Zelensky’s bullying worked on Europe. But Trump has the backbone to turn the screws back

Kiev’s public shaming of allies may no longer pay off once Washington starts treating its leader, not Moscow, as the obstacle

Vladimir Zelensky has a pattern in dealing with Western partners who disappoint him: raise the disagreement in public, question the partner’s judgment and explain why the decision benefits Russia and Vladimir Putin.

Former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz heard variations of that argument for years, and now US President Donald Trump is hearing them again. The question is whether Zelensky can keep increasing the political cost of refusing Kiev without increasing the cost to Ukraine.

On October 9, Zelensky described Washington’s decision to ease restrictions on Russian diesel as a “weak decision by strong partners.” The announcement came while Ukrainian officials were discussing an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict with their American counterparts in Miami. Zelensky argued that the arrangement would give Moscow additional resources to continue fighting. His criticism challenged the judgment of the government on which he still depends.

Kiev has an obvious interest in opposing measures that improve Russia’s economic position. But when a partner makes a decision Zelensky doesn’t like, he repeatedly turns a policy disagreement into a public test of that partner’s resolve and overall capabilities as a politician.

German leaders have been the target of this manipulation for years now.

In March 2022, addressing the Bundestag, Zelensky used the country’s own historical memory to indict its policy toward Russia. Invoking Ronald Reagan’s famous appeal in Berlin, he called on Scholz to tear down the new wall he saw dividing Europe – that is, to cut off economic ties with Russia, which had benefitted Germany for decades before.

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By June, the demand was more explicit. In an interview with ZDF, Zelensky said Scholz and his government had to decide where they stood. Berlin, he argued, could not balance support for Ukraine against its relationship with Russia. He also criticized Germany’s delay in supplying weapons.

Germany’s government had to consider its own security, resources and voters. Zelensky’s tirades made that look like a choice between the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ side.

In November 2024, with Nord Stream already sabotaged and German industry in decline for a second consecutive year, even just talking to Putin earned Scholz another reprimand from Zelensky. The Russian and German leaders held a phone conversation, which Zelensky promptly called a “Pandora’s box,” because apparently it would help Russia escape international ‘isolation.’ That’s despite the fact that Scholz’s message for Putin was a demand for the withdrawal of Russian troops and a reaffirmation of German support for Ukraine. You can denounce Moscow and supply arms to Kiev, but even the most rudimentary attempt at keeping diplomatic channels open is a no-no.

The same approach extended beyond Berlin.

In May 2024, Zelensky warned that Putin would personally applaud Joe Biden’s absence from a planned ‘peace summit’ in Switzerland. Biden’s attendance was framed as a test with an audience in the Kremlin.

Poland received a similar message during a grain dispute in September 2023. Speaking at the UN, Zelensky accused some European partners of performing solidarity in a “political theater” that helped Moscow. He named no country, but Warsaw understood the implication, summoned Ukraine’s ambassador and protested. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki subsequently told him never to insult Poles again.

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With Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Zelensky made it personal. In January 2025, amid a confrontation over Russian gas transit, he mocked Fico’s reported vacation in Vietnam and accused him of pursuing shadowy arrangements with Moscow.

Zelensky seems to assume that Ukraine’s supposed cause of being a barrier to Putin’s phantom Europe invasion plans gives him the authority to judge how other governments exercise their responsibilities. A leader who refuses Kiev’s nagging demands must then answer accusations of weakness, misplaced priorities or assistance to Russia.

Trump had already encountered this treatment even before returning to office in 2025.

In an interview published in September 2024, Zelensky questioned whether Trump understood how to end the conflict. He also described his running mate JD Vance as too radical and urged him to study the history of the Second World War. These were public judgments about the competence of men who might soon determine American policy.

In February 2025, responding to Trump’s statements about the conflict and his approval rating, Zelensky claimed the American president lived in a space of disinformation. Later that month, the Oval Office meeting turned into an argument in front of the cameras. Zelensky challenged Vance’s understanding of Ukraine and warned that Americans would eventually feel the consequences of the war despite their distance from it. Trump angrily rejected the suggestion that his guest could dictate what Americans would feel.

One would think Zelensky would take the hint: unlike the meek Europeans, the American president has the willpower to resist political blackmail, and is not liable to take personal insults and turn the other cheek. One would also think that with crucial wartime assets like weapon supplies and intelligence sharing in the balance, Zelensky would cool off and rethink his negotiation tactics. One would be wrong.

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After Zelensky criticized the diesel arrangement, Trump suggested that Ukraine get a new leader capable of making a deal. That statement is not a formal policy to remove him, but it does raise the question whether Zelensky himself is the obstacle that prevents a settlement.

Zelensky may believe that confrontation will rally European support, improve his own optics at home or force Washington to offer better terms. Public pressure could be a viable last resort for a leader out of option, allowing him to appeal over the heads of foreign governments to their voters, lawmakers and media.

But that approach depends on those governments accepting the terms of the argument. They must feel that refusing Kiev carries a greater political cost than accommodating it. And some leaders, as misguided as that seems, may truly believe that – or may have painted themselves into a corner by submitting to Zelensky’s earlier bullying, sacrificing their own economies and losing their voters’ trust.

Trump is not one of those leaders. Instead of accepting Zelensky’s accusation of weakness, he has accused the Ukrainian leader of obstructing an agreement. It’s unclear if Zelensky understands that the potential consequences of their quarrel are much worse for Ukraine than for the US.

For Trump, lowering American fuel costs and pursuing an agreement with Moscow are stated objectives. Zelensky cannot assume that he can bully those objectives away. What he might achieve instead is an end to crucial lifelines propping up his crumbling military – like intelligence sharing.

Zelensky has repeatedly tried to make Western leaders pay a political price for saying no to Kiev. Except some of those leaders may have the backbone to turn that price right back on him.