Baku - "The European Parliament consists of these Islamophobes, and this must always remain in focus," Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said on 15 September, accusing the West of waging an "undeclared war" against Islam.
Yet just days later, the Azerbaijani government stepped up its enforcement of restrictions on Islamic headscarves in schools, triggering social media campaigns and protests both inside the country and abroad.
This is not the first time Azerbaijan has attempted to ban the hijab in schools. WikiLeaks cables revealed that, as early as 2007, Ramiz Mehdiyev, then head of the Presidential Administration, had expressed concern over the growing number of women wearing headscarves.
He reportedly outlined the government’s intention to introduce school uniforms prohibiting the hijab as a preventive measure, warning that the trend would otherwise become impossible to stop.
In November 2010, the Education Ministry’s decision to prohibit the hijab in schools sparked mass protests in Baku, Ganja, and other cities. As a result, in the years that followed, restrictions were enforced inconsistently, leaving the issue in a legal and administrative grey zone.
The 21 September measure, however, signals a renewed determination to enforce the ban. Although it does not explicitly prohibit the hijab, the authorities rely on school uniform regulations and the principle of secular education to justify restrictions on religious headwear.
Unlike in 2010, the latest enforcement also affects teachers. Videos showing distressed students in tears and parents protesting outside schools have circulated on social media.
Hundreds of people have reportedly been detained amid the wider crackdown.
There have also been reports of women in other public-sector workplaces being pressured to remove their headscarves, suggesting that the issue may extend beyond the education system.
Azerbaijan’s religious landscape is already subject to extensive state control. Since the early 2000s, the country’s religious policy has shifted towards increasingly restrictive regulation.
Successive legislative amendments have narrowed the space for religious freedom, including through restrictions on public religious gatherings and foreign-trained religious preachers, mosque closures, and state control over the appointment of mosque imams.
The Shia Muslim community, which constitutes the majority of the country’s Muslim population, has faced particular scrutiny. A list of 322 political prisoners published by Azerbaijani rights monitors on 5 October included 178 religious believers, making them the largest category on the list.
By presenting the hijab as a “Persian-Arab value” alien to Azerbaijani national identity, the authorities portray restrictions on religious expression as a defence of national identity and sovereignty.
Pro-government media and commentators have framed the controversy as a national security issue, linking visible Islamic dress to alleged Iranian influence and associating the protests with Tehran.
Importantly, this framing also reinforces Baku’s preferred international image as a secular state and a reliable partner for Western governments.
The rift with Turkey
The controversy opened an unusual fault line between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Turkish social media had already been awash with criticism over Baku’s decision to keep its representative in the UN General Assembly hall during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech in September.
The Turkish delegation joined representatives of numerous other countries in walking out during the address, amid widespread condemnation of genocide in Gaza.
Azerbaijan’s subsequent hijab restrictions further intensified this criticism, bringing renewed attention to the tension between Baku’s invocation of Muslim solidarity, its domestic religious policies, and its relationship with Israel.
Protestors staged demonstrations outside Azerbaijan’s embassy and consulate in Turkey.
In an address to a convention of his ruling New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) in Baku on 2 October, Aliyev criticised unnamed actors for interfering in Azerbaijan's domestic affairs.
“Everyone should know their place; they should not interfere in our affairs, stick their noses into our way of life, or tell us what to do. Everyone should mind their own nation and state,” he said.
Although Aliyev did not explicitly name Turkey, his remarks were widely interpreted as a rebuke to Turkish critics. This was particularly notable because, at the time, no Turkish government official had publicly commented on the headscarf restrictions in Azerbaijan.
That changed when Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, described the exclusion of hijab-wearing students from schools as “unacceptable” and expressed hope that Azerbaijan would “correct this mistake” soon.
Leyla Şahin Usta, deputy parliamentary group chair of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), also criticised the restrictions. Sharing a video of the controversy on X, she wrote: “We hope Azerbaijan will reverse this mistake as soon as possible. These distressing images are unbecoming of the modern world.”
The issue is particularly sensitive for the AKP, whose rise was partly shaped by opposition to restrictions on Islamic dress following Turkey’s 28 February 1997 military-led intervention, known as the “postmodern coup."
Yet the criticism was not confined to the ruling party. Politicians from across Turkey’s political spectrum also spoke out against the restrictions, suggesting that the controversy had become a broader public issue rather than an exclusively partisan dispute.
Baku, nonetheless, views the criticism from Turkey as a campaign backed by Ankara.
After Saral’s X post, in a statement, the NAP accused Ankara of fomenting “artificial tensions” between the two countries. It also alleged that Turkish media outlets close to the AKP government were publishing reports about Baku that were “contrary to the facts” and warned that the controversy could damage bilateral relations.
The statement went further, rejecting what it called attempts to distort Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel and the accusations directed at Baku over those ties. It defended the relationship as one based on international law and mutual interests.
The response suggests that Baku views the controversy not simply as criticism of its domestic religious policies but also as a challenge to its right to pursue an independent foreign policy.
What's next?
Despite the increasingly sharp rhetoric, a major deterioration in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations remains unlikely.
The two countries maintain deep strategic, military, and economic ties, giving both governments strong incentives to contain disagreements rather than allow them to escalate.
Although Turkish officials did not directly escalate the dispute with public counter-accusations, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan addressed the tensions during his 15 October visit to Baku. He emphasised the countries’ shared history and their ability to manage differences without undermining their strategic relationship.
“There is no need for these issues to be turned into a propaganda tool through social media,” he said.
Yet the recurring controversies expose tensions beneath the familiar rhetoric of the “one nation, two states” alliance. This is particularly significant as tensions between Turkey and Israel continue to grow.
From Israel’s perspective, such disputes create a potential strategic advantage, as they expose the limits of Azerbaijani-Turkish solidarity. Baku’s decision to bring Israeli President Isaac Herzog to the CICA summit aboard a scheduled Azerbaijan Airlines passenger flight is particularly telling.
The aircraft crossed Turkish airspace despite Ankara’s restrictions on Israeli government aircraft.
The arrangement underscored the contrast between Turkey’s efforts to isolate Israel and Azerbaijan’s continued willingness to facilitate high-level Israeli engagement.
It may reinforce suspicions in Turkey that Baku’s strategic partnership with Israel places limits on the solidarity Ankara can expect from its closest regional ally.
Rovshan Mammadli is a Baku-based journalist and independent analyst. Holding a BA in Israel and Middle East Studies and an MA in International Policy Studies, he focuses on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, Middle East politics, and peace and security in the South Caucasus.
Follow him on X: @MammadliRovshan
Edited by Charlie Hoyle