Greece-Turkey military deconfliction mechanism, established in 2020 with a hotline, can reduce the risk of incidents.
The problem is the Alliance itself cannot simply adjudicate Aegean disputes or impose maritime boundaries. Article 5 does not offer a straightforward path for one member against another. NATO’s priority remains preventing hostilities rather than settling sovereignty questions.
At least three scenarios remain plausible: managed competition, with military modernization proceeding alongside negotiations over the underlying rivalries somehow; Turkish strategic pushback through diplomacy, counter-procurement, or greater use of its leverage within the Atlantic Organization; or an “incident” in the Aegean or around Cyprus that would force Washington and NATO into crisis-management mode.
Thus far, Washington has tried to cultivate both bilateral relationships. Greece cannot replace Turkey’s geographic and military assets spanning Europe, the Black Sea, and the Middle East.
Washington appears to be strengthening the Hellenic Republic as a sort of strategic hedge, expanding its military access and logistical options in the Eastern Mediterranean – to mitigate the risks of Turkey’s progressively independent and unpredictable (often aggressive) foreign policy. Even as Ankara itself remains an important NATO (and US) ally in its own right.
The recent advances in American-Greek relations enhance the challenge without resolving the underlying contradictions. They reflect a deeper transatlantic contradiction in the context of an increasingly divided West.
Uriel Araujo, researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts.