Hardware wallets were supposed to be the safe answer to crypto’s oldest warning: not your keys, not your coins. In 2026, that answer developed some uncomfortable footnotes.
A Forbes analysis frames the year’s Bitcoin hack losses at more than $500 million. Axis Intelligence estimates total hardware wallet losses for the year exceeded $240 million, with the research placing the figure at approximately $241 million when the major incidents and other reported attacks are combined.
Two breaches, two very different failures
The first incident hit Coinkite’s Coldcard devices. A flaw in Coldcard firmware weakened the randomness used to generate seed phrases. The affected firmware dated back to builds from March 2021 onward. In late July and early August 2026, attackers drained an estimated 1,800+ BTC from thousands of wallets, with the haul valued at somewhere between $100 million and $150 million.
The attackers did not need to touch the devices. The weakness lived in how the keys were born, not in how they were stored. Owners could have kept their Coldcards in a safe, and the coins would still have been exposed.
According to Galaxy Research, funds from the Coldcard breach remained largely unmoved in collector addresses as of mid-October.
The second incident was a supply-chain attack. Ledger Nano X and Nano S Plus units sold by CryptoBilis, an authorized reseller, contained hidden implants that compromised users’ seed phrases. Losses from those devices are estimated at roughly $90 million to $100 million by mid-October, spread across various blockchain networks.
How big was the damage, really
No compromise of Ledger’s or Coinkite’s core infrastructure was found. The problems were confined to specific firmware builds in Coldcard’s case and specific device batches in Ledger’s.
Bitcoin’s price showed limited volatility in response to the breaches.
What this means for self-custody
Experts and Bitcoin enthusiasts began reassessing reliance on single-vendor devices, pushing instead for multisignature setups and stronger randomness in seed generation.
Multisig works like a bank vault that needs two or three separate keys turned at once. A wallet might require signatures from two of three devices, ideally built by different manufacturers. If one vendor ships flawed firmware or a tampered batch, the attacker still lacks the other keys. Neither the Coldcard flaw nor the Ledger implants, on their own, would have been enough to empty a properly configured multi-vendor multisig wallet.
Users who generate seed phrases with their own added entropy, such as dice rolls, reduce how much they depend on a device’s internal generator.
With more than $240 million lost to hardware vulnerabilities, some market participants may look toward regulated custody services and investment vehicles that bundle security into the product. Analysts noted a growing concern around hardware solutions relative to institutional custodians and exchange-traded funds, potentially influencing investor behavior moving forward.
What to watch next: whether the Coldcard thieves begin moving the coins Galaxy Research has been tracking, and whether further tampered Ledger units surface beyond the CryptoBilis batch.
Disclosure: This article was edited by Kaye Quema. For more information on how we create and review content, see our Editorial Policy.