‘Trump Is Cooked’: Republicans Clash Over Ukraine as Midterms Loom

“I think Trump is cooked in the midterms, unless literally every poll is disgustingly wrong.”

This assessment came from a Republican-adjacent Washington source speaking to Kyiv Post on condition of anonymity as US President Donald Trump’s handling of Russia’s war against Ukraine draws unusually public criticism from his own party.

“I don’t think [Trump’s] efforts to scapegoat Ukraine will make that worse, but he’s also not getting away with it,” the source added. The latest sentiment comes on the heels of Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff traveling to St. Petersburg to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin for a new round of negotiations, during which he referred to Putin as a “humanitarian”. Meanwhile, Russian forces continued attacking Ukrainian cities and Kyiv reported restricted access to satellite communications essential to frontline operations and intercepting Russian drones.

For Republican commentators and politicians who had spent months pushing the Trump administration to increase pressure on Moscow, this was an unpleasant sight. They found themselves watching the US offer Russia economic relief while pressing Ukraine for concessions and restricting its defense capabilities.

Beyond immediate moral discomfort and questions on Washington’s foreign policy priorities, there’s also the practical aspect as they seek re-election during the Nov. 3 midterms. With all 435 House seats and roughly a third of the Senate contested, the Republican party’s chances of preserving a majority in both chambers risks slipping away as Trump’s approval rating continues to plunge.

Other Topics of Interest

Serbia Votes as Student Movement Mounts Major Challenge to Vučić

Serbia votes in snap elections as a mass student movement mounts the strongest challenge in over a decade to populist leader Aleksandar Vučić.

The undone MAGA momentum

In late July, conservative MAGA commentator Laura Loomer made headlines. Formerly a fierce critic of Ukraine, she traveled to Kyiv to interview President Volodymyr Zelensky, publicly acknowledging that she had repeated Russian propaganda before realizing Moscow’s support for Iran in its confrontation with Israel and the US – a circumstance that helped change her position.

This is how she became part of an emerging pro-Ukraine conservative camp alongside figures such as Ben Shapiro, who had also interviewed Zelensky, as well as Mark Levin and other prominent Trump-adjacent commentators.

For a country often presented to some Republican audiences as a burden on American taxpayers, this was a significant opening and a promising one as well, since the renewed enthusiasm reinforced the case for the sanctions championed by the late Sen. Lindsey Graham. The logic was that if Russia would not agree to a ceasefire or a negotiated end to the war, it should face a heavier economic cost for continuing the invasion.

The momentum bore fruit: Congress passed the bill, and Trump signed it into law on Sept. 18. Key provisions were due to take effect by Oct. 18, although the legislation also gave the president broad waiver powers.

Yet what appeared to be a breakthrough soon became a full-fledged retreat.

Instead of imposing those additional penalties, Trump abruptly announced his diesel agreement with Moscow on Oct. 9.

A week later, he waived major new sanctions and duties under the Graham legislation (though leaving existing sanctions in place) and launched what Susan B. Glasser of The New Yorker coined as a pre-election campaign against Zelensky, toward whom his antipathy is long documented.

Trump blamed Ukraine’s refinery attacks for aggravating fuel shortages and suggested that a settlement would require different Ukrainian leadership, while thanking Putin for presumably being “the reasonable one” in the illegal war he started.

This time, however, the pressure went beyond personal attacks: intelligence sharing, satellite access and weapons deliveries had become part of the dispute, accompanied by a considerably more Moscow-friendly rhetoric than in spring when the US resorted to similar ways of pressuring the victim of Russia’s aggression.

Republicans push back

Glasser’s description of Trump’s actions might be easy for his supporters to dismiss as criticism from a familiar opponent. The reaction from Republicans themselves, however, was harder to explain away with freshly-converted Loomer saying: “Buying Russian oil puts money back into the coffers of the Islamic regime of Iran that chants Death to America. We know this.”

While disagreements with Zelensky, including concerns about corruption and oversight, were not unusual for many Republicans, restricting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself while offering economic relief to Russia was another.

“What is interesting is that his recent, unveiled support for Putin has finally seen some anger from Congressional Republicans,” the source told Kyiv Post, warning that some of them “are leaving office.”

Reacting to Witkoff’s salute to Putin in St. Petersburg as a “humanitarian” for releasing American detainee Stephen Hubbard, another Republican-adjacent source privately told Kyiv Post: “I so hate Witkoff.”

The anger, however, was not limited to private conversations. Republican Sen. Thom Tillis responded in very strong terms to Witkoff’s flattery, asking:: “WTF, Steve?” Separately, Sen. John Cornyn described Putin as a “stone cold killer.”

Hours after the meeting, Russia launched another attack on Kyiv.

The backlash followed strong objections to the privately-struck diesel deal. Tillis, Susan Collins and Mitch McConnell joined a bipartisan letter urging Trump to reverse the agreement, arguing that it would offer limited relief to American consumers while supplying revenue to Moscow.

Republican Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, standing for reelection in Pennsylvania’s 1st Congressional District pursued legislation to block Russian energy purchases. European governments also rejected following Washington’s lead on sanctions relief.

Then came the reports of restrictions on intelligence and satellite communications that only served to intensify the tensions on Capitol Hill.

Zelensky said on Oct. 20 that US intelligence sharing had resumed. Satellite access took longer to improve: restrictions on SpaceX’s Starlink and defense-tailored Starshield services had disrupted connections on fast-moving equipment, including Ukrainian drones.

On Oct. 24, Ukrainian defense specialists reported that terminals were operating above the previous 161 km/h limit. Later that morning, Defense Minister Yevhen Khmara reported stable connections above 400 km/h.

But Patriot interceptor deliveries remained delayed, according to Zelensky’s remarks reported that day. Restored intelligence and communications did not resolve the shortage of missiles needed to intercept Russian attacks.

For Republicans seeking re-election, these developments leave an awkward question to answer: what has Washington attained by this and how it does affect them?

Trump vs. American voters

Despite the existing notion among some that the Republicans are Russia-friendly, the evidence paints a different picture.

Earlier Pew polling found that 47% of Republicans regarded Russia as an enemy. Across Americans, 83% viewed Russia unfavorably.

The real partisan Ukraine disagreement lies in two distinct domains: US budgetary and culture wars. The former comes down to the idea of spending and how it affects the average person’s ability to fulfill the basic American idea of buying a home, which, unlike today, used to be a largely affordable endeavor.

The latter is more poignantly about which way American society should be heading: toward a more secular group with the progressive agenda dominating the mainstream view, or the opposite.

Ukraine got trapped in both as it needs money from an already heavily indebted society and the idea, often spread by Russian propagandists and other malign agents, that it’s a Democratic stronghold of progressive thought.

Both affect the Republican stance toward Kyiv, even if they view Ukraine’s resistance as a legitimate fight at large, which is reflected in the Republican polling ahead of the looming midterms.

University of Maryland surveys, conducted between July 21 and Aug. 17, found Republican majorities supporting continued military assistance to Ukraine in 31 of 39 battleground states and congressional districts surveyed.

The question covered equipment, ammunition, training and intelligence — including capabilities subsequently drawn into October’s disputes.

To understand what that means practically for Republicans, beyond the question of why deal with Putin in the first place, requires consideration of what House members must do when they return to their districts: explain not only why they supported or opposed a particular bill, but also the direction of their party’s policies.

The risk? A backlash.

This is what happened to Ukraine-born Republican Rep. Victoria Spartz who encountered an angry crowd at a March 2025 town hall in Indiana, where questions about Ukraine accompanied criticism of federal spending cuts and other Trump policies.

Republican lawmakers thus face a two-sided task. On the one hand, attacking their party’s leader risks alienating his supporters. On the other hand, defending him without qualification means explaining policies that some of their own constituents oppose – including what Kyiv Post’s source described as “unveiled support for Putin.”

Nor can they simply rely on the “Trump effect,” hoping his endorsement will improve their prospects: A New York Times/Siena survey released on Oct. 21 put Trump’s approval at 36%, against 59% disapproval. Approval of his handling of the cost of living stood at 29%; on gas prices, it was 24%.

Even if candidates can persuade their core supporters that the diesel deal, admittedly, supported by over 50% of the Republican voters, was necessary, winning a competitive election requires more than securing the loyalty of the core base.

The independents the Republicans need

In majoritarian systems, which operate on the “winner takes it all” principle, candidates also need voters who are not reliably behind their party. That includes swing voters and independents, although the two groups are not interchangeable.

Here is where Republicans face less encouraging news.

Independents opposed the diesel deal by 71% to 10%, while opposition among all respondents stood at 63%.

“The diesel fuel deal does almost nothing to help diesel prices, but it does damage Republicans politically. Trump needs Independents to vote Republican,” Steven Moore recently wrote.

Moore is a former Republican congressional chief of staff and founder of the Ukraine Freedom Project, which has worked to build conservative support for Kyiv.

Depending on how much weight these voters give foreign policy, their dissatisfaction could help Democratic candidates or weaken Republican turnout. The survey does not measure whether the deal will change their votes, but the gap between Republican and independent opinion is substantial and cannot be ignored.

They could still vote Republican for other reasons, from economic policy to cultural issues.

Or, they could opt for a Democrat if they choose to show at the polling stations at all, given that fewer than half of eligible Americans voted in recent midterms.

What if the Democrats win?

If there’s anything to learn from Trump’s handling of electoral defeats, it’s that he strongly rules out such possibilities per se. This is why the recent actions aimed at preparing to contest the outcome if they’re not favorable to the Republican Party should be taken into consideration – even if they do not result in substantial practical and societal repercussions.

Yet any hope in Kyiv, or in some European capitals, that a Democratic victory would automatically restore generous and predictable funding, would be misplaced.

Ukraine appears to have a difficult time navigating the American political landscape and how to approach it – an impression stemming from Zelensky’s former right-hand man Andriy Yermak’s confession that he does not wish to understand Washington’s political ins and outs. He’s resigned due to alleged involvement in a large-scale corruption scandal.

The former US Ambassador Oksana Markarova’s perceived Democratic sympathies coupled with the corruption allegations involving her recently-resigned successor Olha Stefanishyna and today’s absence of a newly-appointed ambassador further complicate Kyiv’s positions on Capitol Hill, which bears little resemblance to its 2022 version when both the Democrats and the Republicans voted in favor of providing aid to Ukraine.

What would change more immediately if the Democrats take over is the political pressure on the administration.

If Democrats take the House, they would be positioned to replace Mike Johnson as speaker, control committees and pursue investigations. Ukraine would almost certainly feature in that confrontation, as Kyiv Post’s source predicts: “Democrats with both houses will be launching a salvo of investigations and even impeachment hearings. Trump’s nonsense toward Ukraine will definitely be part of that.”

In fact, the scrutiny of the administration’s decisions is already underway.

On Oct. 22, Sen. Richard Blumenthal announced an inquiry into restrictions on Starlink and Starshield, seeking information from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Musk about who authorized the changes and how they were implemented.

The inquiry also examines the Pentagon’s dependence on SpaceX and whether US forces could face similar disruptions. Restoring Ukraine’s access does not settle who restricted it or why.

A Democratic House would give those investigations greater institutional backing, including control over hearing agendas and the pursuit of documents and testimony. The sanctions waivers and diesel agreement would offer further subjects for scrutiny.

But scrutiny and the reversal of current aid-absent policy aren’t identical endeavors.

Some Democrats, like Ilhan Omar voted against Graham’s sanctions, and even if Democrats initiate another Ukraine aid package, or if Fitzpatrick-initiate bipartisan Ukraine Support Act, which passed the House on June 4 and proposed additional assistance for Kyiv alongside sanctions against Russia, appears on the Senate floor with enough “yays,” it would still need Trump’s signature.

Little suggests that the man who thanks Putin, has his envoy call him a humanitarian, and floats 200% tariffs on both Ukraine and Russia to force them into a peace deal, will do just that.