Ethiopia’s escalating confrontation with Eritrea threatens to further destabilize the Horn of Africa
The war that has erupted in Ethiopia has wider consequences for the Horn of Africa and potentially may impact way beyond the continent.
Fighting between Ethiopian federal forces and Eritrean-backed elements in Tigray has already resulted in accusations of cross-border incursions, with Ethiopian authorities in Addis Ababa formally invoking self-defense – after claiming Eritrean troops crossed into its territory.
Eritrea, for its part, accuses Ethiopia of preparing to seize the port of Assab to end its landlocked status.
The two countries in the past cooperated against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) during the 2020-2022 war, but that partnership has collapsed into open hostility. The conflict is already spilling into the wider hydropolitical and maritime struggles that may reshape the Horn of Africa.
As I commented back in 2022, the hydropolitics of the Nile’s disputes have the potential to turn the Ethiopian-Egyptian dispute into a wider regional confrontation. I had also argued in 2021 that Sudan’s political turmoil, the Tigray conflict, and growing rivalries over the Red Sea were deeply interconnected. The latest escalation between Ethiopia and Eritrea brings these longstanding tensions back into the spotlight.
The connection to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) issue should not be missed. Egypt has long opposed Ethiopia’s unilateral filling and operation of the GERD and any further dams on the Blue Nile.
At the same time, landlocked Ethiopia seeks sovereign access to the Red Sea, particularly through Assab, which Eritrea views as an existential threat. Egypt has responded by tightening ties with Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. On October 4, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi hosted those three countries in El Alamein.
Their joint declaration rejected unilateral Nile actions harming downstream states and insisted that Red Sea governance belongs exclusively to coastal nations. Eritrea and Somalia are not Nile Basin countries, so their endorsement of Egypt’s water position is arguably better explained by strategic alignment than by any direct stake in the river.
To put it simply, Egypt and Eritrea share converging interests in constraining Ethiopian ambitions. Cairo wants a binding GERD agreement; Asmara wants to keep Assab out of Ethiopian hands. Egyptian support for Eritrean sovereignty was reaffirmed in Sisi’s meeting with President Isaias Afwerki just days before the summit.
Ethiopian officials have accused Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan of backing the TPLF and other armed groups, claims all three deny.
The more immediate triggers lie in the breakdown of Ethiopia-Eritrea relations and competing claims over territory and sea access. The point is that Nile and Red Sea disputes are now linked in intricate ways. Egypt’s interest in Eritrean ports such as Assab and Massawa creates a potential connection between maritime security and water negotiations.
The same hydropolitical pattern is visible in Sudan, where fighting around the Roseires Dam has already shown how water infrastructure can be drawn into wider wars.
Again, the consequences could reach far beyond Africa. The Red Sea is a vital shipping corridor linking Asia, the Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean and Europe. Any spread of fighting toward Assab or the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb could raise insurance premiums, lengthen voyages around the Cape of Good Hope, and disrupt energy and container traffic. Gulf states with competing port and security interests could harden into opposing camps.
A prolonged Ethiopian crisis would also complicate Nile diplomacy at a moment when Sudan is already torn by civil war.
Western powers, including the United States, have long shaped Ethiopian politics through aid and security partnerships and bear some responsibility. Some analysts argue Washington’s earlier alignment with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed left too little pressure on all sides to implement the 2022 peace deal.
A wider proxy struggle or interstate war could entangle the Nile basin, Horn port politics and Red Sea shipping into one mutually reinforcing crisis. For one thing, China, India and Japan, all with significant maritime and security interests in the region, could be drawn into greater diplomatic and naval involvement.
Disruptions to the Suez–Red Sea corridor in turn could raise shipping and energy costs, affecting Asian supply chains and European markets alike, thus worsening the effects of existing maritime insecurity in the Red Sea – not to mention the tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, both of which have already unsettled global trade and energy markets.
Meanwhile, competing Gulf powers could deepen their involvement, potentially turning the Horn into another arena of great-power rivalry.
Such developments would also place additional pressure on already strained humanitarian resources and migration routes.
Ultimately, the ongoing war in Ethiopia exposes how deeply interconnected the Horn of Africa’s territorial disputes, Nile hydropolitics and Red Sea rivalries have become. This regional confrontation thus risks developing into a broader geopolitical crisis, with repercussions extending from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific.
Uriel Araujo, researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts.