Although 2026 is already approaching its last two months, the signing of a final peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia still appears to be a distant prospect. In a recent statement to the press, Armenia’s prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, said that "holding a referendum in the country was unrealistic", while also addressing several other important issues. He first spoke about the need to regulate relations between Yerevan and Moscow, before stressing the importance of implementing a range of reforms to meet the European Union’s requirements.
It is worth recalling that, at the beginning of this year, Armenian officials repeatedly stressed during speeches in parliament that a referendum was essential in the context of preparations for EU membership. In an interview with a local television channel in February 2025, Pashinyan even referred to Azerbaijan, describing a referendum as an important and integral element of the peace agenda. Although this statement provoked considerable anger and pressure against the Yerevan administration, the course pursued by Armenia had, by the end of this year, raised hopes among many that a referendum would take place.
However, the current situation and Pashinyan’s new vision once again expose contradictory positions on the peace agenda. The Armenian prime minister says that all outstanding issues relating to peace have been resolved, yet he describes holding a referendum as unrealistic. Why, then, is Armenia relegating its peace agenda with Azerbaijan to the background, while seeking, for the time being, to put the referendum question aside as it attempts to strike a balance between Europe and Russia?
Armenia has long made efforts to integrate with the European Union and has been considering how to loosen its economic ties with Russia without causing a major economic crisis. Last week, after attending the summit of Commonwealth of Independent States countries in Turkmenistan, Pashinyan may have gained a deeper understanding, following his contacts with Russia, of just how heavily his country remains tied to Russian economic networks and how far-reaching the changes would need to be to break free of them.
Consider that 98% of Armenia’s agricultural sector, 87% of its natural gas supply and 70% of its electricity supply are linked to Russia. These figures suggest that, for geographical and historical reasons alike, Armenia will have to undertake much more substantial reforms over a prolonged period if it is to overcome this dependence. Otherwise, its inability to disengage from Russia in the near future could slow its European ambitions and lead to further delays in holding a referendum.
A referendum on constitutional changes could also expose Pashinyan to additional political risks. The prime minister would not automatically lose his position if a constitutional referendum failed, but analysts and European institutions view such an outcome as a potentially severe political blow that could derail his broader political agenda. More specifically, if the public rejected the new constitution, the peace process with Azerbaijan could stall or collapse, risking renewed regional instability, as critics have warned. Such an outcome would weaken Pashinyan’s domestic legitimacy and embolden pro-Russian opposition factions in parliament.
The conclusion, therefore, is that the Armenian government does not want to put its future at risk by embarking on an economic and political gamble while reforms remain incomplete. Significant commitments to Azerbaijan, Russia and Europe are at stake. Although Armenia may look to Europe to help meet its security needs and other requirements, it must still confront some difficult realities. Above all, while seeking to preserve regional stability, Armenia remains compelled to find common ground with Moscow to maintain its economic and security ties with Russia.