Can Bangladesh turn BIMSTEC into an effective regional force?

BIMSTEC is neither simply failing nor steadily becoming an effective regional organisation. Its recent record points to a more complicated situation: institutional activity is increasing, but the gap between regional commitments and region-wide results remains large. The group has a legal charter, more regular sectoral mechanisms, new implementation units and agreements beginning to enter into force. Yet it has not produced the integrated market, reliable transport network or shared capacity to manage regional crises that its ambitions imply.

The most useful test is not whether BIMSTEC holds meetings. It is whether its decisions change the choices available to citizens, firms and governments across all seven member states. Recent developments pass that test unevenly. Maritime cooperation and public health project management show a path towards practical delivery. The stalled free-trade architecture, partial ratification of agreements and uneven political representation expose the continuing gap between institutional output and regional capability.

That distinction matters when judging BIMSTEC’s purpose. The organisation was created to promote economic growth and social progress through cooperation among the Bay of Bengal states. It is not a military alliance, nor does it have a mandate to impose a political settlement on Myanmar. Judging it as if it were a collective security pact would misread its design. But an organisation promising deeper connectivity, shared prosperity and regional resilience must still be assessed on whether it can manage cross-border problems and make its agreements work beyond the capitals where they are signed.

A larger agenda, with an implementation test

The sixth BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok in April 2025 sought to reset expectations. Leaders adopted the first BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030, signed the Agreement on Maritime Transport Cooperation (AMTC) and approved rules of procedure for the organisation’s mechanisms. The summit mattered because it placed a longer-term framework alongside the familiar cycle of declarations. The test was whether these decisions could produce practical advances in trade and the wider economy, questions already central to the expectations surrounding the summit.

That expectation exposed BIMSTEC’s central difficulty: members can agree on goals more readily than they can make them operational. The Charter, adopted in 2022 and in force since May 2024, gives BIMSTEC a formal legal basis. But legal personality does not, in itself, create enforcement capacity, harmonised regulations or the national budgets required to implement regional plans. Each member state still has to translate agreed measures into domestic rules, infrastructure spending and administrative procedures.

Trade is the clearest measure of this gap. The Framework Agreement on the BIMSTEC Free Trade Area was signed in 2004. The current negotiating status of its component agreements shows real but incomplete progress: the text on trade in goods has been finalised, while rules of origin and certification procedures remain under negotiation; customs cooperation is still being negotiated; and talks on services, investment and trade facilitation continue. This is not evidence that nothing has happened. Rather, it shows that the proposed FTA has advanced unevenly, while the full framework remains unavailable to traders.

That delay matters beyond the absence of tariff preferences. A functioning trade area needs predictable customs procedures, reliable certification, rules governing services and investment, and a mechanism for resolving disputes. Without these, businesses cannot build regional supply chains around a promise of future liberalisation. Bangladesh’s call to finalise the agreements at the 2025 summit reflected political recognition of the problem; the remaining question is whether that recognition can be translated into a negotiating calendar with clear deadlines and completed texts.

The scale of the economic shortfall makes this distinction visible. An International Chamber of Commerce–Bangladesh estimate in 2025 put intra-BIMSTEC trade at around 7 per cent of members’ total trade, compared with about 25 per cent within ASEAN. Those figures are not a complete measure of integration: BIMSTEC members have different economic structures and global trading patterns. Still, they capture a key problem. Trade among members is not yet substantial enough to create strong business constituencies that would press governments to deepen regional integration.

Recent activity and what it can deliver

The AMTC offers a more concrete test. It entered into force in May 2026 after Myanmar became the fourth member to ratify it, following Bhutan, India and Thailand. Under the agreement’s terms, it initially applies among those four ratifying states. This is a meaningful legal step, but it is not yet a seven-country maritime system. A treaty can enter into force while the network it was intended to connect remains incomplete.

A September 2026 implementation workshop on the AMTC focused on the Joint Shipping Committee, standard operating procedures, port-to-port links and digital maritime solutions. Participants urged members that had not yet ratified the agreement to do so and nominate representatives. This marks a shift from declaring a vision to addressing operational questions. But it also shows that ratification and participation remain incomplete. Progress should be measured by whether the agreement reduces delays, paperwork and costs on identifiable routes, rather than by the number of meetings convened.

Security cooperation shows a similar pattern: useful, but bounded. At their July 2026 meeting, BIMSTEC’s National Security Chiefs discussed terrorism, organised crime, cyber, maritime and energy security, disaster management and emerging threats. They adopted guidelines for the maritime component of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and endorsed principles for encounters between maritime law enforcement agencies. These are practical steps towards more predictable cooperation. They can help governments coordinate at sea and respond to emergencies without requiring BIMSTEC to become a defence bloc.

The first BIMSTEC Home Ministers’ Meeting, held in New Delhi on 13 October 2026, added a new layer to this security architecture. The meeting adopted the Delhi Declaration and called for cooperation on terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, transnational organised crime, cybercrime, money laundering and terrorist financing. It also emphasised the implementation of existing legal instruments, information-sharing, specialised training and capacity-building. This represents institutional progress, but it should not be confused with an operational security regime: the declaration’s value will depend on domestic legal follow-through, information-sharing protocols and sustained participation.

The meeting’s timing is itself revealing. BIMSTEC leaders had agreed to hold home ministerial meetings in 2018, but the first one took place only eight years later. That delay illustrates how the organisation’s mechanisms can remain dormant despite summit-level decisions. Their recent activation is significant, yet it also underlines why effectiveness must be judged by the speed and continuity of implementation, rather than simply by the eventual convening of a long-promised forum.

Bangladesh’s representation raises a separate question about political ownership. Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed did not attend; instead, a delegation led by Home Ministry Senior Secretary Manzur Morshed Chowdhury represented Bangladesh. The government’s information adviser rejected suggestions that the minister’s absence was linked to India–Bangladesh relations and said the country was participating through its secretary. The distinction is important: this was not a state-level boycott. However, when the other members were represented at the ministerial level, Bangladesh’s lower-level representation may still have reduced its political weight at a meeting shaping regional security priorities. The available evidence does not establish a diplomatic motive; nevertheless, the difference in the level of representation remains analytically relevant, regardless of intent.

The contrast with July is notable: Bangladesh participated in the National Security Chiefs’ meeting, but its home minister was absent from the inaugural ministerial gathering. That pattern does not prove a retreat from BIMSTEC. It does, however, raise a practical question for a country holding the group’s chairmanship: can Dhaka sustain political engagement across the mechanisms it is expected to lead, or will participation vary according to the level and bilateral setting of each meeting? For agreements on law enforcement and intelligence-sharing, consistent political ownership matters because technical officials need authority, legal backing and resources to implement decisions.

The same practical shift is visible in public health. In July 2026, BIMSTEC inaugurated a Project Management Unit in Dhaka, supported by the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Its immediate purpose is to help implement action plans on public health and traditional medicine under a regional pandemic preparedness project. It is a small institutional development, but an important one: it provides the Secretariat with a unit intended to manage programmes, coordinate partners and monitor implementation. Whether it becomes a model for other sectors will depend on staffing, funding and results that member governments can verify.

Science and technology cooperation is advancing through a similar sequence. In August, representatives of all seven member states met as the governing board of the Technology Transfer Facility to discuss AI, digital transformation, research partnerships and the facility’s operations. In September, Sri Lanka and the Secretariat signed the host-country agreement, described as the final step towards operationalising the facility. The Expert Group on Science, Technology and Innovation also agreed to complete outstanding activities under its 2023–2027 plan and proposed a virtual start-up conclave for December 2026. These are signs of institutional progress, but establishing a facility does not automatically translate into technology transfer. Its value depends on joint research, shared intellectual property rules and meaningful access for firms and universities across the region.

Taken together, these examples suggest that BIMSTEC is becoming more capable in narrow, technical areas where governments can cooperate without resolving major political disputes. Shipping procedures, disaster relief, health planning, research collaboration and law enforcement coordination can be advanced through expert groups and administrative agreements. This may be a sensible form of regionalism for a diverse membership. It is also less ambitious than creating a shared market or political community. BIMSTEC is most effective where the task is specific, the benefits are visible and states retain control over implementation.

The structural obstacles

The first obstacle is the breadth of the agenda. BIMSTEC covers trade, connectivity, energy, public health, technology, climate and security, among other areas. A broad portfolio can help members find common ground, but it can also spread diplomatic attention and the Secretariat’s limited capacity across more priorities than the organisation can effectively manage. When every sector is described as strategic, it becomes difficult to identify which commitments take precedence, which have dedicated budgets and which have clear deadlines.

The second obstacle is the gap between decision-making and implementation. At the 2025 summit, BIMSTEC’s Secretary-General acknowledged both the lack of significant progress on the six FTA agreements and the long delays in implementing summit and ministerial decisions. The Secretariat can coordinate and monitor, but it depends on member governments for political direction, technical staff, financing and ratification. Without a stronger implementation mandate and transparent reporting, the organisation’s central administration can identify delays without necessarily being able to overcome them.

Third, BIMSTEC must manage asymmetry without allowing regional cooperation to appear as a vehicle for the largest member’s priorities. India’s economic scale, geography and administrative capacity give it an outsized role in many transport and security initiatives. Smaller members may benefit from access to wider markets and transport routes, but they also need assurances that benefits, costs and decision-making responsibilities are shared equitably. Consensus and sovereign equality protect smaller states from being formally overruled; however, they can also make ambitious commitments difficult to reach. The challenge is not to eliminate asymmetry, which is impossible, but to design projects whose benefits are visibly reciprocal.

Fourth, members do not share a single strategic outlook. Bangladesh’s priorities include trade, transit, energy and the Rohingya crisis; Nepal and Bhutan are particularly concerned with reliable access to external markets; Sri Lanka has interests in maritime services and technology; Thailand’s regional orientation is shaped by its Southeast Asian connections; and India has its own security and connectivity objectives. These interests overlap, but they do not automatically align. The result is an organisation that can support issue-by-issue cooperation more easily than it can establish a common political position.

Myanmar exposes the limits of this model. The 2025 Bangkok summit included Myanmar’s military leader while the country was in the midst of conflict and facing severe humanitarian needs; the visit drew protests and criticism. BIMSTEC’s inclusive approach may preserve channels of communication, but it also creates a credibility problem when members cannot agree on how to address the political crisis. The organisation should not be expected to resolve Myanmar’s conflict. Yet the conflict affects border security, displacement, humanitarian access and land connectivity. If BIMSTEC cannot coordinate even limited responses to these spillover effects, its claim to regional resilience is weakened.

Finally, geography alone does not create integration. Roads, ports and shipping routes require compatible regulations, border procedures, financing and political continuity. The Asian Development Bank’s BIMSTEC Trade Facilitation Strategic Framework 2030 emphasises that trade facilitation depends on addressing regulatory and procedural barriers alongside physical infrastructure. A corridor without efficient customs clearance can remain a promise on paper. Likewise, a maritime agreement ratified by only some members cannot yet deliver a fully integrated regional network.

What Bangladesh’s chairmanship can test

Bangladesh’s chairmanship through 2027 gives Dhaka an opportunity to test a more disciplined approach. It should resist measuring success by the number of meetings held or declarations issued during its term. A stronger measure would be a publicly accessible dashboard recording each major commitment, the responsible ministry or member state, the next deadline, funding status and results achieved. If a commitment is delayed, the reason should be made visible. That would make implementation a shared political responsibility rather than a technical matter left to the Secretariat.

The first priorities should be areas where limited but practical gains are possible. Bangladesh can press for a timetable for the remaining AMTC ratifications, then support a pilot route with published data on port-to-port movements, customs clearance and shipping costs. On trade, it can propose a sequenced calendar for the FTA components closest to completion, while advancing trade facilitation and customs procedures alongside tariff negotiations. Progress should be reported in terms of procedures simplified and the number of members participating, rather than merely the number of meetings convened.

Dhaka should distinguish between what BIMSTEC can and cannot do regarding Myanmar. A regional economic organisation cannot compel a political settlement. It can, however, support humanitarian coordination, public health preparedness, cross-border crime prevention and dialogue on the effects of conflict on connectivity. Bangladesh’s call at the 2025 summit for a more proactive BIMSTEC role in Rakhine and Rohingya repatriation demonstrated the issue’s political importance. Any such effort will require realistic goals, participation from relevant actors and safeguards against treating a technical project as a substitute for a political solution.

Above all, Bangladesh should use its chairmanship to focus the institution rather than expand its agenda. One or two deliverables in each priority area, with designated leads, budgets, timelines and review points, would be more meaningful than another broad action plan. The deficit in political will, fragmented trade arrangements and weak institutional frameworks had already been identified in discussions preceding the 2025 summit. The test for the current chair is whether those familiar obstacles can be translated into a short list of verifiable improvements.

BIMSTEC is not losing all its effectiveness. It is showing greater activity and beginning to build practical mechanisms in selected areas. But activity is not yet integration, and entry into force is not the same as region-wide implementation. The organisation advances its stated purposes when it improves cooperation on trade, transport, resilience and shared technical challenges. It falls short when commitments remain broad, unevenly adopted or unmeasured. Its future credibility will depend less on the next vision document than on whether ordinary regional transactions become easier, safer and more predictable for all seven member states.

---

Mohd Amdadul Haque is a doctoral candidate in the Department of International Politics at Shandong University and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Gopalganj Science and Technology University. His work focuses on geopolitics, maritime security, great-power rivalry and Bangladesh’s foreign policy. He can be reached at [email protected].

---

Send your articles for Slow Reads to [email protected]. Check out our submission guidelines for details.