As if the simmering trouble in the Strait of Hormuz were not bad enough, Saudi Arabia has lately been embroiled in an intensifying conflict at the Bab al-Mandeb Strait as well. West Asia’s largest economy and the world’s eighth-largest defence spender is no pushover. Yet, the simultaneous constrictions at its two vital chokepoints pose an unprecedented challenge to the Kingdom, already grappling with an economic downturn at home and shifting alliances abroad. The evolving situation may be the toughest test yet for Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister, although existential alarms seem overblown. The high-stakes crisis could have profound domestic, regional and global consequences for geopolitics, energy and global trade. A granular analysis of its causes and ramifications is called for.
An old conflict, slanted reportage
Despite media saturation with related developments, the coverage is often myopic and slanted, perpetuating several myths that need either debunking or proper nuancing. Historically, the Saudi-Al-Houthi conflict is nearly a century old. Saudi King Ibn Saud’s forces defeated Yemeni Imam Yahya’s tribal fighters in 1934, compelling the latter to cede three provinces in the Asir region under the Treaty of Taif. Although a bilateral border was demarcated in 2000, many Yemeni nationalists still question its finality.
Second, until 1990, Yemenis did not need visas to travel to and work in Saudi Arabia, leading millions to migrate to the booming oil economy. A significant number of Saudi nationals, particularly in the Hijaz and Asir regions, still have Yemeni ancestry, the most egregious example being al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden.
Third, sectarian differences sharpen the divisions: while Saudis are predominantly Wahhabi Sunnis, al-Houthis are mostly Zaydis, a five-worshipping Shia sect. Al-Houthis constitute around a third of Yemen’s total population, with the rest being Sunnis. This sectarian divide underlies the vicious 12-year-old Yemeni civil war — Saudi Arabia supports anti-Houthi Sunni factions and accuses al-Houthis of attacking Islam’s holiest cities.
Fourth, although al-Houthis have strong ties with Iran, describing the relationship as a proxy arrangement is an oversimplification, as it gives insufficient weight to their Arab identity. Al-Houthis remained inactive during the two recent United States-Iran wars. In contrast, when Israel attacked Hamas and Hezbollah in 2023-24, al-Houthis were the only Arab side to wade into hostilities, launching missile and drone attacks against Israel and disrupting shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, despite intensive American and Israeli airstrikes. Rather than supporting al-Houthis, Iran recently offered to mediate between Riyadh and Sana’a. Similarly, al-Houthis have reportedly promised not to attack U.S. and Israeli assets unless in retaliation, causing U.S. President Donald Trump to vacillate over MbS’s call for support. Arguably, the al-Houthis’ successful closure of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait set a precedent for Iranian action in the Strait of Hormuz 18 months later.
Last but not least, the media has also been silent on al-Houthis’ rationale for air and naval attacks against Saudi Arabia: retaliation for the Kingdom’s decade-old air and sea blockade against them.
Similar myths are percolating about navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and need to be challenged. A 70% rise in global oil prices belies loud and repeated claims that oil and gas flows from the Gulf are near normal. Truth has been collateral damage in Trumpian hyperbole to ‘talk down’ U.S. pump prices ahead of crucial congressional midterm elections.
Second, Iran has been inconsistent about its self-appointed role as the ‘supervisor’ of Hormuz traffic. After turning a blind eye to the U.S.-protected stealthy oil shuttle for weeks, it has stepped up attacks on tankers. This has raised suspicions that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards initially entered into an informal tolling arrangement with some Gulf oil exporters. However, Tehran has now decided to restrict supplies to keep oil prices high until the U.S. midterm elections.
Lastly, why has Pakistan, credited with the June 17 Islamabad Memorandum, been sidelined from a peacemaking role, even as Qatar, Iraq and even Moscow are being requisitioned? Some reports indicate that Mr. Trump has quietly demoted Islamabad as a go-between, with Iran blaming Pakistani diplomacy for being either gullible or complicit in selling him a document tilted in Iran’s favour.
The Iran-Houthi pincer
Riyadh has long perceived Tehran as a geopolitical and sectarian rival and sought to resist its influence in West Asia. It remains deeply suspicious of the Iran-backed “Axis of Resistance” of non-state actors in general, and al-Houthi militias in particular. The Kingdom aims to keep Yemen as a weak but not dysfunctional state. Yemenis, on the other hand, chafe at Saudi interference and nurse their historic grievances against Riyadh.
These smouldering tensions, kept in check by a tenuous ceasefire since 2022, exploded in July 2026. In September, in a sudden escalation, the al-Houthi militia occupied coastal plains along the Red Sea, positioning themselves more strategically at the Bab al-Mandeb chokepoint, menacing nearly 12% of global maritime traffic. The Saudi-led coalition’s recent counteroffensive has rekindled the fighting, with a strong Saudi bombing campaign. The al-Houthi militia retaliated by launching missiles and drones at strategic Saudi targets, including Riyadh airport and Aramco headquarters, denting Saudi Arabia’s image as a safe and stable country. This is the first time in 35 years that the Kingdom’s cities have come under sustained attack. Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the al-Houthi threat to Saudi-linked maritime activity, and the disruption of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, allegedly by Iraqi Shia militias, have created a worst-case scenario for Saudi Arabia, jeopardising its vital oil exports, particularly to Asia.
The Saudis have no good options for untangling this unprecedented Iran-Houthi pincer. Despite an $83 billion defence budget, Riyadh lacks the military heft to dislodge the al-Houthis from their mountainous perches by a ground offensive. The offensive by its local Yemeni allies has bogged down into a war of attrition. Pro-Saudi stakeholders, such as the White House and the partners to the Makkah Agreement, have responded with tokenism, seemingly daunted by Yemen’s reputation as a graveyard of foreign interventions and the prospects of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait being blocked again. The only other viable strategy, therefore, is to negotiate a package of measures to de-escalate tensions, lift mutual air and maritime blockades, and negotiate a truce based on the 2022 ceasefire. From Riyadh’s perspective, the risks would include a loss of prestige both domestically and regionally, the possible collapse of Yemen’s fractious “internationally recognised government”, and the consolidation of the Tehran-Sana’a axis.
An expeditious resolution of the Yemeni crisis is a Saudi priority, as it would help insulate the Kingdom from the fallout of the next round of U.S.-Iran conflict, which could follow the U.S. midterm elections. Iran has made no secret of its intention to retaliate for American attacks on its civilian infrastructure by hitting the Gulf Arab states acting as the U.S. accomplices. In the past, Riyadh has been privately inconsistent on this issue, advising Washington to clobber Iran until regime change at one time, and also cautioning it about the potential blowback against Saudi Arabia’s vulnerabilities. Unless the current fracas with Yemen is sorted out, Saudi Arabia may have to face attacks from Iran as well as the al-Houthis.
The stakes for India
Although India has avoided any direct entanglement at the two maritime chokepoints in the Arabian Peninsula, it is not immune from the impact. Beyond the ongoing economic losses and related supply disruptions from interrupted trade, high oil, gas and fertiliser prices, India needs to look after the safety and well-being of nine million of its citizens currently resident in the Gulf. It is worth recalling that in 1990-91, the huge expense involved in repatriating 1,60,000 Indians from Kuwait precipitated the economic crisis, forcing the country to pledge its sovereign gold for the first time. While India is much stronger today, it remains sobering to note that the number of Indians living in the Gulf now exceeds that figure by more than 50 times.
Mahesh Sachdev is a retired Indian Ambassador, specialising in the Arab world and oil issues