OMAHA—While ostensibly not a belligerent party to Russia’s war against Ukraine, North Korea may emerge as one of the conflict’s largest beneficiaries. Neither Moscow nor Kyiv seem closer to finding an end to the war even if a three-way peace talk comes to fruition, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s most recent public statements have largely repeated demands that have remained unchanged throughout 2026. Yet North Korea’s role supporting Russia in the war has already yielded substantial gains.
North Korean People’s Army troops started deploying to Russia in October 2024, following the signing of the partnership framework between Pyongyang and Moscow in June of that year. North Korean military activity remains cloaked in secrecy and the exact terms of the Russia–North Korea support agreement are unknown. However, Pyongyang benefits substantially and strategically from combat experience, weapons sales, battlefield testing of its systems, financing, and possibly technology transfers. These gains could extend beyond the war, strengthening North Korea’s military capabilities and potentially altering the strategic security equation in the Indo-Pacific.
What does North Korea gain?
By sending its troops to help Russia, North Korea firstly gains combat experience. Its army has not fought a significant engagement since 1953, and the North Korean deployment to Kursk represents the first opportunity for a generation of soldiers and commanders to learn the hard lessons of actual combat. Reports indicate that North Korea has deployed approximately eleven thousand troops to Russia, and Ukrainian military intelligence stated in August that an additional thirty thousand to fifty thousand North Korean troops could soon arrive. In all, the Institute for the Study of War estimates that roughly twenty-five thousand North Korean troops have rotated through the Russian theater since the deployment began. So far, these forces have been mostly used for border security. But if Ukrainian estimates of looming increases are correct, then the additional forces could free Russian forces for additional offensive actions, which could place additional strain on already stretched Ukrainian defenses.
Beyond combat experience, weapons exports and combat testing of indigenously produced weapons are the next area of significant operational, tactical, and strategic gain for Pyongyang. Testing under combat conditions yields significantly better engineering data and real-time improvements. In fact, North Korea may already be implementing battlefield-learned improvements. According to an early 2025 report, North Korean ballistic missile accuracy had improved since the beginning of the deployment. Japanese public broadcaster NHK separately reported that Moscow had pledged further assistance in drone and counter-drone technology to the North Koreans in exchange for their continued support. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that North Korea has exported fifteen million artillery shells to Russia since 2022. Ukrainian intelligence has stated that, at points in the war, up to 40 percent of Russian artillery consumption came from North Korean factories. And an article in The Korea Times, citing South Korean Defense Intelligence, reported that North Korea has sent some 33,000 shipping containers containing munitions, self-propelled guns, rocket launchers, and short range ballistic missiles to Russia.
Feedback from these arms transfers will likely improve the quality of North Korean weapons and boost the North Korean arms industry. It will also likely improve engineering and quality control, and could result in reciprocal transfers of sanctioned and embargoed technology that North Korea currently lacks. The full extent of the benefits are impossible to quantify, but dollar figures can be estimated for some aspects of the partnership. For example, reporting indicates that Russia has paid North Korea up to $13 billion for its military assistance. In August, Bloomberg placed the broader sanctions-evasion windfall for Pyongyang as high as $22 billion.
It is critical to understand not only what material is leaving North Korea, but also what is coming in. Technological transfers from Russia may include everything from space-related technology to precision-strike improvements, both of which have long limited North Korean capabilities. Shortly before the partnership was signed in June 2024, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un traveled to a Russian space launch facility in the Russian far east. At the time, US officials warned that Russia could share satellite and space-launch technology—capabilities that North Korea struggles to produce domestically—in exchange for munitions and manpower. While there is no public evidence that Russia has directly contributed to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, it is plausible that the by-products of such technology transfers could benefit Pyongyang’s weapons research and development programs.
Nuclear propulsion may be another matter. In late 2025, Kim unveiled the hull of North Korea’s first nuclear-powered submarine. This may have been enabled by Russian assistance and, if it becomes fully operational, could significantly improve North Korean nuclear capabilities. In addition, South Korean officials have asserted that Russia has transferred air-defense missile systems to North Korea. All of this taken together, North Korea’s support for Russia has likely helped Pyongyang close several important technological gaps that it has long struggled with under sanctions and isolation.
Implications for the United States and Indo-Pacific
Most estimates put Russian casualties in the war above a million and growing at thousands per month. Ukraine, too, has sustained significant losses. It is costing hundreds of billions of dollars to sustain the war effort, and the economic damage is running into the trillions of dollars. Recovery will take decades, assuming a stable peace is able to be reached.
North Korea, by contrast, has entered a European war at limited direct cost. It has not risked confrontation with its principal adversaries while gaining strategic leverage and greatly improving its military capabilities. Its partnership with Russia, Pyongyang’s most formal security arrangement with Moscow since the Soviet era, has given it a new form of strategic insurance. It has also weakened multilateral arms-transfer sanctions and enforcement and made it far more difficult for the United States and United Nations to track and expose sanctions-evasion networks.
The consequences for Indo-Pacific partners may play out over decades. Once isolated and largely constrained by China, Kim may now feel emboldened to pursue his regional objectives vis-à-vis South Korea and Japan. The combination of Pyongyang’s increased capabilities and now battle-hardened forces could raise North Korean confidence in its own strategic decision-making, thus potentially increasing the baseline risk for Northern miscalculation on the peninsula, or even with its neighbors and the United States. This could take many forms, including clashes in disputed areas to a new round of “missile coercion” by North Korea.
Many questions remain. What is China’s calculus regarding North Korea’s advancing capabilities? Beijing values stability on the peninsula, and a loss of leverage on Kim is unlikely to be seen by Chinese officials as a positive development. Critically, how enduring is the “unlimited partnership” with Russia, particularly if the exigencies of the war in Ukraine come to an end? What does it mean for US strategic planning and contingency responses? For nuclear deterrence?
For now, the answers are unknown. But on its current trajectory, North Korea appears poised to emerge from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with a stronger hand.