A Taiwanese friend said that he has never believed that China would attack Taiwan, as winning without fighting has always been Beijing’s preferred strategy.
China would prefer to achieve its objectives without a devastating war. If intimidation, economic pressure and political warfare could persuade Taiwan to accommodate Beijing’s demands, why risk an amphibious invasion?
However, the conclusion that China therefore “will not attack” does not follow, and confidence that Beijing would never use force could contribute to miscalculation.
The important question is not whether Chinese leaders want a major war. They have powerful reasons to avoid one. The question is whether Beijing might conclude that it can achieve its objectives through limited coercion because Taiwan lacks the political will to resist.
Former chief of the general staff admiral Lee Hsi-ming (李喜明) identified this problem. Taiwan’s willingness to fight is difficult to quantify, but persistent domestic attacks on the country’s willingness to resist could create a dangerous impression in Beijing: Taiwan does not want to fight and might collapse once serious pressure is applied.
That goes to the heart of deterrence. Deterrence depends not only on military capability and resolve, but also on an adversary’s perception of them.
Taiwan might possess anti-ship missiles, drones, mines, air defenses and favorable geography, but if China believes Taiwanese society would fracture after several days of a blockade, cyberattacks or military pressure, it could discount those advantages.
Imagine, then, that Beijing does not initially plan an invasion. Instead, it expects Taiwan to fold under coercion.
Large military exercises become a partial blockade. Cyberattacks disrupt communications and financial networks. Economic pressure intensifies. Perhaps China conducts limited strikes while presenting Taipei with political demands.
What if Taiwan refusess?
Beijing would face a choice: Retreat and accept the political consequences of failed coercion, or escalate. A blockade could become strikes; strikes could provoke retaliation; further escalation could draw in the US and Japan. A strategy intended to avoid war could produce one.
History repeatedly demonstrates that wars can begin not because leaders desire prolonged conflict, but because they expect their opponents to collapse quickly. The danger lies in discovering that assumption was wrong only after coercion has begun.
“China will definitely attack” and “China will never attack” are analytically unsatisfactory. Both arguments claim certainty about a decision dependent on changing circumstances, perceptions and calculations. A better question is what could change Beijing’s cost-benefit calculation. One is Taiwan’s political endurance.
The ideal outcome for Washington and Taipei is not for Taiwan to resist heroically until US forces arrive. It is for a war to never begin. That requires Beijing to believe, before a crisis, that Taiwan cannot be rapidly coerced into submission.
Taiwan therefore needs to send Beijing two messages: You cannot easily defeat us and we will not easily quit.
If China truly prefers to “win without fighting,” deterrence requires convincing it of something paradoxical: Without fighting, you cannot force Taiwan to submit. Even with fighting, you cannot be confident of doing so.
The greatest danger in the Taiwan Strait might not be that Beijing has already decided to wage war. It might be that China convinces itself that Taiwan will surrender before a real war is necessary — and discovers too late that it was wrong.
Simon H. Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton, who lectures on international relations.